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1 Introduction 
Over time, we have gradually become more and more dependent on computerized systems 
of various kinds. Infrastructure like mobile phones, Internet, e-mail, online bank services 
etc. are important elements in our everyday life. In many cases we cannot imagine how to 
manage without them. As the systems increase in complexity, the number of security risks 
is most likely to rise. Security incidents occur on a daily basis within most companies, and 
the systems we surround us with are vulnerable to attacks [95]. In CSI/FBI Computer 
Crime and Security Survey for 2005 [35] 74% of the companies reported security 
incidents. The worst security breaches within UK companies are estimated to cost about 
90.000£ (§133.000€), and the companies experience about 19 incidents of that kind per 
year [128]. Virus attacks are the major source of the largest financial losses, with 
unauthorized access on second place [35]. Security incidents may have critical effects also 
for systems traditionally not associated with security breaches. In 2003 the Davis-Besse 
nuclear plant (Ohio, US) was hit by the SQL Slammer worm. The worm disabled crucial 
control systems for about five hours. Fortunately, the systems had analogue backups that 
remained unaffected. The so-called “northeastern blackout” in 2003 was a failure in the 
electrical power grid that left 50 million people in North America without power [127]. 
The incident affected transportation, communication, industry, water supply etc., and it 
took several days to restore everything back to normal operation. The failure was not 
caused by any form of malicious attack, but a contributing factor to the incident was a 
software bug. 
The request for safe, secure and reliable systems have lead to a demand for good security 
risk analysis methods. The methods must handle detailed analyses of technical aspects, as 
well as more high-level enterprise level analyses. This means that the methods must be 
general, but not too general in order to provide sufficiently support to the analysis process. 
Many security risk analysis techniques include people familiar with the target of analysis 
as participants, under the guidance of an analysis leader. A well designed security risk 
analysis method should support the analysis process by facilitating communication, 
interaction and understanding between these participants. Security risk analysis is often 
considered to be complicated and time-consuming. The participants in a security risk 
analysis often have to deal with complex systems and advanced technology. In many cases 
the only visible part of the system analyzed is its interfaces and effects, while the internal 
structure is hidden. Consequently, the participants may experience difficulties in 
understanding and analyzing the system with respect to security risks. This makes room for 
errors and misunderstandings which may hamper the analysis process. Another important 
challenge of security risk analysis methods is how to facilitate the involvement of people 
with different backgrounds and competences. People who uses or maintain the system on a 
daily basis posses vital knowledge about how the system is actually used, not only how it 
is intended to be used. Combining this type of information with the knowledge of the 
system designers, developers and owners is believed to benefit the security risk analysis 
results. The challenge is then to facilitate communication and collaboration between these 
different groups of people when they meet in the security risk analysis setting. In this thesis 
both “security risk analysis” and its abbreviation “security analysis” will be used. 
1.1 Our Work  
Our work has been to develop a graphical approach to threat and risk modeling that 
supports the security analysis process. There exists no such thing as the correct 
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representation of threats, vulnerabilities, risks etc. since this highly depends on the 
situation at hand, but it makes sense to look for the preferable representation with respect 
to a specific security analysis approach. In this work we target security analyses that use 
brainstorming sessions to identify and analyze security risks. These analyses are 
characterized by their involvement of people with thorough knowledge of the target of the 
analysis, like users, designers, developers and decision makers.  
Our graphical approach to security risk modeling contributes to solving three issues related 
to security analysis. The first is how to facilitate communication in a group consisting of 
people with different backgrounds and competences? Our aim has been to provide the 
participants with a mean for communication that covers both technical and more high-level 
information, without being too complicated to understand. Offering a common 
communication basis will hopefully reduce misunderstandings and thereby give a more 
correct risk picture. 
Second, how to estimate the likelihood and consequences of the risks? The existence of 
reliable data on which this can be based on is unlikely. The participants must use their 
expert knowledge, experience and familiarity with the domain to estimate both the 
likelihood and the consequences of incidents that might never happened to this day. The 
estimation process may easily become complex and difficult to follow, particularly when 
the number of risks is high. Our aim has been to offer a structured, graphical risk picture to 
make the complexity more manageable. A graphical representation may illustrate who or 
what caused the incidents and the weaknesses in the system that made them possible. 
Third, how to document the security analysis in a comprehensible manner? The findings of 
a security analysis constitute vital information not only to the participants in the analysis, 
but to the organization as a whole. The results need to be documented in a way that is 
understandable even for those not involved directly in the analysis. Our aim has been to 
define a documentation method that should be more or less “self-explaining” and not rely 
on extensive training to be understood. 
We believe our approach to security risk modeling will contribute towards making the 
above challenges more manageable. We have aimed to make a language that is easily 
understandable, even for people without training in modeling or security analysis.  
1.2 The Contribution of the Thesis 
The main contributions of this thesis are a set of new artifacts and the results from 
evaluating the new artifacts. First we summarize the artifacts, then the evaluation results: 
1.2.1 New Artifacts 
A) A conceptual foundation for security risk analysis: 
We have specified main security risk analysis concepts and their relationships in a 
conceptual model. The conceptual foundation originates from the CORAS method and is 
based on international standards within security and risk analysis. A conceptual foundation 
may help to reduce misunderstandings with respect to interpretation of terminology. It may 
also contribute to a consistent use of terms both in the security analysis process and in 
security risk analysis modeling.  
Described in: Chapter 6 – Language Requirements Defined within a Quality Framework.
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B) A framework for evaluating the quality of security risk modeling languages:  
To assess the quality of security risk modeling languages we have constructed a quality 
evaluation framework. The framework covers both practical modeling tasks as well as the 
more theoretically parts of a language like domain appropriateness and comprehensibility 
appropriateness. The framework consists of two main parts: (1) a detailed description of 
core security risk scenarios that a security risk modeling language should be able to 
express used as a “benchmarking test”, and (2) a set of quality requirements based on an 
extended version of SEQUAL (quality framework for modeling languages). The 
framework has been designed with two goals; first to capture the rationale for our 
analytical evaluation. Second the framework makes it possible to compare the quality of 
different security risk modeling languages. 
Described in: Chapter 5 – Initial Investigations.
C) A language for security risk modeling:  
We present in our work a security risk modeling language that through its customized 
diagram types supports the entire security analysis process. Since it accompanies the 
CORAS method for security analysis it will in this thesis be referred to as the CORAS 
security risk modeling language (abbreviated to the CORAS language). The CORAS 
language has five diagram types: (1) asset diagram, (2) threat diagram, (3) risk diagram, 
(4) treatment diagram, and (5) treatment overview diagram. The asset diagram is used 
initially in the analysis to support asset identification, valuation and specification of risk 
acceptance levels. The threat diagram is the most central diagram type in the language. 
First, it is used in risk identification to support specification of threats, vulnerabilities, 
threat scenarios and unwanted incidents. Then, during risk estimation the threat diagram 
forms the basis for estimating likelihood and consequences of the different unwanted 
incidents. Finally, the threat diagram is the starting point for the treatment identification 
where treatments are added to the diagram. The risk diagram supports risk evaluation by 
specifying the risks and including which are acceptable and which are not. The treatment 
overview diagram is based on the treatment diagram and gives an overview of non-
acceptable risks and the suggested treatments. This can be seen as a plan for mitigating the 
risks, and is suitable for presentation purposes. The CORAS language is not restricted to 
security analyses of information systems. We show this in Appendix F by using an early 
version of the language in an analysis of security-, legal- and trust issues related to 
collaborative engineering in virtual organizations within the aerospace industry. 
Described in: Chapter 8 – The CORAS Security Risk Modeling Language and Guideline, 
Examples of use in: Appendix H – Quality Evaluation of the CORAS Language, Appendix 
C – A Graphical Approach to Risk Modeling, Motivated by Empirical Investigations, 
Appendix E – Model-based Security Analysis in Seven Steps – a Guided Tour to the 
CORAS Method and Appendix F – Assessing Enterprise Risk Level: The CORAS 
Approach.
D) A structured semantics for the security risk modeling language:  
To ensure that the semantics of the CORAS security risk modeling language is understood 
in the same manner by everyone reading them, we have developed a textual syntax that 
maps from the graphical syntax to precise English. The mapping is based on the Backus–
Naur form notation (EBNF) [81], and may also be seen as the first step towards a formal 
semantics. 
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Described in: Chapter 8 – The CORAS Security Risk Modeling Language and Guideline 
(summary), Appendix D – Structured Semantics for the CORAS Security Risk Modeling 
Language.
E) A guideline for the use of the security risk modeling language:
The full potential of a graphical security risk modeling language cannot be reached without 
providing a comprehensive guideline for how to use it. The guideline describes in detail 
how to create the different diagrams for each step during the security analysis process. In 
addition to realistic examples, it also provides guidance on how to conduct the analysis and 
what target descriptions that may be used. In Appendix E we provide a thorough, example 
driven introduction to a complete security analysis using the CORAS security modeling 
language, especially targeting practitioners. Appendix C contains a shorter example.  
Described in: Chapter 8 – The CORAS Security Risk Modeling Language and Guideline, 
Appendix C – A Graphical Approach to Risk Modeling, Motivated by Empirical 
Investigations (short version) and Appendix E – Model-based Security Analysis in Seven 
Steps – a Guided Tour to the CORAS Method (targeting practitioners).
1.2.2 Results in the Form of Evaluations 
We present two types of evaluations: investigations made during development to improve 
the artifacts, and evaluations of artifacts in their final form.  
F) Empirical support for the conceptual foundation: 
The conceptual foundation was revised on basis of the results from two empirical 
investigations with focus on ease of understanding. We first explored how risk analysis and 
security analysis concepts are understood based on their existence in every day language. 
The findings made us aware of particular difficult concepts that were considered when 
redesigning the conceptual foundation. In the second investigation we decided to use 
subjects with highly relevant backgrounds and competences, similar to potential users of a 
security risk modeling language. One of the most interesting findings was the discovery of 
the same pattern of difficult and easy concepts/relations as in the first study. This means 
that security risk analysis employs a conceptual foundation that may cause 
misunderstandings and confusion, even for highly skilled people. 
Described in: Chapter 5 – Initial Investigations (summary), Appendix A – Empirical 
Investigations of the CORAS Language for Structured Brainstorming and Appendix B – 
Risk Analysis Terminology for IT systems: Does it match Intuition?.
G) Results from applying the quality framework:  
We have applied the quality framework twice, first to evaluate the original UML profile 
[111, 112, 124], then to evaluate the new CORAS security risk modeling language. The 
results include complete modeling efforts of the core security risk scenarios and analytical 
evaluations according to the SEQUAL-based quality requirement framework. The results 
make it possible to compare the quality of the two security risk modeling languages.  
Described in: Chapter 7 – Evaluation of the UML Profile (summary, for full details we 
refer to [57]), Chapter 9 – Evaluation of the CORAS Language and Guideline, Appendix H 
– Quality Evaluation of the CORAS Language.
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H) Results from applying the language: 
The CORAS security risk modeling language has from 2004 to 2006 been tested, evaluated 
and refined in six major industrial field trials. The security analyses have been conducted 
as part of the research project SECURIS (www.sintef.no/securis) which aims to investigate 
and improve the CORAS method by applying it in real security analyses. Each analysis 
required about 250 person hours from the analysis team and 50-100 hours from the client. 
The representatives of the client argued that the graphical language made it easier to 
actively involve the participants in the analysis and helped ensuring an effective 
communication between the analysis team and the participants. They also found the 
notation itself easy to understand and remember. It was considered to be a good way of 
visualizing threat scenarios and very suitable for presentations. According to one of the 
participants this type of visualization emphasizes the “message” or the purpose of the 
analysis. 
Described in: Chapter 9 – Evaluation of the CORAS language (field trials).
I) Empirical support for the use of visualization mechanisms:  
It is well known that using visualization techniques correctly can improve a graphical 
representation. Information visualization techniques include among other the use of size, 
shape and color to make information more accessible to the reader. The study reported in 
Appendix A convinced us to use special risk-related symbols in our language since this 
improved the subjects’ ability to complete tasks. The background for the investigation was 
related studies which claimed that graphical symbols in modeling languages make the 
diagrams more understandable. We compared basic UML icons with special risk related 
symbols. The results showed that one may further improve a UML based language by 
replacing the standard UML symbols with more specialized symbols that reflects the 
domain it is used for. An interesting finding in the second study (Appendix G) of graphical 
mechanisms was that people prefer textual information labels rather than just visual means 
like size, color and shape. We let a group of professionals within system and software 
engineering make the final design decision with respect to how the diagrams should look 
like. The results indicate that if using visual means like shape, size or color to convey 
meaning in diagrams they must be accompanied with an explanatory textual information 
label.
Described in: Chapter 9 – Evaluation of the CORAS Language and Guideline (language 
design decisions), Appendix A – Empirical Investigations of the CORAS Language for 
Structured Brainstorming, Appendix G – Investigating Preferences in Graphical Risk 
Modeling.
J) Results from applying the guideline: 
The most complete example of using the guidelines is in the quality evaluation of the 
CORAS language, where it is used when modeling the core security risk scenarios 
(Appendix H). The description of the scenarios is provided as text only with no guiding or 
restrictions on to how it should be modeled. A smaller example is given in Appendix C.
Since the guideline has been developed iteratively and improved for each of the SECURIS 
field trials, every field trial analysis report contains the results from a full application of the 
guideline, however these reports are confidential.
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Described in: Appendix H – Quality Evaluation of the CORAS Language, Appendix C – A 
Graphical Approach to Risk Modeling, Motivated by Empirical Investigations (smaller 
example).
1.3 The Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of the following chapters and appendices: 
Chapter 1 – Introduction: this chapter provides an introduction to the research domain, the 
thesis contribution and the structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 – Problem Area: this chapter introduces the main problems within our area of 
research, focusing on specification, documentation and communication of security risks. 
This is also where our success criteria are specified. 
Chapter 3 – State of the Art: this chapter introduces the state of the art within security 
analysis methods and standards, graphical modeling techniques and information 
visualization mechanisms.  
Chapter 4 – Research Method: this chapter describes the research methods we have used. 
Chapter 5 – Initial Investigations: this chapter contains the finding from the initial 
empirical investigations made of security risk analysis terminology and the symbols in the 
previous version of the CORAS language. This is based on III and IV in page iii, and a full 
version can be found in Appendices B and C.
Chapter 6 – Language Requirements defined within a Quality Framework: this chapter 
gives the detailed requirements to an ideal security risk modeling language inspired by 
quality requirements for modeling languages within system development and also based on 
experiences from real security analyses in field trials. 
Chapter 7 – Evaluation of the UML profile: this chapter presents a summary of the quality 
evaluation of the UML profile which was the starting point for our work on a graphical 
security risk modeling language. A full version can be found in [57]. 
Chapter 8 – The CORAS Security Risk Modeling Language and Guideline: this chapter 
presents the syntax and semantics of the language, including a detailed example driven 
modeling guideline. This is particularly based on II, IV and V, and the full versions can be 
found in Appendices C, E, and F.
Chapter 9 – Evaluation of the CORAS Language and the Guideline: this chapter 
summarizes the evaluations of the CORAS language using questionnaires, in field trials 
and applying the quality framework. 
Chapter 10 – Discussion: the final chapter discusses our contribution with respect to the 
success criteria from Chapter 2.
References, Table of Figures and List of Tables.
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Appendix A – Empirical Investigations of the CORAS Language for Structured 
Brainstorming. This is an initial exploration of the understanding of risk analysis concepts. 
It also includes the experiment with special graphical symbols versus traditional UML 
symbols. Corresponding to I in page iii. 
Appendix B – Risk Analysis Terminology for IT systems: Does it match intuition? This 
technical report presents the investigation of the understanding of the revised conceptual 
foundation. Paper II in page iii corresponds to this report. 
Appendix C – A Graphical Approach to Risk Modeling, Motivated by Empirical 
Investigations. This paper provides an introduction to the complete CORAS language, 
including the conceptual foundation and the guideline. Corresponds to III in page iii. 
Appendix D – Structured Semantics for the CORAS Security Risk Modelling Language.
This technical report defines the structured semantics for the CORAS language. 
Corresponds to IV in page iii.
Appendix E – Model-based Security Analysis in Seven Steps – a Guided Tour to The 
CORAS Method. An example of a complete security analysis, including modeling 
guidelines for the CORAS language. Corresponds to V in page iii. 
Appendix F – Assessing Enterprise Risk Level: The CORAS Approach. An example of a 
full security analysis, using the previous version of the CORAS symbols. Corresponds to 
VI in page iii. 
Appendix G – Investigating Preferences in Graphical Risk Modeling. Reports the design 
decisions based on the findings from the experiment. Corresponds to VII in page iii. 
Appendix H – Quality Evaluation of the CORAS language: contains the evaluation of the 
CORAS language with respect to its ability to model a set of core security risk scenarios 
and fulfillment of language quality requirements. 
1.4 How to Read the Thesis 
According to which artifact you are interested in, we recommend four alternative strategies 
for reading the thesis: 
A) The development of the conceptual foundation is described in Chapter 1, 2, 4, 5, 9 and
10.
B) If you are mainly interested in the CORAS language itself, you should read Chapter 1,
2, 4, 8, 9 and 10 since they take you through the most essential chapters.
C) For a description of the development of the modeling guideline, including the guideline 
itself you should read the same chapter as for strategy B. 
D) If you like to explore the quality evaluation framework for security risk modeling 
languages, we recommend Chapter 6. The development strategy is described in Chapter 4
and examples of how we have applied it are found in Chapter 7 (a summary, for full details 
we refer to [57]) and in Chapter 9 (full details in Appendix H).
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In the figure below, we have illustrated the different strategies for reading the thesis using 
the letters A, B, C and D. The gray color indicates chapters that are recommended for all 
strategies.
Figure 1 – Reading guide 
To avoid confusion while reading, it is important to remember the difference between the 
UML profile and the CORAS language: 
The UML profile Refers to the UML Profile for Modeling Quality of Service and Fault 
Tolerance Characteristics and Mechanisms [124] that was developed 
as part of the CORAS project (2000-2003). The language is based on 
the use case notation from the Unified Modeling Language (UML).
The CORAS 
language
Refers to the language presented in Chapter 8 developed as part of this 
thesis. The language does not conform to UML, but is inspired of the 
UML profile and therefore have similarities with the UML use case 
notation.
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2 Problem Area 
In this chapter, we first introduce the problem area, and then we formulate and motivate a 
list of success criteria for the work presented in this thesis. 
2.1 Introduction 
We all take actions to avoid security risks in our daily life. It may be as simple as locking 
the office door when leaving for the day, protecting the laptop with a password or avoiding 
insecure web browsers when accessing the net bank. For your home computer, it is quite 
manageable to enforce good security routines like updating the virus protection, activating 
the firewall and keeping updated on relevant security patches. The situation becomes more 
complex if the system is a major information system, providing business critical 
information through several interfaces to a large user base. To ensure a sufficient level of 
security for such a system, there is need for a thorough security risk analysis method.  
The security field is rapidly changing and it can be challenging, if not impossible for a 
single person to keep updated on all relevant security issues for a complex system. This is 
why a full-scale security risk analysis is typically conducted by a group of people with 
competence on different areas, for example experts in security technology, system experts, 
users and decision makers. The idea is that a group of people with different competences 
will view the system from different perspectives, and therefore identify more and possibly 
other risks than a more heterogeneous group. When we in the following speak of security 
risk analysis, we refer to this kind of analysis. It is typically used in cases where security is 
crucial to an organization, either in their daily business or with respect to the product or 
service they deliver. The analysis may take hundreds of hours and is consequently an 
expensive operation. Any means that may contribute to reduced costs, without sacrificing 
the quality of the security risk analysis results, are more than welcome. 
A security risk analysis (or just security analysis) may consist of several "structured 
brainstorming" sessions. Brainstorming is often associated with a creative process of 
coming up with new ideas to solve a problem. A structured brainstorming is a methodical 
and step-wise "walk-through" of the target of analysis, particularly useful for identifying 
potential security risks and estimating likelihoods and consequences of these risks. The 
brainstorming session may be structured according to special security aspects, the physical 
organization of the system, the work processes or similar. In brainstorming sessions within 
security analyses, the participants are asked to put forward as many threats, vulnerabilities 
and risks as they may think of within the context of the analysis. These are in turn assessed 
to find the best way to deal with them. Structured brainstorming may be used to assess 
systems of various size and complexity, including organizational procedures or routines in 
which the system is used. This does not mean that the same brainstorming approach is 
applied directly to all types of systems; some adaptation is needed to fit the particular 
domain.  
2.2 The Need for a Special Purpose Language 
A security analysis based on structured brainstorming is a team effort that involves a group 
of people that must communicate and cooperate with each other. The topics discussed may 
be complex and difficult. A common method for explaining complicated problems is to 
draw sketches or illustrations on a blackboard. For instance, in software engineering 
graphical models are often used to ease the explanation of complex systems (e.g. [105]). 
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The effectiveness of such drawings depends however on the artistic skills of the modeler, 
the group members’ individual interpretations of the drawings and other factors. The 
potential sources of misunderstandings regarding a drawing are therefore numerous. To 
reduce this weakness and increase the comprehension and preciseness of security analysis 
documentation, we see the need for a well-defined and easily understandable graphical 
notation for documenting security relevant scenarios. Moreover, this notation (or language) 
must be supported by a carefully designed modeling guideline, which connects the 
language to the security analysis method. In the remaining of this chapter, we refer to this 
language and its guideline as the "security risk modeling approach".
Documentation from one step in a security analysis typically provides input to the next 
step. The security risk modeling approach should also follow this structure. This implies 
that the different steps in the analysis should be documented using customized diagram 
types. The diagrams should build on each other like the steps in the security analysis 
process, meaning that it should be possible to extend the diagrams from one step with more 
information in the next step. Since the brainstorming session is an interactive process, it 
must be possible to modify and update diagrams "on-the-fly". This may be very 
challenging for the modeler, since it is carried out while the participants are watching. 
Nevertheless, it gives the participants an opportunity to instantly validate and correct the 
diagrams, possibly providing additional information, which in turn gives a representation 
that is as complete, and correct as possible.  
Threat scenario identification and risk estimation require particular support. Threat 
scenarios describe all the different ways a risk may occur, something that can be complex 
and difficult to follow (illustrated in Figure 2).
Figure 2 – Risks and threat scenarios 
Risk estimation is concerned with determining the likelihoods and the consequences of 
risks. The likelihood of a risk is based upon the combined likelihood of all threat scenarios 
leading up to the risk. In theory, this may seem unproblematic, but practice has shown that 
reliable data to base estimates upon hardly exists. Sometimes statistical material can be 
used as a starting point or a suggestion, but someone familiar with the target of analysis 
and the domain must always judge its relevance. Quite often, the participants are unable to 
estimate the likelihood of a threat scenario, and consequently the likelihood of the risk, in 
terms of an exact numeric value. A solution may be to use intervals, where the participants 
only judge in which interval category a likelihood belongs to. This implies that a suitable 
modeling approach must support likelihood estimation on the basis of interval values, as 
well as exact, numeric values if they exist. 
Security analysis documentation should serve multiple purposes, for example as 
highlighted in [6, 131]. As already explained, it should support specification of 
intermediate findings at the various methodological steps. The documentation should also 
show that the security analysis process has been conducted properly, and provide evidence 
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of a systematic approach to risk identification and analysis. This may be required in the 
case of certification according to quality standards like ISO9001 [71] or BS7799-2 [26]. 
The documentation represents a record of security issues that can be shared with the rest of 
the organization and thereby extend the organization’s knowledge base to become more 
robust against security threats. Furthermore, often the results from a security analysis 
should be presented to the management, board of directors or other parties that have not 
been involved directly in the analysis. The documentation should ideally provide them 
with a risk management plan, showing the risks, the main vulnerabilities and how they 
should be mitigated. This highlights of course the importance of having documentation in a 
form that requires only a minimum of explanation to understand.
Traditional risk analysis documentation has mainly focused on tables and text. This may 
require the reader to go through an extensive amount of documentation in order to 
comprehend the security analysis findings. Getting an overview of the findings may be 
especially challenging for people who only participate in parts of the analysis. Text and 
tables do not provide sufficient support to the participants during the analysis, since it 
requires careful attention to everything that is written. When a table grows it may become 
difficult to keep record of all relevant information and the participants may easily loose 
track of what has been documented. A graphical documentation approach may provide an 
overview of the complete risk picture in a more compact and space effective manner than 
text and tables, which is especially suitable for use in group work. Well established 
modeling techniques within risk analysis (e.g. fault trees [66] and event trees [64]) are 
more commonly used for calculating probabilities, than describing the overall risk picture. 
A new modeling approach must relate to these existing modeling techniques, by either 
using them as complementary modeling techniques or being able to express the same 
information. In fact, it may be said that the new modeling approach is an effort to better 
integrate existing notations. We do not argue for a complete replacement of text, tables and 
existing notations with something new, but rather build on existing techniques to bring 
security risk analysis documentation one step further. The intention is to combine 
traditional risk documentation techniques with state-of-the-art modeling techniques, to 
support the entire security analysis process. 
2.3 Problem Characterization 
Above we provided an overview of the overall problem area. In the following, we narrow 
this down to four main "work packages" addressed by this thesis. For each of them we 
formulate a set of criteria, providing a characterization of what it means to successfully 
complete the work package. 
2.3.1 A Common Basis for Security Analysis Terminology 
As mentioned previously, the participants in a structured brainstorming may have very 
different backgrounds and competences. The authors of [131] recommend these roles to be 
represented when assessing IT systems: (1) user or intended user of the system assessed, 
(2) experts on relevant aspects of the system and (3) system designer. There must also be a 
person responsible for facilitating the process (analysis leader), and a secretary whose 
responsibility is to document the findings. To ensure an effective analysis process, the 
participants must quickly become familiar with the security analysis terminology. This 
means that the terminology should be as easy to understand as possible. Moreover, this 
terminology must be reflected in the security risk modeling approach. There are several 
international standards relevant to risk- and security analysis (see Chapter 3). However, 
these standards have often been made for specific purposes by different standardization 
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organizations, and may not focus on the same aspects. To help achieving a consistent and 
clear terminology for use in security analysis, there is a need for a conceptual foundation of 
security risk related terms, building on the most relevant of these standards. An important 
prerequisite for the usefulness of such a conceptual foundation is that the definitions are as 
close as possible to how the concepts are interpreted in everyday language. At the same 
time, the definitions should not directly conflict with relevant standards. This will facilitate 
integration with other security analysis methods and avoid misunderstandings among the 
users. A conceptual foundation defined as a list of definitions is not sufficient. There 
should also be a description of how the various concepts relate to each other. A concept 
may have relations to several other concepts, and this must be expressed in a simple 
manner, preferably illustrated graphically. This motivates the following success criterion: 
1. The work of this thesis should include a conceptual foundation for security 
analysis, that: 
a. specifies the main security analysis concepts and their relationships 
b. uses a terminology that is easy to understand 
c. uses a terminology that is in accordance with international standards 
d. is described in a simple and understandable manner 
e. provides a solid, underlying basis for a security risk modeling approach 
2.3.2 A Language for Specifying and Documenting Security Analysis 
Findings
The need for a customized security risk modeling approach that includes both a 
language/notation and a set of modeling instructions has already been highlighted. The 
language should have a well-defined syntax that specifies its components and rules for how 
they may be combined in diagrams. This will ease the learning, since the models will build 
on a known set of rules that is recognizable for the reader, even if the actual information 
modeled in the diagram is unknown. The syntax should make use of best practice within 
information visualization to help illustrating particular important parts of the security 
analysis findings. This means that mechanisms like size or color may be used to convey 
specific meanings in the models. The language should also be designed in interaction with 
real users to include their preferences, and to ensure that it fulfils their needs. Well-known 
risk modeling notations should be considered for inclusion in the language. If this is 
impractical, one should try to include their underlying ideas even though they will be 
expressed with a different syntax. The language also needs a precise semantics that defines 
how the diagrams should be understood. The semantics should be structured in the sense 
that the meaning of an arbitrary, syntactically correct diagram can be generated 
schematically. Moreover, to make the semantics accessible for regular users of the 
language we would like the generated meaning of a diagram to be expressed in English. 
The structured semantics will help ensuring that all readers understand the models in the 
same manner. This motivates the following success criterion: 
2. The work of this thesis should specify a language for describing security risks, that: 
a. is suitable for use in structured brainstorming sessions  
b. is easily understandable for the participants in the brainstorming, including 
those who receive the analysis results afterwards 
c. has a precise syntax, meaning its design should be based on: 
i. best practice within information visualization 
ii. experiences with realistic security risk scenarios 
iii. users’ preferences 
iv. existing risk modeling techniques 
d. has a structured semantics that translates arbitrary diagrams into English 
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e. supports and documents the different steps in the security analysis process 
2.3.3 Modeling Instructions for the User 
To utilize a language to its full potential, the person who uses it (typically the one who is 
responsible for documenting the analysis) must be provided with instructions for how it 
should be used. This is not only valuable to the modeler, but also important for the quality 
of the models. A set of instructions for how to model, may help achieving models that are 
more complete and consequently the analysis will be better documented. The instructions 
should be in the form of a guideline, which in addition to rich and detailed modeling 
instructions also provides realistic modeling examples from real security analysis 
situations. The guideline should first of all address inexperienced modelers and those 
unfamiliar with security analysis. To give this group as much support as possible, the 
guideline should if possible include recommendations from practical use of the modeling 
approach. Since the modeling tasks are tightly coupled to the analysis process, the 
guideline should follow the same structure, with relevant guidance for each step. This 
motivates the following success criterion: 
3. This thesis work should provide a modeling guideline for the modeler, that: 
a. is rich and detailed with realistic examples 
b. addresses non-experienced modelers 
c. has recommendations based on user experiences 
d. follows the security analysis process step by step 
2.3.4 A Way of Evaluating the Quality of Security Risk Modeling 
Approaches  
When developing this security risk modeling approach, the requirements should be 
properly defined, similarly to a requirement specification for e.g. a software product. The 
degree of fulfillment of this specification can then be used as a measure of the quality of 
the modeling approach. A considerably portion of these requirements will however be of a 
general character and can therefore be seen as a quality assessment framework for any 
security risk modeling approach. People who need to judge the quality of, or compare, 
different security risk modeling approaches, may use this framework. There exist 
frameworks for comparing security analysis methods [158] and for evaluating the quality 
of modeling languages in general (Sect. 6.2), but to our knowledge there are none for 
evaluating the quality of security risk modeling approaches. Such a quality evaluation 
framework should cover model quality in general, and aspects that are specific to security 
risk analysis. Examples of the latter are the strong relationship between the different steps 
in the analysis process and the modeling approach, the special terminology, and the focus 
on structured brainstorming. The framework should also have a modeling test case that 
may be used as a "benchmarking test" to evaluate the approach’s ability to model typical 
and realistic security risk scenarios. This motivates the following success criterion: 
4. This thesis work should provide a framework for evaluating the quality of security 
risk modeling approaches, that:  
a. covers quality requirements related to modeling languages in general 
b. includes quality requirements special to security risk analysis 
c. includes a modeling test case representing core security risk scenarios 
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3  State of the Art 
This state of the art is divided into 6 sub sections: (1) risk management, (2) security risk 
analysis methods, (3) standards relevant to security- and risk analysis, (4) risk- and system 
analysis techniques, (5) risk documentation techniques and (6) information visualization 
techniques.
3.1 Risk Management 
Domains like finance, safety/reliability, and security all use the term risk. Even though our 
work addresses security risk analysis, it will cover aspects of the safety/reliability domain 
since we use or build on their methods, terminology and more. When speaking of 
approaches, methods or techniques that do not belong to a particular domain we will use 
the terms risk analysis, risk analysis technique etc. If the focus is particularly on security, 
we will use "security risk analysis" or just "security analysis". Financial risk analysis will 
not be covered by this thesis. 
It may be difficult for the reader to clearly understand the differences between risk 
management, risk analysis, risk analysis techniques etc. The problem lies in the lack of 
precise definitions. Something presented as a method in one context may be regarded a 
framework, methodology or technique in another. To make this easier we will use the 
following distinctions and classifications in this state of the art (framework and 
methodology fall within method): 
x Risk management is the culture, processes and structures that are directed towards 
realizing potential opportunities whilst managing adverse effects [6]. In practice, this 
means the use of one or more methods to identify and evaluate new risks, and also 
monitor, review, and communicate information about existing risks.  
x Risk analysis method/security risk analysis method refers to a method used in the 
systematic process of understanding the nature of and deducing the level of risk [6]. In 
practice, this refers to the overall assessment of a system, or part of a system, that 
includes risk identification and evaluation, and also suggestions for risk mitigation. 
This kind of method often makes use of one or more risk analysis techniques. 
x Risk analysis technique/security analysis technique refers in this thesis to analysis 
techniques that may be used in various parts of a risk analysis method. These 
techniques are typically used to e.g. estimate the likelihood of risks, analyze potential 
outcomes of a risk, look for particular vulnerabilities, and more. 
The domain, objective and the level of detail of an analysis influences which approach for 
managing and controlling risks that is appropriate to use. Often it is necessary to tailor a 
risk management approach or strategy to meet specific usage requirements. The two main 
strategies within risk management are asset-based and threat- and vulnerability-based risk 
management [133]. The asset-based risk management focuses on identifying the valuable 
aspects of the system (assets), and then assesses how they may be protected from threats 
and risks. Asset-based risk management typically involves so-called bottom-up risk 
analysis techniques like FMEA/FMECA (Failure Mode Effect Analysis / Failure Mode 
Effect and Criticality Analysis) (Sect. 3.4.2) and HazOp (Hazard and Operability) analysis 
(Sect. 3.4.3). Threat- and vulnerability-based risk management aims to identify the threats 
and vulnerabilities of a system first, and then look at the risk they pose in a top-down 
manner. An example of a threat and vulnerability-based risk analysis technique is SWOT 
(Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) which helps identifying the general 
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areas of concern regarding a system (Sect. 3.4.1).The two categories of risk management 
have their strengths and weaknesses and the optimal solution is probably to use a 
combination of them. Often a top-down threat and vulnerability assessment is conducted 
initially to establish the scope of the analysis and characterize the overall risk picture. Then 
a more detailed bottom-up approach can be used to identify assets and their risks, using the 
findings from the top-down approach.
3.2 Security Risk Analysis Methods 
In this section we first present the starting point of our work, the CORAS security analysis 
method (3.2.1), and then other relevant security analysis methods. We survey the main 
differences and similarities between these methods and CORAS, and summarize this in the 
end of the section. One important common factor for these methods is that they employ 
some form of structured brainstorming in the identification, estimation, evaluation or 
treatment of risks.  
3.2.1 The CORAS Security Analysis Method 
The security analysis method CORAS (http://coras.sourceforge.net) was developed in the 
EU-funded CORAS project (IST-2000-25031) from 1999 to 2003. The project had eleven 
partners representing the United Kingdom, Greece, Germany and Norway. One of the aims 
of the project was to gather well-known risk analysis techniques into an integrated security 
risk analysis method called the CORAS security analysis method. The method should 
make it easier to apply several risk analysis techniques in an integrated manner with 
particular focus on security risks analysis.
The CORAS method employs several international standards [7, 65, 66, 76, 82, 86] and the 
process follows the Australian / New Zealand Standard for Risk Management [7] (Sect. 
3.3.1). This CORAS method has five main phases: (1) establish context, (2) identify risks, 
(3) analyze risks, (4) evaluate risks and (5) treat risks. Each phase has different purposes 
and produces different types of documentation. Structured brainstorming is used in risk 
identification, risk estimation and in the risk treatment phases. 
Another major result from the CORAS project was the graphical security risk modeling 
language based on UML, the UML profile (Sect. 3.5.1). In addition to the methodological 
approach and the graphical language, the CORAS project resulted in a library of reusable 
experience packages, a computerized integration tool, an XML mark-up for exchange of 
risk assessment data and a vulnerability assessment report format (Figure 3), but these are 
not relevant to this thesis work. The work with the CORAS method has been continued 
within the research project SECURIS (NFR 152839/220) which runs from 2003 to 2007. 
One of the main objectives of SECURIS is to improve the security analysis method by 
applying it in industrial field trials.
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Figure 3 – Results from the CORAS project 
3.2.2 OCTAVE 
OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation) [3] is a risk-
based strategic assessment and planning technique for security. OCTAVE is conducted in 
three phases: (1) identify critical assets and the threats to those assets, (2) identify the 
vulnerabilities that expose the assets to threats, and (3) develop an appropriate treatment 
strategy (Figure 4).  
Figure 4 – The OCTAVE process 
Phase 1 normally involves two workshops, the first with senior management to define the 
scope of the analysis, and the second with staff that have a more technical expertise on the 
target of analysis. The workshops may have a form of a structured brainstorming where 
people with different competences and backgrounds participate. The intermediate findings 
are documented in tables and form the basis for developing asset-based threat profiles 
using a simple graphical tree-structure (described in Sect. 3.4.8). The approach in 
OCTAVE is quite similar to the one used in CORAS. 
3.2.3 CRAMM 
CRAMM (CCTA Risk analysis and Management Method), is the UK Government's Risk 
Analysis and Management Method [8]. It is owned by the UK government’s Security 
Service, but managed by Siemens/Insight (http://www.cramm.com). In CRAMM, risk 
analysis is identification and assessment of security risks while risk management is 
concerned with identifying appropriate countermeasures, or treatments for those risks. In 
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our work the term security analysis covers the complete process from risk identification to 
treatment identification. Risk management according to CRAMM includes three phases: 
(1) asset identification and valuation (including dependencies between assets), (2) threat 
and vulnerability identification and (3) treatment (countermeasure) identification (Figure 
5). The information is gathered through interviewing the owners of the assets, the users of 
the system, the technical support staff, and the security manager. In this manner, CRAMM 
is more like a review of the security of a product, conducted during system development or 
for an already running system.  
Assets Threats Vullnerabilities
Risks
Countermeasures
Implementation
Audit
Analysis
Management
Figure 5 – The CRAMM process 
The documentation produced during a CRAMM review uses a standardized CRAMM 
format, mostly in the form of specialized tables. CRAMM may help an organization to 
achieve compliance with ISO17799 [82], and the outcome is compliant with the mandatory 
documentation needed to achieve ISO27001 certification (BS7799-2) [26, 75]. The 
concepts and activities in CRAMM were a source of inspiration in the CORAS project. 
3.2.4 Facilitated Risk Assessment Process 
Peltier Associates (http://www.peltierassociates.com) develops the Facilitated Risk 
Assessment Process (FRAP). A risk assessment according to FRAP focuses on security 
aspects of systems or business processes. The assessment team consists of representatives 
with competence on technical aspects, as well as business- and management aspects. The 
FRAP has focus on threats, vulnerabilities and consequences towards data integrity, 
confidentiality and availability. A FRAP consists of the following three phases: 
x Pre-FRAP meeting: the objective of this meeting is to decide on the system 
description and scope of the assessment, as well as assembling an assessment team.  
x The FRAP session: this phase consists of three activities; first one decides the roles 
each participant will have in the brainstorming session, reviews and agrees on the 
definitions and scope of the risk assessment. Second, one conducts the actual 
brainstorming to identify potential risks within the scope of the assessment, and third 
one prioritizes the identified risks according to how vulnerable the system is, and what 
impact the risks may have. When the risks are sufficiently specified, the participants 
may also suggest possible controls or treatments for the risks.  
x The post-FRAP meeting(s): these meetings aim to further analyze the information 
gathered at the FRAP session. The outcome is an overview of risks and how they 
should be mitigated by existing or new controls (treatments). The final report contains 
a complete documentation of the process, including an action plan for the 
recommended treatments. 
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3.2.5 Microsoft’s Security Risk Management 
As the name indicates, the Microsoft security risk management process [120] includes 
more than just a risk analysis method. The process consists of four phases (Figure 6, from 
[120]), where the first and the second correspond to our interpretation of a risk analysis 
method. 
x 1st phase - assessing risk: during this phase one gathers data about assets, threats, 
vulnerabilities, existing security controls and suggested treatments. This information 
is then analyzed in facilitated discussions (what we call structured brainstorming 
sessions) and the outcome should be a list of risks. 
x 2nd phase - conducting decision support: the list of risks from the previous phase 
function as input to an assessment of the various control or treatment solutions that are 
proposed. The outcome of this phase is a set of treatment options that are considered 
to be appropriate for mitigating the risks.  
x 3rd phase - implementing controls: the decided risk treatments are implemented.  
x 4th phase - measuring program effectiveness: in this phase the implemented 
treatments are monitored to verify their effectiveness. This phase also covers the 
ongoing process of watching out for new, potential risks. 
Figure 6 – Microsoft's security risk management process 
3.2.6 Other Methods 
We also include some security related methods and framework that are worth mentioning. 
3.2.6.1 COBIT 
ISACA (http://www.isaca.org) develops COBIT (Control Objectives in IT) that started as a 
guide on best practice IT management controls, intended for computer auditors. COBIT is 
a framework that focuses on assisting managers in the implementation and quality control 
of IT processes and systems in their organization, and not so much a risk analysis method 
according to our definition. To obtain the latest version of the COBIT (v4) documentation 
you must be a member of ISACA.  
3.2.6.2 FIRM 
The Information Security Forum (ISF) is an international association of more than 260 
leading companies and public sector organizations (http://www.securityforum.org). ISF 
provides a set of methods and tools related to risk analysis and risk management. Among 
others they have a methodology for the monitoring and control of information risk at the 
enterprise level called FIRM. SARA is their risk analysis method for critical information 
systems, and SPRINT is a method for less critical systems and assessment of business risks. 
The methods are however only available through membership in ISF. 
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3.2.6.3 MEHARI 
MEHARI (Méthode Harmonisée d'Analyse de Risques Informatiques) [119] is a French 
risk analysis method, designed by CLUSIF (https://www.clusif.asso.fr/en/clusif/present/),
an organization consisting of security experts. MEHARI provides a method, tools and 
knowledge bases for use in controlling the risks of an organization. The method is 
compliant with ISO/IEC13335 (see Sect. 3.3.2) and its results can be used as input to 
ISO27001/BS7799-2 certification (see Sect. 3.3.3). MEHARI is not well known outside 
France and can only be purchased from CLUSIF. 
3.2.7 Summary 
This section summarizes the relations between CORAS and other security analysis 
methods.  
Method Compared to CORAS 
OCTAVE Similar process, similar vocabulary. Comes with more specific guidelines 
and predefined templates for documentation than CORAS. Limited use of 
graphical risk modeling. 
CRAMM Similar process, similar vocabulary. More focused on certification and the 
requirements needed for this purpose than CORAS. No graphical risk 
modeling. 
FRAP Similar process, similar vocabulary. Makes no particular use of graphical 
modeling.  
Microsoft's Security 
Risk Management 
Covers the entire risk management process, where the two first phases 
constitute a method according to our definition. The analysis process is 
similar to CORAS, but it does not use graphical modeling. 
Other methods COBIT is internationally well known, but it is more an audit framework than 
a security analysis method.  
FIRM, SARA, SPRINT and MEHARI are not widely used outside their 
organizations countries, and therefore of less interest. We have however 
no indications that any of these methods are fundamentally different in 
their risk analysis process than CORAS. 
3.3 Standards Relevant to Security- and Risk Analysis 
There exist several international standards relevant to security and risk analysis. In this 
section, we give a presentation of the ones relevant to our work, and how they relate to the 
conceptual foundation in CORAS. The section concludes with a short summary of each of 
the standards' relations to CORAS. 
3.3.1 AS/NZS4360 
The Australian New Zealand Standard for Risk Management (AS/NZS4360) [6, 7] defines 
a complete risk management process. It defines risk management as the total process of 
identifying, controlling, and eliminating or minimizing uncertain events that may affect IT 
system resources. The standard is accompanied with a handbook that gives a "generic 
guide for the establishment and implementation of a risk management process for 
information security risks" [54, 55]. The process has five main phases (Figure 7): (1) 
establish context, (2) identify risks, (3) analyze risks, (4) evaluate risks and (5) treat risks:
1. When establishing the context, the purpose is to decide what parts of the system 
that will receive attention, and why. This phase also aims to specify the 
stakeholders and vulnerabilities of the system.  
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Risk assessment is the collective term for identification, analysis and evaluation of risks. 
These three phases have the following purpose: 
2. During risk identification, one should identify potential threats and threat scenarios 
that can constitute risks towards the system. A commonly used risk identification 
technique is some form for structured brainstorming.  
3. The purpose of risk estimation is to estimate the risks’ likelihoods and potential 
consequences. This activity is mostly centred on applying statistical methods or 
more qualitative judgments to establish the likelihood and consequences of the 
risks, and modeling notations like fault trees [66] and event trees [64] may be used. 
4. Risk evaluation includes prioritization of the risks according to their severity and 
selecting the ones that cannot be tolerated which will be subject to treatment 
identification.  
5. In the risk treatment phase the purpose is to identify the risks that need treatments, 
i.e. risks that are too serious to leave unattended. 
Figure 7 – Risk management process overview 
The standard also defines two parallel activities communicate and consult, and monitor
and review, which are related to the continuous risk management effort within an 
organization. CORAS takes much of its terminology from AS/NZS4360 and consequently 
the conceptual foundation is to a high degree in accordance with this standard. 
3.3.2 ISO/IEC13335 
The standard ISO/IEC13335 Information technology [76-79] provides help and guidance 
on how to manage security of information systems. The standard consists of five parts. 
Part 1- Concepts and models for information and communications technology security 
management [76] addresses security and security management in and organizational view, 
providing guidance on planning, implementation and operation of security measures. Part 
2- Information security risk management has been revised by Part 1. Part 3- Techniques 
for the management of IT Security [77], Part 4- Selection of safeguards [78] and Part 5- 
Management guidance on network security [79] are more technical security standards. 
ISO/IEC13335 has in its latest revision been adapted to align with AS/NZS4360 and it is 
expected that several of its parts will be released under the new standard: Information 
Security Management (ISO/IEC 27000-family). Since ISO/IEC13335 has become aligned 
with AS/NZS4360, there is a substantial agreement between the conceptual foundation in 
CORAS and the terminology used in the ISO standard. 
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3.3.3 BS7799/ISO17799 
BS7799 [25] was published in 1995 by the British Standards Institution, as a standard to 
guide the development and implementation of information security management system. It 
was a so-called code of practice, which means that it provides help and guidance on the 
selection and implementation of controls, but cannot be used in third party verification or 
certification of products. The demand for such a certification option lead to the 
development of BS7799-2 (ISO27001) Information technology – Security techniques, 
Information security management systems – Requirements [26, 75] which has requirements 
specified in the form "shall". In addition it integrates the process-based approach of 
ISO9001 Quality management systems – Requirements [71] and ISO14001 Environmental 
management systems – Requirements with guidance for use [72]. The original code of 
practice is now known as BS7799-1 (ISO17799) [25, 82]. Even though the standard has a 
broad international accept, it does not define concepts in the level of details like the 
CORAS conceptual model. It is more like a high-level guideline for security risk 
management. 
3.3.4 ISO15408 (The Common Criteria) 
The Common Criteria (ISO15408) [33, 73] gives a set of security requirements a product 
or system must conform to in order to match a specific level of security. This makes it 
possible for a vendor to explicitly state the level of security he/she require from a system or 
product. The requirements are divided into functional requirements and assurance 
requirements. The functional requirements are security aspects that a product must 
conform to. Assurance requirements are used to evaluate whether the security aspects of a 
product or system work and whether these are implemented correctly. There are seven 
assurance levels, each with a stricter requirement to how the product or system should be 
evaluated:
1. EAL1: the product must be functionally tested 
2. EAL2: the product must be structurally tested 
3. EAL3: the product must be methodically tested and checked 
4. EAL4: the product must be methodically designed, tested and reviewed 
5. EAL5: the product must be semiformally designed and tested 
6. EAL6: the product must have semiformally verified design and be semiformally 
tested
7. EAL7: the product must have formally verified design and be formally tested 
Although the Common Criteria does not come with an implementation method, various 
attempts have been made to specify a method that supports integration of its security 
aspects into the software engineering process [157]. The common criteria evaluation is 
conducted by authorized entities as an assessment of the product or system against the 
defined criteria. This is more like a security audit than a complete security analysis 
process, and focuses on specification and testing of the product or system. Except for 
"asset" the standard does not use any of the risk related concepts in CORAS. 
3.3.5 IEC61508 
IEC61508 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-
related systems [69] is the international standard for all safety lifecycle activities for 
systems comprised of electrical and/or electronic and/or programmable electronic 
components (electrical/electronic/programmable electronic systems (E/E/PESs). The safety 
lifecycle of a system covers all safety related activities made in phases from concept, 
through design, implementation, operation, maintenance until decommissioning. Typical 
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examples of E/E/PESs are control and supervisory systems used in domains like industry, 
health and transportation. The key features of IEC61508 can be summarized like this [15]: 
1. It facilitates development of sector specific standards for safety related E/E/PESs 
that builds on the same underlying principles, terminology etc. 
2. It helps specifying safety requirements for safety related E/E/PESs.  
3. It introduces safety integrity levels (SIL) that are used to specify the level of safety 
required by a function in a safety related E/E/PESs. 
4. It has a risk-based approach to determine SIL requirements. 
5. It sets numerical target failure measures for safety related E/E/PESs that are linked 
to the SIL’s. 
6. It sets a lower limit on the target failure measures that can be claimed for a single 
safety related E/E/PES. 
Compared to the concepts in CORAS, IEC61508 concepts are much more system oriented 
with terms like safety function, module, safe state etc. The standard does not focus on 
traditional security oriented aspects like risks posed by someone/something with malicious 
intents like hackers, intruders or malicious code. The lack of such concepts makes it less 
comparable to a conceptual model for security risk terminology like in CORAS. 
3.3.6 ISO21827 
The standard Information technology - Systems Security Engineering - Capability Maturity 
Model (ISO21827) [74] defines a complete development process for security engineering. 
Its concepts and definition are mainly taken from ISOIEC13335, except for "threat" which 
is defined as Capabilities, intentions and attack methods of adversaries, or any 
circumstance or event, whether originating externally or internally, that has the potential 
to cause harm to information or a program or system or cause those to harm others.
Nevertheless, this interpretation of threat does not conflict with the more general definition 
used in the CORAS method: a potential cause of an unwanted incident. Due to its near 
coupling with ISO/IEC13335, which is already used in CORAS' method and underlying 
foundation, the terminology used in ISO21827 is considered to be sufficiently covered.  
3.3.7 Other Standards and Guidelines 
The standards Information technology – Security techniques – Guidelines for the use and 
management of Trusted Third Party services (ISO/IEC14516) [80] and Information 
technology – Security techniques – IT Network security (ISO/IEC18028) [83] are standards 
targeting technical security solutions in a detailed level with no focus on security analysis 
as a process. Their objectives are to extend the security management guidelines provided in 
ISO/IEC13335 and ISO/IEC17799. 
Information technology – Security techniques – Information security incident management
(ISO/IEC TR 18044) [85] provides advice and guidance on information security incident 
management for information security managers and for information system managers. The 
standard can be seen as a supplement to the security risk management process and not a 
stand-alone security analysis standard.
Information technology – Software life cycle processes – Risk management 
(ISO/IEC16085) [63] defines a process for the management of risk during a complete 
software lifecycle process with no particular focus on security. This includes risks related 
to both buying and supplying software, as well as developing, operating and maintaining 
software. It may be used to guide standards like Software life cycle processes (ISO12207)
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(a high-level standard addressing all processes of the software life cycle) or Systems 
Engineering - System Life Cycle Processes (ISO15288) (a framework for describing the 
life cycle of systems created by humans). 
There are also quality management standards that organizations may be audited against to 
prove their compliance with specific quality requirements. These includes among others: 
the ISO9000 quality management family [71], IC9700 and IC9200 business certifications
(www.icharter.org), and ISO20000 for IT service management [84]. None of these is 
targeting risk analysis or security analysis. 
The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology publishes standards and best-
practice guidelines for a wide range of IT security related topics. The NIST SP800-30 Risk 
Management Guide for Information Technology Systems [123] provides a foundation for 
the development of an effective risk management program, containing both the definitions 
and the practical guidance necessary for assessing and mitigating risks identified within IT 
systems. The publication is therefore more like a guideline than a standard and in a 
comparison with OCTAVE the authors claim [162] "following the OCTAVE guidance will 
meet the spirit and intent of the NIST guidance for conducting the risk assessment as part 
of a total risk management program described in NIST SP 800-30" 
3.3.8 Summary 
This section summarizes the state-of-the-art with respect to standards for security and risk 
analysis that are relevant to the conceptual model for security risk analysis defined in 
CORAS.
Standard Relation to CORAS 
AS/NZS4360 CORAS employs many of the concepts in this standard in its 
underlying foundation. 
ISO/IEC13335 CORAS employs many of the concepts in this standard in its 
underlying foundation. 
BS7799 and related 
standards 
Has a stronger relation to the CORAS method than the conceptual 
foundation, since it deals with risk management without detailed risk 
analysis concept definitions. 
Common Criteria The standard does not provide as detailed concept definitions like the 
one used in CORAS' conceptual model. 
IEC61508 Employs much more system oriented concepts than the security 
focused conceptual model in CORAS. 
ISO21827 Sufficiently covered by CORAS, since it is based on ISO/IEC13335. 
Other standards The other standards and guidelines are either specialized towards 
particular security technologies, too high-level or lacks focus on 
security analysis. 
3.4 Risk- and System Analysis Techniques 
Traditionally risk analysis techniques document their findings in tables only, but our claim 
is that many of them may benefit from using graphical documentation techniques as well. 
In this section, we present risk analysis techniques that have in common that they may be 
used in structured brainstorming, and we evaluate whether they are appropriate for 
graphical risk documentation techniques. The evaluation is summarized in Sect. 3.4.13. 
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3.4.1 SWOT 
A SWOT analysis [62] is used to evaluate the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and 
Threats associated with a project or business activity in a top-down manner. Used in 
project or business planning the objective is to define a goal, strategy or actions, and find 
means to achieve it (e.g. increase income, reduce development time). In security analysis it 
is used to get an initial overview of the risk picture and helps scoping the analysis to focus 
where it is most needed. In a security analysis the objective of a SWOT will be to protect 
the assets within the target of analysis and then find: 
1. Strengths: attributes of the target that are helpful in protecting assets. 
2. Weaknesses: attributes of the target that are harmful to achieve sufficient protection 
of the assets. 
3. Opportunities: external conditions that are helpful in protecting assets. 
4. Threats: external conditions that are harmful to achieve sufficient protection of the 
assets.
A SWOT analysis takes form as a brainstorming session involving a cross-functional team 
consisting of people with different background and view of the target system. The 
information they come up with may be used as input to a more detailed security analysis. 
The findings are typically documented in various forms of table formats, adjusted to the 
particular need of the analysis, but often structured according to the four SWOT aspects. A 
security risk focused SWOT analysis may benefit considerably from using an easily 
understandable graphical approach to model its findings. This will for instance make it 
possible to illustrate how a threat in one area may exploit a weakness in another, or how an 
opportunity may become a weakness if seen from a different point of view. 
3.4.2 FMEA/FMECA 
FMEA/ FMECA (Failure Mode Effect Analysis / Failure Mode Effect and Criticality 
Analysis) [17] is a method that assess potential failures of individual components within a 
system. The method is usually conducted in two steps, first the failure modes and their 
effects are identified (FMEA). Then the failure modes are ranked according to their 
criticality and their probability (FMECA). The basis of the FMEA/FMECA is functional 
description of the system, where each component is analyzed to identify all possible or 
failure modes and classify them according to their criticality. The FMEA/FMECA is a 
"bottom-up" approach, especially suitable for detecting a system's possible failure modes, 
and determining their consequences. The failure identification is normally organized as a 
brainstorming, structured by the system's functional descriptions. The findings are 
documented in a table where each separate module's potential failure modes are 
investigated with respect to failure detection method, failure effect and how critical it may 
be. It is not obvious how to document relations between failure modes in different 
modules, neither how the effects may be common for several modules. This is a common 
problem of tables, where relations between different rows are difficult to show. In this 
regard, a graphical language may be useful to document relations between the findings 
instead of, or in addition to the conventional FMEA/FMECA tables.  
3.4.3 HazOp 
HazOp (Hazard and Operability) analysis [70] is a well known risk identification technique 
used in all forms for risk analyses. A HazOp is a structured brainstorming with the aim of 
finding ways system behavior may deviate from design intention, and whether threes 
deviation can lead to unwanted incidents (hazards). The participant all must have through 
knowledge of one or more aspects of the system analyzed. The input to the analysis is 
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system documentation of any kind, and in addition the analysis leader uses specialized 
guidewords to ensure that all aspects are covered. The guidewords are used in questions 
like "what if the service delivers too much data?", "what if the service delivers too little 
data?", "too slow response or too early?" and so on. This is meant to mitigate the weakness 
that the information gathered during a HazOp is restricted to the already existing 
knowledge within the group. The idea is that the guidewords can make people think of 
aspects they have not been thinking of before. A similar technique that is commonly used 
within safety analysis is called HazId (Hazard Identification). This is basically a simplified 
HazOp that uses checklists rather than guidewords, and it is often used early in the analysis 
process or for smaller risk analyses. HazOp can be tailored to fit any domain and system, 
in for instance [131] the method is especially targeting software HazOp. These kinds of 
methods represent particular suitable situations for using graphical security risk modeling 
languages since a common understanding and communication between the participants are 
crucial to the quality of the findings. Similar to FMEA/FMECA tables, also HazOp tables 
are unsatisfactory for showing relationships between the findings (the different rows in the 
table). There is clearly a need for both documentation methods, where one keeps detailed 
information about each risk in tables while the relationships between the risks are 
documented graphically.  
3.4.4 Fault Tree 
The fault tree notation is used in fault tree analysis (FTA) [66] to describe the causes of an 
event. Fault trees are well known and widely used within risk analysis, and become more 
commonly in security analysis, typically of systems that may have consequences for safety. 
The notation provides an excellent way of structuring the order of events, and is particular 
useful if there exist numerical statistical data to use in calculations. Fault trees may among 
others be used to model the findings of HazOp analyses [152]. The top node represents an 
unwanted incident, or failure, and the different events that can lead to the top event are 
modeled as intermediate nodes or leaf nodes (Figure 8, taken from [133]). The probability 
of the top node is calculated based on the probability of the leaf nodes and the logical gates 
"and" and "or". 
Figure 8 – Fault tree example 
Fault trees can be used both qualitatively to specify the different paths that lead to the 
unwanted incident, as well as quantitatively to estimate the likelihood of the top node 
incident [2]. The leaf nodes in a fault tree must be independent of each others, otherwise 
one has to apply special methods for computing likelihood values [107]. An incident model 
that takes the fault tree notation a step further into a more complex structure is the MORT 
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(Management Oversight and Risk Tree) [87] which is more common within safety risk 
modeling. There exist specialized methods for quantitative analysis of fault trees (e.g. [43]) 
and also methods that takes into account uncertainty regarding the likelihood estimates 
(e.g. [92]), but these topics are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The modeling notation used in FTA is quite easy to understand and particularly useful for 
systems consisting of hardware/software modules. Whenever the system also includes 
people's behavior, the notation becomes too "rigid". It is not feasible to set numerical fault 
rates for humans in the same manner as for e.g. hardware components. FTA does cover the 
outcome of the unwanted incident and provides therefore only one side of the risk picture. 
The underlying idea of illustrating the chain of events that may lead to a fault or unwanted 
incident is however very useful, and can be used as a basis for a modeling language that is 
less strict than the fault tree. The  
3.4.5 Event Tree 
Event trees [64] use a tree notation to represent the outcome (or consequences) from an 
event and the probability of the various consequences (Figure 9, example from [133]). In 
the same manner as a fault tree, also the event tree is both qualitative (shows the outcomes 
from and event) and quantitative (estimates the likelihood of each outcome). When 
constructing an event tree it is normal to use a binary split from the initial event, towards 
the final consequences (success/failure). Event trees can be used as an extension of fault 
trees to create a "cause consequence" diagram (Figure 10). The event tree lets the modeler 
specify the "barriers", or the mechanisms that shall prevent the consequences of an 
unwanted incident from escalating. It also describes what the outcome will be if the 
barriers fail to work.
The event tree lets you specify every detail about the expected outcome from an unwanted 
incident. It also includes the barriers that should be in place to minimize the consequences. 
Similar to the fault tree, also event trees provides half the risk picture, excluding the chain 
of events that may lead to the incident. As one may see from the small example in Figure 
9, the tree will grow rapidly when the number of barriers is high, and it does not allow for 
showing how a failure in a barrier may initiate a new unwanted incident. Nevertheless, the 
underlying idea of event trees is very valuable, but there is room for an improved and 
possible more flexible notation.  
Figure 9 – Event tree example 
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3.4.6 Cause-consequence Diagram 
The cause-consequence diagram [122] combines the features of both fault tree and event 
tree. When constructing a cause-consequence diagram one starts with an unwanted incident 
and develops backwards to find its causes (fault tree) and forwards to find its consequences 
(event tree). Figure 10 shows and example of a cause-consequence diagram which is a 
combination of the two previous diagrams (Figure 8 and Figure 9). 
Figure 10 – "Cause consequence" diagram 
The cause-consequence diagram provides the complete risk picture, which both FTA and 
ETA lacks. It illustrates the chain of events from the very beginning with the initiators of 
unwanted incidents, to their final consequences towards assets. Since it builds on FTA and 
ETA it also inherits their weaknesses (as discussed in the two previous sections), but it 
captures much of the main idea behind what we consider as the ideal way of presenting a 
risk picture. The notation should be optimized with respect to presentation, but it should 
also be able to model the risk picture in a high level manner, without demanding all details 
about the chain of events (order of events, probabilities, logical gates etc.). For instance, 
detailing each path through the diagram may be left for subsequent analyses.
3.4.7 Attack Tree 
Attack trees [138, 139] is a modeling notation that aims to provide a formal and methodical 
way of describing the security of a system based on the attacks it may be exposed to. The 
notation uses a tree structure similar to FTA, with the attack goal as the top node and 
different ways of achieving that goal as leaf nodes (Figure 11, example from [138]).  
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Figure 11 – Attack tree example 
There exist an extension of attack trees called defense trees [16] which in addition to 
representing attack strategies performed by an attacker, also represents the possibly 
countermeasures that may be implemented in the target system to mitigate the attacks. 
Since the notation is based on fault trees we get the same difficulties with respect to 
expressing logical gates, assigning likelihood/probability values to threat scenarios and 
computing precise likelihoods. Attack trees do however allow for less precise likelihood 
values (e.g. possible/impossible like in Figure 11) which makes it easier to use for high 
level analysis. Its focus is more on human behavior than system behavior since it 
represents different ways of attacking a system. In many cases it may for instance be 
valuable to represent both how the system reacts to a security breach caused by a human, 
and a non-human source. 
3.4.8 OCTAVE Threat Tree  
The OCTAVE method (Sect. 3.2.2) for security analysis has its own tree notation which 
has much in common with event trees, but also fault trees. The figure below is an OCTAVE 
threat tree from [3] showing the threat posed by a human actors using network access to 
harm "PIDS" (Patient Information Data System). The diagram illustrates the source of an 
incident, the method and the motive behind the incident which can be compared to fault 
trees. At the same time, it illustrates the outcome of the incident that is more like an event 
tree. The OCTAVE threat tree can be seen as taking the tree notation one step closer to 
security risk analysis, in particular information security. The use of deliberate and 
accidental threats (in OCTAVE called motive) is for instance in accordance with 
ISO/IEC13335 Information security (Sect. 3.3.2). Our concern is whether it is feasible to 
mix two well established techniques like FTA and ETA in this way. This makes it more 
difficult to exploit the benefits from computerized FTA or ETA tools, and also conflicts 
with many analysis methods that recommend using these analysis techniques. The 
intention of adapting the tree notations to more security focused analysis by integrating 
security related concepts is however good. 
3 – State of the Art 
30 A graphical approach to security risk analysis 
ASSET  ACCESS ACTOR MOTIVE OUTCOME IMPACT
       
     disclosure  
    accidental modification  
     loss, destruction  
     interruption  
   inside    
     disclosure  
    deliberate modification  
     loss, destruction  
     interruption  
PIDS  network     
     disclosure  
    accidental modification  
     loss, destruction  
     interruption  
   outside    
     disclosure  
    deliberate modification  
     loss, destruction  
     interruption  
Figure 12 – OCTAVE threat tree 
3.4.9 Bayesian Network 
A Bayesian network [98, 107, 108, 129, 136, 150] is like a directed, acyclic graph. The 
intermediate nodes represent causes or contributing factors to the top node, which in Figure 
13 is a "system failure" (taken from [129]). A Bayesian network is both a graphical and a 
probabilistic model that may be used to for instance predict the number of faults in a 
software component [41]. In Figure 13 the causes that contribute strongest to the event 
(A1-A3) are placed directly before the event. The causes are grouped into three categories: 
organizational factors, human factors and technical factors. When a Bayesian network is 
analyzed quantitatively, each node holds a table with a probability distribution reflecting 
its parent nodes. For any manipulation of the probabilities of the nodes, the effects both 
forwards (towards child nodes and the top node) and backwards (towards parent nodes) 
can be computed [42]. A Bayesian network can be utilized both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. If the Bayesian network is analyzed qualitatively, it provides relations 
between causes and effects. When analyzed quantitatively, one uses its powerful 
mathematical model for computing probabilities, which is not only based on the 
probabilities for the leaf nodes like in fault trees, but also on intermediate nodes. 
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Figure 13 – Example of a BN from [129] 
3.4.10 Markov Analysis 
Markov analysis [61, 68, 94, 107] is a stochastic mathematical analysis method that looks 
at sequences of events and analyzes the tendency of which event that will be followed by 
another. Markov analysis may be used to analyze the reliability of systems that have a 
large degree of component dependencies. In contrast to FTA, Markov analysis does not 
assume complete component independence. It is also well suited to analyze systems that 
may partially fail or experience degraded states. A Markov analysis considers the system 
as a number of states, and transmissions between these states. The states are modeled 
graphically and statistical calculations are performed to determine the probability of each 
state transmission. Markov analysis is among others promoted by ISO/IEC61508. Markov 
models are more suitable for showing the operation modes of a system where one may 
transit forth and back between states, than a chain of events of a security attack which is 
more likely to be a one way chain. Nevertheless, describing the operation modes of a 
system also includes describing the different barriers that should prevent an attack or 
reduce the consequences of an attack and for this purpose Markov analysis may be a useful 
tool. Using Markov analysis requires a well-specified system and may not be as suitable 
for high-level analyses. 
Figure 14 – Markov model 
3.4.11 Block Diagram 
Block diagrams [67, 129] are often used in reliability assessments and shows how the 
components of a system are parallel or serial and thereby identifies possible weak points. 
In the figure below, components 1-3 are parallel, while component 4 is not and therefore 
may be the weakest point in this system. While this notation is a suitable way of 
representing the components of the target system, it is not directly applicable to model 
security risks. The idea of showing alternative paths in a system can however be used in 
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security risk modeling to show where a threat may work its way through the target of 
analysis. The UML profile is already using this modeling principle, and it will be an 
important feature in a new security risk modeling language. 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 8
97
Figure 15 – Block diagram example 
3.4.12 Other Techniques 
There exist also risk analysis methods that assess UML models on a very detailed level. In 
[53] the authors propose a severity assessment methodology which integrates Functional 
Failure Analysis (FFA) [1], FMEA and FTA to analyze the severity of failures of the 
architectural elements. In [34] the authors describe a risk analysis method of performance 
failures based on annotated UML models and [50] describes a method for analyzing 
architecture level UML models to identify the parts of the system which may give rise to 
risks. The method applies complexity analysis of components and connectors, expert 
judgments for severity analysis and Markov models to estimate the risk factor of the 
different system scenarios. A method for estimating risk in the early phases of design is 
proposed in [5], where the analysis is conducted at the requirements-level based on UML 
design specifications. In [149] the authors propose a framework that models cluster 
computing systems’ availability based on UML design notations, and evaluates system 
availability by transforming the UML availability modeling into corresponding analytical 
models (e.g. Markov models). Common for these techniques is that they deal with risk 
analysis on a very technical and detailed system level. 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) [93] is typically used early in the design phase of a 
plant where the process is new and one has little knowledge of its risks. The outcome is a 
set of hazards (what we refer to as unwanted incidents), their causes and major effects, in 
addition to a list of corrective/preventive measures. As the name indicates, the analysis is 
similar to a HazOp, except for being used in an earlier phase.  
MORT (Management Oversight Risk Tree) [87] is a technique that can be used both to 
investigate the causes of incidents and to audit risk management systems. The technique 
uses a tree structure similar to fault trees (Sect. 3.4.4). A related approach is SMORT 
(Safety Management and Organization Review Technique) [96] which builds on MORT 
and targets internal investigations of incidents and near incidents. 
 "What if?-analysis" is one of the oldest risk identification methods, based on asking a 
series of questions often starting with "What if…?" or similar. The method may use 
checklists as a basis and is used in assessing system design. The analysis method is a 
typical brainstorming method, where consequences and recommendations are put forward 
by the people participating. This is an example of a "what if"-analysis result from an 
analysis of an reactor [93]: 
What if? Consequence / hazard Recommendations 
Cooling water pump breaks 
down
Runaway reaction 
explosion/fire 
Stand-by pump / alarm 
systems 
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3.4.13 Summary 
This section summarizes our judgments of existing risk analysis techniques and how they 
are relevant when developing a new, graphical risk modeling language inspired by the 
UML profile. 
Technique Relevant to a new risk modeling language? 
SWOT Yes, since it relies on a brainstorming technique which involves 
several participants it is a suitable situation to use graphical modeling 
language to facilitate communication and understanding. 
FMEA/FMECA Yes 
HazOp Yes, since it relies on a brainstorming technique which involves 
several participants it is a suitable situation to use graphical modeling 
language to facilitate communication and understanding. 
Fault tree Yes, there is no method for modeling logical and/or-gates in the UML 
profile which means that the reader cannot know which one to use 
when reading UML profile threat diagrams. The CORAS UML 
diagrams can probably express the chain of events that a fault tree 
represents, but not the logical order in terms of and/or dependencies, 
and not facilitate precise calculations 
Event tree Yes, there is no method for modeling or-gates in the UML profile, but 
some of the intention of an event tree can be modeled, although it will 
not look like a conventional event tree. Since event tree is a commonly 
used notation, the new language should include its idea and objective. 
Cause-consequence 
diagram
Yes, since this is based on both fault tree and event tree, it is natural 
to include the intention behind cause-consequence diagrams into a 
new language. 
Attack tree Yes, since the notation is quite similar to fault trees it should be 
considered and sufficiently covered when developing the new 
language. 
OCTAVE threat tree Yes, both because it has strong similarities with event trees and 
because OCTAVE is an international well known security analysis 
method that a new language should aim to comply with if possible. 
Bayesian network Yes, the event modeling in Bayesian networks is similar to the threat 
scenario modeling in the UML profile, but the statistical model is 
unique to the Bayesian network. While it is not within our ambitions to 
develop this kind of a probability model, it would undoubtedly be very 
interesting and possibly future work. 
Markov analysis Partly, but only to simulate the different states since the analysis relies 
on it own, special modeling notation. 
Block diagram Yes, even though block diagrams are more suitable to model 
components of the target system and not the security risks itself, the 
idea of showing different paths through a system can be used in a new 
security risk modeling language. 
UML based analysis 
techniques 
These techniques already use UML modeling in analysis, and they 
also target a much more detailed level of system specification than our 
approach will address. 
Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis (PHA) 
Yes, with its similarities to HazOp we can conclude that also for this 
technique graphical modeling can be useful 
MORT/SMORT Partly, because MORT is based on using fault trees, which means that 
it already has a customized modeling notation. However, if the 
graphical approach is able to express all aspects of the 
MORT/SMORT analysis and shows superior with respect to 
understandability or usability, there is no reason for not substituting the 
fault tree with our approach. 
What if? Analysis Yes, with its basis in a kind of structured brainstorming we are certain 
that a graphical modeling approach may be useful. 
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3.5 Risk Documentation Techniques 
There are many techniques that can be used to support risk identification, estimation and 
documentation, but the fact that CORAS already had a graphical modeling language made 
it a suitable place to start. We therefore give a rather detailed presentation of the UML 
profile, and then we describe other graphical notations that may be used in risk- and 
security analysis, and system development. 
3.5.1 The UML Profile 
The full name for the UML profile is the UML Profile for Modeling Quality of Service and 
Fault Tolerance Characteristics and Mechanisms [124], and it is standardized by the OMG 
(Object Management Group). The language is based on the use case notation from the 
Unified Modeling Language (UML) [134]. It uses the official UML meta model, but with 
added richness in terms of domain specific symbols and concepts related to security risk 
modeling. In the following we describe the UML profile by means of examples of 
modeling taken from the profile [124]. The presentation will guide you through a complete 
security risk modeling process. The diagrams have not been given special names in the 
standard, but for simplicity we provide each diagram with a name in the figure caption. 
Stereotyping is a technique used in UML to add information to a model element by giving 
it special names or stereotyping labels. 
The values and scales that will be used during the security analysis are defined in the value 
definition diagram (Figure 16). The stereotype <<ValueDefinition>> is used for defining 
each value type that is used. In this example all values are enumerations, i.e., values on an 
ordinal scale, except for "RiskReductionRef" which defines a mapping. Alternatively, 
assets could have been defined in terms of monetary values, frequency as probabilities and 
so on. 
Figure 16 – Value definitions diagram in the UML profile 
Figure 17 shows the specification of an asset, which is an important part of the CORAS 
method. The service is an entity that is associated with some quality characterizations. The 
asset is defined as the quality level of the service, related to the offered service quality. The 
asset is owned by the stakeholder "Service provider", and its value is assigned by 
instantiating the value definition for asset values (Figure 17). The diagram also shows that 
the asset has one vulnerability, which is "extensive computation". 
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Figure 17 – Asset specification diagram in the UML profile 
In Figure 18, the modeling of a threat is exemplified in a UML profile threat diagram. The 
threat "Malicious person" has the scenario (i.e. behavior) "Flooding". This threat scenario 
is related to the asset "QualityLevel". In this diagram, asset is shown using the UML actor 
stereotype only, while Figure 17 provided detailed information about the same asset. 
Figure 18 – Threat diagram in the UML profile 
Figure 19 illustrates how unwanted incidents are modeled with the UML profile. The 
unwanted incident "Denial-of-Service" may harm the asset "QualityLevel", and includes 
the threat scenario from the threat diagram above. A scenario may lead to another scenario, 
and this is shown by use of the stereotype <<Initiate>>. In this case, "Denial-of-Service" 
initiates the unwanted incident "Loss of customer" which may affect the asset 
"Customers".  
Figure 19 – Unwanted incident diagram in the UML profile 
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A risk is an assignment of consequence, frequency and risk value to an unwanted incident. 
Figure 20 illustrates how this is modeled. The values are instances of the corresponding 
value definitions (Figure 16). The risk of "Denial-of-service" is assigned to the unwanted 
incident "Denial-of-Service" using the stereotype <<RiskEvaluation>>. The diagram also 
shows that the risk is related to the asset "QualityLevel".  
Figure 20 – Risk diagram in the UML profile 
Similar risks may be grouped into risk themes. Figure 21 shows how the stereotype 
<<RiskTheme>> is used to define risk themes of instances of risks. This allows a risk to be 
a member of several risk themes. In this example, the risks "Denial-of-service" and "Loss 
of customer" are grouped to form the risk theme "DoSRelated". As seen in the example, a 
risk theme is also assigned an overall risk value. 
<<RiskTheme>>
DoSRelated
<<Risk>>
r1:Denial-of-Service
<<Risk>>
r2:Loss of customer
value = moderate
<<RiskValue>>
Rvalue:RiskValueDef
Figure 21 – Risk theme diagram in the UML profile 
Figure 22 models "Authentication" as a treatment for the unwanted incident "Denial-of-
Service". The stereotype <<Transfer>> (one of the predefined treatment options in 
AS/NZS4360) denotes that this treatment involves transferring the responsibility for the 
risk to the authentication mechanism solution. 
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<<Asset>>
QualityLevel<<ThreatAgent>>
Malicious person <<ThreatScenario>>Flooding
<<UnwantedIncident>>
Denial-of-Service
<<include>>
<<Treatment>>
Authentication
<<Transfer>>
Figure 22 – Treatment diagram in the UML profile 
Figure 23 shows an example of how a treatment effect is modeled. The treatment effect 
"DoSTransfer" is bound to the treatment "Authentication" by the use of the stereotype 
<<TreatmentEvaluation>>. The figure also shows that "DoSTransfer" relates to the risk 
"Denial-of-Service". The risk reduction, i.e. the value of the treatment effect, is a mapping 
from moderate to low, which means that implementing the treatment will reduce the risk 
value of "Denial-of-Service" from moderate to low. 
Figure 23 – Treatment effect diagram in the UML profile 
The UML profile is as far as we know the only modeling notation that supports the entire 
security analysis process step-by-step. However, there exist related notations that can be 
used to model particular parts of the documentation in a security analysis, like reliability 
aspects of the system analyzed (e.g. "block diagram" in Sect. 3.4.11) or potential ways of 
attacking a system (e.g. "attack tree" in Sect. 3.4.7).
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Comparing CORAS to the other techniques 
The threat diagram in the UML profile may resemblance a fault tree, but may have more 
than one top node and lacks the notion of logical gates. The threat scenarios can be seen as 
leaf nodes/intermediate nodes are not given probabilities, something which makes fault 
tree computation impossible. The CORAS UML diagrams can express the chain of events 
that a fault tree represents, but not the logical order in terms of and/or dependencies. 
Neither can the CORAS UML diagrams provide a model for precise likelihood 
calculations. 
The concept of barriers that one finds in event trees is underspecified in the CORAS UML 
diagrams, which only models the relation from an unwanted incident to each of the assets it 
potentially may harm. The success or failure of the barriers and the different types of 
consequences are not modeled explicitly. In addition, the consequence towards each asset 
must be modeled in separate CORAS UML diagrams 
The UML profile provides insufficient support for the end-to-end view cause-consequence 
diagrams give. The complete chain of events are not modeled in one diagram, but must be 
specified using multiple diagram types. 
The UML profile can be used in the same manner as an attack tree, with a threat assigned 
to the initial threat scenario as the leaf node, more threat scenarios as the intermediate 
nodes and the unwanted incident as the root node. The UML profile may on the other hand 
extend the attack tree notation by illustrating which assets that are affected by the 
unwanted incident (root node), and also the threats initiating the unwanted incidents.
The concepts modeled in OCTAVE threat trees are in many ways the similar to the 
concepts modeled in UML profile diagrams but they have different names. The concept 
"asset" is similar to asset in the CORAS method, while "access via network" would be 
considered a vulnerability. Both "inside actor" and "outside actor" would be called threats 
in the CORAS method, the "outcome" would be an unwanted incidents and their "impact" 
would be consequences in terms of damage to the asset. Also the information modelled is 
similar to the one gathered in the CORAS method, but the UML profile would normally 
not be used to model all possible outcomes of an event. This is however possible, but 
maybe not feasible when the events are numerous. 
If the Bayesian network is analyzed qualitatively, it provides relations between causes and 
effects similar to the UML profile. The difference lies however in the Bayesian network's 
powerful mathematical model for computing probabilities, which is not only based on the 
probabilities for the leaf nodes like in fault trees, but also on intermediate nodes 
The strength of the Markov model is the complex, underlying statistical model used for 
calculating probabilities for the different states of a system. The UML profile does not 
include a similar feature, and can at most be used to illustrate the different states of a 
system. 
3.5.2 Misuse Case  
The misuse case notation [145-147] is related to the UML use case notation (the example 
in Figure 24 is taken from [145]). As opposed to a use case which expresses allowed 
functionality in a system, a misuse case expresses the opposite, i.e. the functions that the 
system should not allow. A misuse case can be defined as "a completed sequence of 
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actions which results in loss for the organization or some specific stakeholder" [145]. 
Among others, misuse cases have been used in design of secure systems architectures 
[126]. A similar notation to use cases is abuse cases [115, 117] which by Sindre and 
Opdahl is considered to be complementary to misuse cases. Abuse cases target security 
requirements with respect to design and testing, whereas misuse cases are used to elicit 
security requirements in relation to other system requirements. 
Figure 24 – Misuse case example 
Misuse cases can be a useful tool in security analysis to direct focus towards functions in a 
system that may be exploited. The UML profile is inspired by the misuse case notation, but 
is richer and has a stronger relation to traditional risk analysis techniques. Misuse cases can 
therefore be expressed with the UML profile. 
3.5.3 UML Variants for Security 
There are a number of security oriented extensions and applications of UML, and in this 
section we introduce some of them. These and related approaches have however all been 
designed to capture and analyze security properties and security aspects at a more detailed 
level than what is required in the type of modeling aim for. 
UMLsec [89-91] is an extension of UML (a UML profile) that provide means for 
specifying security requirements. The underlying basis is an "abstract state machine 
model" that formalizes UML elements (except for use cases) and extends stereotypes. The 
purpose is to be able to formally verify software specifications, which may reduce the 
number of security risks. A similar approach to UMLsec is described in [39], focusing on 
extending properties of essential UML elements (including use cases, actors, classes and 
methods) in order to apply security models directly (exemplified with their "mandatory 
access control" model). 
Another language is SecureUML [11, 12, 110] which aims to extend UML with a meta 
model for role based access control (RBAC) [44] for use in model driven security 
engineering. Their "Model Driven Security" approach is based on first specifying systems 
models and their security requirements and then use tools to generate the system 
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architecture from these specifications. The approach combines system modeling and 
system security in a detailed level with particular focus on RBAC. RBAC is also targeted 
in [130] where the authors model the concept as reusable UML templates, more 
specifically by proposing a class diagram template for RBAC and use object diagram 
templates to specify RBAC constraints. 
authUML [4] is a smaller framework in the same category as SecureUML and UMLsec 
which lets the modeler formally model and analyze access control requirements in UML 
use cases. Also within the area of aspect-oriented design there exists methods for analyzing 
the consequences of security concerns to other functional concerns [48], and in [116] the 
authors propose a method for visual security protocol modeling to be used within model-
driven architecture. 
3.5.4 Simple Technique for Illustrating Risk 
The simple technique for illustrating risk (STIR) [114] modeling technique uses the UML 
use case diagrams to illustrate assets, threats and safeguards (existing countermeasures 
against risks). STIR has similarities with the UML profile, but the technique has fewer 
concepts and a different way of modeling. Figure 25 from [114] is an example of an ATS 
diagram (assets-threat-safeguard) that is used to get a complete overview of the threats for 
each asset and their protection by safeguards. The ATS diagrams are then examined to see 
whether the assets are sufficiently protected and the findings can be used as input to a more 
detailed risk analysis.
Figure 25 – Asset-threat-safeguard diagram 
3.5.5 Riskit Graph 
The Riskit method [97] includes a risk modeling technique based on a graph notation that 
makes it possible to specify factors that may influence a software development project 
(example in Figure 26 from [97]). The Riskit method deals with project risks and has main 
focus on supporting software development organizations in developing their products. The 
evaluation and management of risks that might occur during the operation of software has 
therefore been left out [97] (p. 12). Riskit uses its own definitions inspired by for instance 
organizational strategy research [45]. A factor may be compared to a threat scenario in 
UML profile, while the event is an unwanted incident. Reaction can be compared to 
consequence, and the effect set can be seen as a further detailing of the consequence. Riskit 
lacks "threat", possibly because it unusual to consider deliberate harmful actions towards a 
software development project when assessing the project risk. It also lacks the notion of 
"vulnerability".
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Figure 26 – Example of a Riskit graph 
3.5.6 Microsoft's Threat Modeling and Related Approaches 
In [59, 60, 153] Microsoft present what they call threat modeling for software applications.
The process involves defining threats to a system, ranking them according to their risk 
level, and finally choosing between different techniques to mitigate them. By using their 
threat model STRIDE, the risk analysis will be focused towards particular threat scenarios 
(i.e. Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of Service, and 
Elevation of privilege). To support the process they make use of data flow diagrams [38, 
46] to describe the target, and a kind of tree notation to rank risks (quite similar to attack 
trees). The threat modeling takes place in the design phase to help reveal potential risks, 
but it is also claimed to be helpful in code review and testing.
In [121] another method called threat modeling is presented. The process resembles [153] 
but claims that the sequence and description of steps is different and the execution of steps 
is extended to suit complex, networked systems. The threat modeling is used as a basis for 
defining security requirements to a system and consists of three steps: (1) characterizing 
the system, (2) identifying assets and access points, and (3) identifying threats. Only step 1 
seems to involve modeling, the other two assess the models from step 1 using check lists 
for common threats, vulnerabilities, attack goals etc. Attack trees [138] are mentioned 
during threat identification, but only as an additional mean that may be used to support the 
process. The outcome of the process is a threat profile for the system that is used for 
security requirement elicitation. 
The process presented in [169] is claimed to be a lightweight formal complement to 
Microsoft’s threat modeling approach. The process focuses on modeling functions, threats, 
and threat reducing efforts and then it checks the consistency between security threats and 
functions. Finally, it verifies the lack of threats in the refined model of indented functions 
and threats that have been mitigated. The process employs high level Petri nets 
(Predicate/Transition nets) [47], a formal method with both a graphical as well as a 
mathematical notation, often used to describe distributed systems. 
3.5.7 Summary 
This section summarizes the various modeling techniques that may be relevant to a new 
security risk modeling language. 
Modeling technique Is the technique relevant to a new security risk modeling 
language? 
Misuse case Yes, misuse cases were a source of inspiration for the UML 
profile and its ideas and notation will also be relevant to a new 
language. 
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UML variants for security Partly, since these notations deal with risk analysis on much 
more detailed system specification level than our approach will 
do. They are however interesting as notations that can be used if 
there is a need for further specializations detailing of the threat 
scenarios. 
STIR Partly, because the UML profile already covers the modeling 
aspects of STIR. 
Riskit graph Partly, since the notation mainly addresses project risks and it 
becomes a bit awkward to "force" project related concepts like 
tools, techniques, resources and project schedules into a security 
analysis focused setting like the CORAS method. 
Microsoft Threat Modeling Yes, since the intention of dataflow diagrams and attack trees 
already may be illustrated in the UML profile as threat scenarios 
and unwanted incidents. It may also be interesting to investigate 
the possibility of complying to this approach since it represents a 
major, international threat modeling approach. 
3.6 Information Visualization Techniques 
The phrase "a picture is worth a thousand words" is claimed to bee a too simplistic view 
[164] since the usefulness of pictures highly depends on the situation at hand, and the skills 
of the reader. Nevertheless, software engineering studies have shown that applying 
graphical means to program- and component specifications increases the understanding of 
the system [18], and one has successfully applied graphical means to visualize the program 
interdependencies [109]. According to [106], the key activities for a reader of a diagram is 
searching and recognizing relevant information, and then using this to draw conclusions. 
Many graphical means and mechanisms may help the reader with these activities. We were 
inspired by research within the fields of information visualization in computer displays and 
statistical graphs/figures, related modeling languages, diagrammatic reasoning and model 
quality.
One of the key issues when documenting risks is the ability to show which methods a 
threat may use to initiate risks, and which of these are more likely than the other are. In 
many ways, this can be compared to showing different paths through a graph, and therefore 
we refer to it as graph navigation. It is also useful to be able to illustrate the weaknesses or 
deficiencies that make one vulnerable to threats, and finally one should be able to provide a 
summary of the most crucial risks. In the following we motivate and present the graphical 
means and mechanisms that may be used in security risk modeling, structured according to 
these three main issues: representing graph navigation, vulnerabilities and risk.
3.6.1 Representing Graph Navigation 
We refer to the process of understanding and reading diagrams as "graph navigation". 
When describing the different paths via which a threat may choose to harm assets it may be 
useful to draw special attention to the paths that they are more likely to follow. It was also 
desired by the users of the original UML profile to have a way of describing the logical 
operators AND and OR when two paths are combined. An ambiguous threat scenario 
situation where logical operators could be useful is described in Figure 27. 
Figure 27 – Typical threat scenario situation 
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The original UML profile is based on a node-link diagram type, which in its simplest form 
consists of nodes connected via edges. A closed contour in a node-link diagram generally 
represents a concept of some kind, and a linking line between concepts represents some 
kind of relationship between them. Manipulating the appearance of these lines may give 
them different meanings, for instance the likelihood of the different paths (Figure 28).
Figure 28 – Node-link configurations 
Lines linking closed contours may have different colors, be straight or wavy, or have other 
graphical qualities that represent an attribute or type of relationship [160]. The thickness of 
a connecting line may be used to represent the magnitude of a relationship (a scalar 
attribute). Contrasts in the size or color of a line may make it "pop-out" perceptually and 
thereby call for the reader’s attention [156]. This may be a useful feature to include in a 
security risk modeling language.  
Network traffic maps that often use node-link diagrams to visualize network traffic, also 
inspired the use of line variations. Typically one illustrates the load or type of link data 
using different line colors or varying the thickness of the lines [14]. Variation of line 
appearance is also inspired by the gestalt principle similarity, meaning something that is 
different from its surroundings, will be easier identified by the reader (e.g. italic style vs. 
normal style in text). The gestalt principles [161] are some of the most recognized set of 
rules for good graphical displays. Implementing the gestalt principles may reduce the effort 
needed to understand illustrations, program interfaces, websites etc.  
When looking for an AND-operator symbol, it was natural to turn to one of the most 
frequently used technique in risk analysis: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [66]. Fault trees let 
you specify dependencies between events in a tree structure using logical AND/OR 
operators called "gates" (Figure 29), similar to the ones used in electrical circuit design 
[140]. One of our goals is to make the security risk modeling language fault tree compliant. 
In the original UML profile, there was no standard interpretation of two threat scenarios 
pointing to the same threat scenario or unwanted incident (Figure 27). In order to express 
fault tree-logic we needed a way of saying both "If A and B occurs, C must occur" and "If 
either A or B occurs, C must occur". The challenge was to find the preferred way of 
illustrating this.  
Figure 29 – The AND-gate symbol 
An alternative to logical gates may be the UML inspired "information note". In UML one 
may attach notes to a diagram element to convey additional information about the specific 
element. 
3.6.2 Representing Vulnerabilities 
The original UML profile could only illustrate vulnerabilities as properties of their 
respective assets. There was no way of showing exactly where in the chain of events a 
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vulnerability was exploited, and there was no special vulnerability symbol. Both these 
aspects were requested by the users of a security risk modeling language. 
The way vulnerabilities was modeled in the original UML profile made it simple to see all 
the vulnerabilities of an asset at a glance, but involved the duplication of vulnerabilities 
that were shared between two or more assets. Vulnerability is a stand-alone concept, not a 
binary relation as the ones discussed in the previous section on graph navigation. The 
descriptive text accompanying the vulnerability is obligatory. The question was whether it 
should have a symbol in addition to the textual description.
In research on the quality of modeling languages, pictures are claimed to have a much 
higher perceptibility, and information conveyed in pictures will be emphasized at the cost 
of textual information [99]. To achieve what [49] terms "syntactic disjointness" , the 
symbol must be unique and it must neither be too small, nor too large to cause 
misinterpretations (large elements often attracts attention at the sacrifice of the smaller 
elements). Syntactic disjointness makes it easier to separate the different elements in a 
model.
One may argue that the way vulnerabilities was modeled in the original CORAS language 
was an example of the gestalt principle proximity, stating that things that logically belong 
together should be placed close to each other (commonly used in program interfaces and 
websites). This view is very suitable if the focus is on the assets and their vulnerabilities, 
but when it comes to addressing which threats exploiting which vulnerabilities and 
especially where in the chain of events the exploitation takes place, the situation is 
different. This kind of information is especially valuable in relation to treatment 
identification.  
Winn [165, 166] has found that people, whose languages are written from right to left, also 
process graphics from right to left. A related finding is that the item to the left always was 
interpreted as the cause while the item to the right was the effect [167]. This is in 
accordance with one of the node-link rules [160] stating that "placing closed contours 
spatially in an ordered sequence can represent conceptual ordering of some kind" (Figure 
28, alt. b), and vulnerabilities may very well be placed within this ordering. The direction 
of the line should also be indicated with arrows along the line, since this have been found 
helpful in understanding similar notations like flow charts (used in schematic 
representations of processes) [29]. If the number of lines increases one may easily loose 
track of the path and repeated arrows help distinguishing between crossovers and 
connection points. 
3.6.3 Representing Risks 
Representing risk is a great challenge to its abstract nature. In the threat diagrams of the 
original UML profile risks were not illustrated explicitly, but represented as relations 
between unwanted incidents and assets. Illustrating the severity or magnitude of risks and 
unwanted incidents helps keeping focus on the most critical risks, something that is 
especially useful during the final risk treatment phase. 
To visualize this issue, one may use means like line thickness, textual information labels, 
shapes that varied in size or color and more. The color of an enclosed region may represent 
a concept type (Figure 30) and the size may be used to represent the magnitude of a 
concept (Figure 31). This is also inspired by the gestalt principle of breaking the pattern to 
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attract attention. The reader of a risk diagram should quickly discover the most serious 
unwanted incidents, since they often represent major risks.  
Figure 30 – Color Figure 31 – Size 
There are some aspects to be aware of when using color-coding. The number of different 
colors one may use is limited by the reader’s ability to remember and distinguish the 
colors. Much research has been conducted to find the optimal number of colors, and the 
suggestions varies from 5 to 8 [27, 31, 32, 142, 163]. One should also have in mind how a 
model with colored symbols will look when printed in black-white and whether this may 
affect the interpretation of the symbols [49, 160].  
Different types of coding in statistical graphs have been investigated with respect to 
display search time. The coding that gave the best performance was color, the second best 
coding was shape and then came letters/digits [30]. This top ranking of color has been 
confirmed by many other studies [88]. According to these results, one should benefit from 
using color to emphasize the most serious incidents, meaning that the reader should 
identify them more quickly compared to using other means. As in the case of colors, the 
number of different size-categories is not indefinite. The number of different size steps that 
can be distinguished from each others at a glance is as low as four (p. 182). An important 
aspect when using shapes is to avoid symbols of similar shapes. Shapes that are too similar 
have been found to increase search time and are therefore not recommended [148, 160]. 
Studies of rapid processing of information [28, 137] have found letters and digits to be 
some of the best coding forms. These investigations involved Sternberg tasks1 which 
studies short-time memory and how graphical means are memorized. Digits, colors and 
letters were found to be the top three coding forms for rapid processing of information. 
Another investigation found digits, words and letters to be superior to colors and shapes 
when it comes to processing speed, and digits, letters and words were found to represent 
less subjective workload than colors and shapes [155]. These findings support the use of 
textual information in graphical modeling.  
In some general rules regarding the use of shapes are described. For instance that the shape 
of a closed contour can be used to represent a concept type (Figure 32). Risk was one of 
the few relevant concepts for which the original UML profile did not have a special 
symbol. 
Figure 32 – Shapes 
In [19, 160] the authors address evaluation of languages in terms of how easy they are to 
understand for users that are new to it. They look at it from the perspectives of philosophy, 
linguistics and cognitive psychology. They use a selection of the cognitive dimensions of 
[51, 52] to assess a languages ease of understandability. One of the dimensions is the 
number of different symbols in the language. If the number is high, the language will be 
1 For a limited time the subject is shown a set of objects which has to be memorized. 
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more difficult to learn, but the number of symbols must be high enough to ensure the 
language’s expressive power. Other dimensions are the consistency and the 
discriminability of symbols in the language. Both inconsistent symbols and too similar 
symbols may cause misunderstandings. The degree of "motivation" of the symbols in the 
language plays an important role related to understanding. In a motivated language there 
exist a natural relation between the elements of the language and the concepts they 
represent [135]. The symbols in a motivated language will bear meaning in themselves and 
therefore make it easier to understand. As the authors point out, this is a challenge in 
software representations since it is often the effects and interfaces of the system that are 
interesting, not the "thing" itself. Motivation is also dependent on the culture the symbol is 
used in (e.g. a red cross vs. a red half moon).  
3.6.4 Summary 
This section summarizes the graphical mechanisms that may be used in a security risk 
modeling language, and also for what purpose they may be used. 
Mechanism Should be tested for the following purpose 
Size Size may be used to show likelihood of paths in a graph, the magnitude 
of threats, vulnerabilities, threat scenarios, unwanted incidents and risks. 
Text labels Text labels may be used to give additional information to the reader, 
possibly about magnitude or seriousness of risks, unwanted incidents 
and more. It may be used in combination with more graphical 
mechanisms. 
Color Color may be used to show the magnitude of threats, vulnerabilities, 
threat scenarios, unwanted incidents and risks 
Shapes (symbols) Intuitive shapes or symbols may be used to illustrate important concepts 
which contributes to the risks, e.g. vulnerability, different types of threats, 
assets or similar.  
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4 Research Method 
This chapter describes the research method used in our thesis work. We first explain the 
concept of technology research, its methods and evaluation techniques. Then we present 
and motivate our instantiation of this, in particular how the results have been evaluated.
4.1 Technology Research  
Within research on methods, tools, languages etc. for use in system development there are 
two main research paradigms: the behavioral-science paradigm and the design-science 
paradigm [56, 113]. The behavioral-science paradigm originates from research methods 
within natural science where it is used to develop and refine principles and laws. This is 
also considered to be the "classical" way of doing research [151] as we know it from 
mathematics, physics, chemistry and the social sciences. This type of research aims to 
explain phenomena in the world around us. When used in relation to system development 
it focuses on organizational or human aspects. The second research paradigm, design-
science derives from engineering and the sciences of the artificial [144]. It aims to solve a 
problem by developing new artifacts which in relation to e.g. IT systems are defined to be 
constructs, models, methods and instantiations [113].  
The research process used in behavioral-science can be summarized in three steps: (1) 
problem analysis, (2) innovation and (3) evaluation [151]. In the problem analysis phase 
the need for new explanations or adjusted theory is identified. The innovation involves 
coming up with new explanations or extend already existing theories. The evaluation 
should provide support to the new theory, i.e. show that it is in accordance with reality. 
This process may be repeated until the research goal is achieved. Design-science research, 
or technology research as it is called in [151], may use the same process as behavioral-
science: the problem analysis focuses on identifying the needs with respect to a new 
artifact. The innovation consists in inventing and developing this artifact, and finally the 
artifact should be evaluated against relevant needs to show its usefulness. 
Hevner et al. [56] have defined a set of guidelines for design-science in information 
systems. Our research domain, security risk analysis of computerized systems is also 
relevant to information systems and can therefore benefit from using the same set of 
guidelines. The guidelines are meant as assistance for conducting effective design-science 
research: 
1. Design-science research requires the creation of an innovative, purposeful artifact.
2. The artifact must be for a specified problem domain. 
3. Thorough evaluation of the artifact is crucial.
4. The artifact must be innovative, solving an, until now, unsolved problem or solving 
a known problem in a more effective or efficient manner.  
5. The artifact itself must be rigorously defined, formally represented, coherent, and 
internally consistent.  
6. The process by which it is created, and often the artifact itself, incorporates or 
enables a search process whereby a problem space is constructed and a mechanism 
posed or enacted to find an effective solution.
7. The results of the design-science research must be communicated effectively both 
to a technical audience and to a managerial audience. 
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As stated above, a thorough evaluation is crucial and in the section below we survey 
research methods for evaluation.  
4.1.1 Methods for Evaluating the Results 
As highlighted by McGrath [118], an ideal evaluation method should offer high precision, 
be realistic and facilitate generality. Unfortunately, these three aspects are fundamentally 
different from each other and cannot be reached using one evaluation method only. As 
Figure 33 shows, an evaluation method that gives high precision like a laboratory 
experiment is low on both realism and generality. The challenge for the researcher is 
therefore to select a set of evaluation methods that brings sufficiently support to the 
research results. McGrath classifies evaluation methods into eight categories as follows: 
x Laboratory experiment: is an attempt to create a copy of an existing system where 
the researcher can control and possibly isolate (all) the variables to be examined. The 
method can give precise measurements, but lacks realism and its findings are not 
easily generalized. 
x Experimental simulation: is a laboratory test aiming to simulate a real situation 
where the subjects participate for research purposes. When it comes to strengths and 
weaknesses, the method lies between a field study and a laboratory experiment. 
x Field experiment: is a field study carried out in a natural environment, but in which 
the researcher intervenes and manipulates a certain factor. The method lies between a 
field study and a laboratory experiment when it comes to strengths and weaknesses. 
x Field study: consists of direct observations of a "natural" (existing) system, with little 
or no interference from the researcher. The method is realistic, but lacks precision 
and cannot easily be generalized.
x Computer simulation: is to create a model of the real world. The results are low on 
precision, but score on realism and can to a certain degree be generalized. 
x Non-empirical evidence (formal theory): is argumentation based on logical reasoning 
rather than empirical evidence. The results from using the method are suitable for 
generalization, but scores low on realism and precision. 
x Survey: is a collection of information from a broad and carefully selected group of 
informants. The results from a survey may be generalized, but there is less focus on 
realism and precision. 
x Qualitative interview (judgment study): means collecting information from a few 
selected individuals who provide more precise and detailed answers than obtained 
through a survey. The method gives results that are more precise than those of a 
survey, but cannot be generalized to the same degree and is low on realism. 
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Figure 33 – Evaluation methods [118] 
4.2 Our Research Method 
As already explained in Chapter 3, our thesis work has been carried out in the context of 
the research project SECURIS funded by the Research Council of Norway. The research 
activities in SECURIS have been driven by industrial filed trials. Each year from 2003 
until 2007 there was 1-3 such trials. Methods and tools developed within the project were 
thereby tested out in real industrial settings to ensure that they met the needs of the 
industrial partners. Within the SECURIS project, and also in this thesis we refer to these 
trials as field trials although they were more like experimental simulations in the 
classification of McGrath. 
The overall goals of our thesis work is characterized in the problem description in Chapter 
2 as a set of success criteria. The problem description was initially very general and 
unspecified, but as the research progressed it was refined into concrete criteria. This 
iterative and incremental research approach has been used throughout our thesis work. 
More specifically, for each research challenge that occurred we have typically proposed 
one or more solutions and evaluated these to select the most promising solution for further 
work. This iterative process has resulted in four new artifacts, but also new knowledge that 
have general interest beyond our specific approach to security analysis. 
Figure 34 – Our research method 
In the following we present the research methods used for each of the artifacts in the order 
they were presented in Chapter 2:
1. A common basis for security analysis terminology 
2. A language for specifying and documenting security analysis findings 
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3. Modeling instructions for the user 
4. A way of evaluating the quality of security risk modeling approaches  
It is important to note that even though these artifacts are treated separately below, they 
were in fact developed in parallel, and one artifact may build on another (e.g. the language 
builds on the conceptual foundation). 
4.2.1 Developing a Common Basis for Security Analysis Terminology  
The CORAS security analysis method already had a conceptual foundation for security 
analysis terminology. However, this conceptual model had not been subject to empirical 
investigations addressing understandability. 
In order to improve the original model we investigated it in two iterations, first using 
students as subjects (Empirical investigation of terminology I), and then professionals 
within system engineering and risk analysis (Empirical investigation of terminology II). 
Chapter 5 summarizes the two studies, while the full details are available in Appendices A
and B.
Figure 35 – Method used for developing the foundation 
By investigating alternative solutions of the conceptual foundation, the evaluation became 
a part of its development. Both investigations were surveys based on questionnaires, where 
the knowledge of risk analysis terminology was tested. According to McGrath, surveys 
give results that may be generalized, but they will be less precise and low on realism. In 
this case we argue that the realism of the evaluation was higher than normal since we 
investigated the intuitive understanding of the concepts, something that may be relevant in 
any context. The precision of the results is however low since surveys written in natural 
language may give room for misunderstandings. Questions that seemed to have caused 
trouble for the subjects were discarded from the analysis. By doing this we reduced the 
possibility of misinterpreting the findings, which can be seen as an attempt to increase 
precision.
In the following tables, we present the set-up for the two investigations, including a 
description of subjects, material, analysis method, and how the results have been used. 
Table 1 – Set-up for terminology investigation 1 
Subjects: 31 master students in systems engineering from the University of Oslo. 
Material:
A questionnaire with 20 short statements. Each covered the relationship 
between 2-4 security analysis concepts (in the conceptual model), and was 
either correct or incorrect. 
Measuring: The score for each statement, looking for particular easy or difficult concept-relationships. 
Results used for: Redesign of the conceptual model. 
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Table 2 – Set-up for terminology investigation 2 
Subjects: 
57 subjects: 
x 12 professional researchers, including 2 industrial psychologists, from 
the Institute for Energy Technology (http://www.ife.no), who had 
competence on developing safety critical systems for nuclear power 
plants.
x 22 professional researchers, including 3 industrial psychologists, from 
SINTEF ICT (http://www.sintef.no) with competence on software 
development, modeling, and usability studies. 
x 23 master students in systems engineering from the University of Oslo 
and the University College of Østfold. 
Material:
A multiple choice questionnaire with 16 questions or statements about risk 
analysis terminology based on the conceptual model that had been redesigned 
since terminology investigation 1. 
Measuring and 
analyzing: 
The data was analyzed with respect to three aspects:  
x to what extent do the subjects answer correctly without being properly 
trained?  
x is there any difference between the score of the students and the 
professionals?  
x which concepts and relations are particular difficult or easy to 
understand? 
We used the definitions of the conceptual model to decide whether an answer 
was correct or incorrect, and the results were given as percentage of all the 
subjects. 
The difference between the students and the professionals was investigated 
using a one tailed t-test, with a significance level Į=0.05. 57 subjects is 
considered to be sufficient for assuming normal distribution and therefore a 
parametric t-test may be used (the limit is said to be about 30 subjects [159]). 
To identify particularly difficult or easily understandable parts of the terminology 
similar questions were grouped into a total of six groups and the differences 
between these six question groups were investigated using the Wilcoxon 
signed rank test [159] (p. 614), also with a significance level Į=0.05. In this 
case a more conservative, non-parametric test was used since the number of 
questions for each category was different and therefore the data was not 
expected to be normally distributed. A non-parametric test is more conservative 
than its parametric alternative in the sense that it needs a larger sample set to 
discover differences than a parametric, but can on the other hand be used for 
smaller sets and does not assume anything about the population of the sample 
set.  
SPSS v13.0 on Windows XP was used for all the statistical tests. 
Results used for: 
Confirming the design of our conceptual foundation which forms the basis for 
the graphical security risk modeling language, in addition to pointing out 
possible final adjustments. 
4.2.2 Developing a Language for Specifying and Documenting Security 
Analysis Findings 
With the UML profile (Sect. 3.5.1) as the starting point, an improved language was 
developed. The process has been iterative and incremental (Figure 36) in the sense that the 
language has been tested in several field trials, each time in a improved version, based on 
the previous field trials and also findings from other investigations. After completing the 
final version of the graphical language, a structured semantics has been defined (Sect. 
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8.1.4) capturing the intended meaning of the CORAS diagrams in terms of paragraphs in 
English.
CORAS UML 
profile
SECURIS field 
trials
Empirical 
investigation of 
UML icons
New CORAS 
language
SECUIRS field 
trials
Empirical 
investigation of 
modeling 
preferences
CORAS language 
final version of 
graphical syntax
Structured 
semantics
Figure 36 – Method used for developing the security risk modeling language 
Different evaluation methods have been used during the development of the CORAS 
language. The evaluations have given valuable input for further research and redesign. The 
evaluation methods used were: SECURIS field trials (what McGrath refers to as 
experimental simulation), "classroom experiment" (close to laboratory experiment), survey 
and a "modeling benchmarking test" (a kind of experimental simulation). 
SECURIS field trials 
The field trials in SECURIS also falls within the category of action research [13, 37] since 
the researchers played the role of analysts and therefore to some extent were within the 
scope of the object studied. The researchers facilitated and led the analysis, while the client 
decided the scope of the analysis and provided people and resources. Each security 
analysis required about 250 person hours from the analysis team, and 50-100 hours from 
the client. The security analyses produced two reports, one confidential report presenting 
the findings regarding security risks, and one presenting lessons learned from applying the 
CORAS method and the current version of the security risk modeling approach. The results 
were used to improve both method and modeling approach before the next SECURIS trial. 
The first application of the UML profile in real security analyses provided experience with 
practical use, and formed the basic requirements to such a language. In the subsequent field 
trials, improved versions of the modeling language were tested and a modeling practice 
was gradually established. The field trials were a unique opportunity to test the method and 
modeling on real security issues since it was integrated in the client organizations regular 
work on security. The client and its representatives had a genuine interest in the findings 
from the analysis, and the results influenced decisions beyond the scope of the actual 
analysis, in some cases it had effects throughout the whole organization. To get the 
participants personal view on the method and modeling, we collected written feedback via 
evaluation forms.  
Classroom experiment 
One of the innovations of the UML profile was the use of specially designed icons related 
to security risks. Our first investigation aimed to gather support for this design decision by 
comparing models with and without special icons to identify differences. The special icons 
should help inexperienced users to understand the language better and faster, and therefore 
master students in system engineering were used as subjects. (See also Chapter 5
(summary) or Appendix A.)
4 – Research method  
A graphical approach to security risk analysis 53
Survey
After several field trials, the language had "stabilized" and it was time to make the final 
design decisions regarding the modeling style and its graphical representation in the form 
of concrete syntax. To identify the preferences of the users, we presented several ways of 
modeling the same scenarios to a group of subjects and asked them to select the ones they 
preferred. We also tried to learn from related research within other domains; in particular, 
we made use of recommendations from the field of from graphical information 
visualization. (See also Chapter 5 (summary) or Appendix G.)
Modeling benchmarking test 
The modeling benchmarking test consists of a set of core security risk scenarios, defined 
on the basis of field trials and more general security risk related information (Chapter 6).
The collection of scenarios is an example of information gathered during a typical security 
analysis. Modeling the core security scenarios with the CORAS language may be seen as 
kind of experimental simulation in McGrath’s terminology.  
With respect to Figure 33, we note that the icon investigation scores high on precision, the 
investigation of modeling preferences scores on generality, and the SECURIS field trials 
and the modeling-benchmarking test are fairly strong on realism. However, these 
evaluations have focused on slightly different aspects of the same modeling approach. The 
CORAS security risk modeling approach consists of both a language (syntax + semantics) 
as well as a modeling guideline, all strongly connected to the CORAS security analysis 
method. It is therefore unfeasible to continue focusing on separate evaluations of the 
different parts, and instead consentrate on experiences from practical application of the full 
CORAS approach. 
The validity of the structured semantics has been ensured by using diagrams from real field 
trials as input for the pattern-matching rules. Since the structured semantics covers every 
legal combination of constructs, the developers had to precisely define de permitted 
modeling options and styles. This also provided valuable input to the modeling guideline. 
The research has so far completed the set of rules, and the next step will be to evaluate the 
diagram translation with respect to understandability and more. 
In the following tables, we present the set-up for the classroom experiment (the icon 
investigation) and the survey (investigating modeling preferences), including a description 
of subjects, material, analysis method, and how the results have been used. 
Table 3 – Set-up for the icon investigation 
Subjects: 
25 master students in system engineering from the University of Oslo. The 
experiment took place as an exercise in the master course "Unassessable IT 
systems". 
Material:
The icon experiment material consisted of two sets of security risk scenarios 
modeled with the UML profile, one using standard UML icons and one using 
CORAS icons, and a related questionnaire. 13 of the 25 subjects received 
models with CORAS icons, 12 received standard UML icons. Both sets were 
stereotyped2 with stereotype names (see Figure 37). 
The material had three parts:  
x Part 1 and 2 consisted of questions related to whether the subjects 
2 In UML one uses stereotyping to label elements of different kinds. This can be either textual, with icons or 
both. “<<Actor>>” is an example of textual stereotyping that often is added to the pin-man icon in UML. 
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were able to quickly identify specific elements like treatment, risk, 
threat agent etc. in a model (i.e. whether they are able to navigating 
the models). The questions were of the type "How many assets are 
explicitly modeled in this diagram?"  
x Part 3 focused on how the models were understood and interpreted. 
An example of the type of question used here is "Which unwanted 
incidents affect the asset "Web server" in this model?" 
For part 1 and 2 the subjects had only a limited time to answer the 
questionnaire (3 minutes and 1,5 minutes) to stress the point that they 
should quickly identify the different diagram elements. For part 3 they had 
more time available (15 minutes). 
Measuring and 
analyzing: 
The two groups of subjects were compared to see whether the one with 
CORAS icons received a higher score than the group without.  
In the same manner we analyzed whether one group managed to complete 
more questions than the other group, or used less time pr. model-question-
set.  
Since the number of subjects that answered within each part of the 
questionnaire decreased for each part, in addition to an overall limited 
sample set, we used a non-parametric test to ensure that our statistical 
analysis was conservative. The non-parametric Mann-Whitney test was used 
with alpha level = 0.05. 
Results used for: 
To decide whether one should continue to use special graphical icons in the 
security risk modeling language because it had positive effects on the 
interpretation of the models.  
Figure 37 – Icons used in the icon investigation 
Table 4 – Set-up for the modeling preferences investigation 
Subjects: 
33 professionals within system engineering: 
The majority were males between the age of 26 and 35 with 1-3 years of 
work experience.  
Material:
The material was in the form of a questionnaire with alternative 
representations of a CORAS threat diagram. The diagram was a simplified 
version of a real threat diagram. The subjects were to prioritize between 
different modeling alternatives using the set-up shown in Figure 38. The 
survey was distributed via e-mail to people in various parts of the software 
industry. 
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Measuring and 
analyzing: 
The investigation targeted three unsolved issues: 
x How should we visualize frequency measures in threat diagrams to 
ease graph navigation, especially the likelihood of single relations and 
combined relations? 
x What is the preferred way of visualizing vulnerabilities? 
x How can we visualize risks in the models to improve the 
understanding of this abstract concept? 
The null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis for all tasks were: 
H0: the modeling alternatives are equally preferred by the subjects. 
H1: the modeling alternatives are not equally preferred. 
The data was recoded into "0" and "1" to reflect which diagram that was 
preferred: a mark in one of the three fields to the left (see Figure 38) was 
transformed into "0" and marks in the three fields to the right were recoded 
as "1". The middle field was interpreted as missing data to obtain a cut-off 
point between the two sides. The frequency of 1’s and 0’s could thereafter 
be compared.  
The data was in the form of frequencies and not distributed normally; 
therefore the non-parametric Chi-Square test [143] was used to identify 
possible statistical differences between the representations with a 
significance level of 0,05. The Chi-Square test uses the assumption that the 
frequency of 1’s and 0’s are the same.  
SPSS v13.0 on Windows XP was used for the statistical tests. 
Results used for: Deciding how the final version of the security modeling language should look like with respect to design and layout for particular modeling tasks. 
Figure 38 – Instructions for filling out the modeling preference tasks 
4.2.3 Developing Modeling Instructions for the User
In order to use the security risk modeling language to its full potential there is a need for a 
modeling guideline, particularly targeting inexperienced users. The modeling guideline can 
be seen as the link between the language and the method, and changes to either one of 
them affects the guideline. The early use of the UML profile in the CORAS project had 
established a kind of modeling practice. This practice was applied in the SECURIS field 
trials, each time in a revised version based on experiences from the previous field trial. 
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Figure 39 – Method used for developing the guideline 
The evaluations of the modeling guideline are based on lessons learned from field trials, 
experimental simulation in terms of consistency checking against the structured semantics 
and modeling the benchmarking test case. 
The SECURIS field trials differed a lot with respect to target, technology, scope and 
complexity. It was therefore unfeasible, and also impossible to define a strict guideline at 
an early stage. As the field trials progressed, the guideline was adapted to handle the 
various challenges that arose. 
The development of the structured semantics provided valuable input to the modeling 
guideline. Before the structured semantics, the modeling style for each diagram type was a 
bit underspecified. The formal style of the structured semantics forced the developers to 
decide which combinations of constructs that should be allowed in a diagram. The 
guideline had to ensure that it did not conflict with the permitted and unacceptable 
constructs in the language. In this way, the structured semantics worked as a consistency, 
or quality check of the guideline. This work made the modeling guideline more complete 
and also helped define the exact content and purpose of each of diagram type.  
In the same manner as the language itself must handle the core security risk scenarios 
(benchmarking test), it should be easy to arrive at these models by following the modeling 
guideline. This can be seen as a kind of experimental simulation where the use of the 
guideline is simulated. This simulation made it easier to identify inconsistencies, lack of 
guidance or similar, in the guideline. 
It would have been extremely valuable to apply the guideline in a field study without the 
involvement of the researchers. After the field study, there should have been a qualitative 
interview of the users to obtain in-depth information about their experience with the 
guideline. However, this was not practical within the setting of the SECURIS project. 
4.2.4 Developing a Way of Evaluating the Quality of Security Risk Modeling 
Approaches 
The quality framework for security risk analysis modeling approaches has been developed 
to evaluate the new CORAS language, an also to make it easier for others to evaluate the 
quality and expressiveness of security risk modeling approaches.  
Three main sources of information were used when developing the quality framework: 
x SEQUAL [100-104] a quality framework for modeling languages within information 
modeling.
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x Modeling needs within security analysis in general, particularly with focus on 
weaknesses in existing risk modeling notations. 
x The use of the UML profile during field trials. 
Evaluation of the framework has been made in two iterations; first integrated as part of its 
development, and second by applying it to the UML profile and the new CORAS language. 
Figure 40 – Method used for developing the quality framework 
When specifying the language requirements we used SEQUAL as basis. SEQUAL has 
been developed for comparing modeling languages, identify areas where a language needs 
improvements etc. In addition to the general quality requirements, more security analysis 
specific requirements were included into the SEQUAL structure. These were based on 
relevant modeling needs of existing security risk- and risk analysis methods. A security 
risk modeling language must be able to express realistic and relevant security risk 
scenarios. In the SECURIS field trials we have gained experience that we have used to 
construct a complete example of informal security analysis documentation called "the core 
security risk scenarios". (See also Chapter 6). The evaluation of the quality framework 
during its development is based on non-empirical evidence. Each requirement is followed 
by a characterization of the rationale for its inclusion into the framework (see Chapter 6).
This makes it possible for a potential user of the framework to understand the background 
for the requirement and judge the relevance of a given requirement.  
To evaluate the final quality framework it was first applied to the UML profile (See 
summary in Chapter 7, [57]). The results were important to the problem analysis (See 
Chapter 2) since it gave valuable insight into the weaknesses and strengths of the UML 
profile, and consequently which parts that we had to improve in the new CORAS language. 
The second evaluation of the framework was to apply it to the new CORAS language 
(Chapter 9 and Appendix H). These two evaluations may be classified as experimental 
simulations where the framework is tested against real modeling approaches. After two 
evaluations, there were indications that some of the requirements originating from 
information modeling and some of the early requirements to security risk analysis 
modeling, were not as relevant as they had seemed3. An example is the general 
requirement that all concepts in a language must have a special symbol. Experience with 
the CORAS method in practice, does not support the request for a special symbol for e.g. 
"consequence", - but we cannot exclude that other approaches may need it. Because of this, 
we chose to keep these requirements in the framework since they may be relevant to other 
kinds of security risk modeling approaches than CORAS.  
3 The requirements that have been characterized as less relevant are listed in the framework description in 
Chapter 6, and also in Appendix H.
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5  Initial Investigations 
This chapter presents the initial investigations the results of which heavily influenced the 
design of the CORAS language. We first conducted a study of the interpretation of the 
conceptual model already developed in the CORAS project (5.2.1) prior to the start-up of 
our thesis work. On the basis of this investigation we came up with a revised conceptual 
foundation. We later conducted a second investigation focusing on improving finding ways 
to improve the understandability of certain important concepts (5.2.2). The last of the 
initial investigations was an experiment testing whether to use specialized graphical icons 
(5.3).
We start by explaining the original conceptual model developed in the CORAS project 
(5.1).
5.1 The Original Conceptual Model of the CORAS Project 
Security analysis uses a terminology that includes general risk analysis concepts as well as 
more specialized security analysis terminology. A conceptual model may be used to 
explain how a concept like risk relates to for example threat or vulnerability. In the 
CORAS project, the conceptual model also played an important role as a kind of abstract 
syntax for the CORAS UML profile (presented in Sect. 3.5.1).
The original conceptual model of CORAS in Figure 41 using the class diagram notation 
from the Unified Modeling Language (UML) [125]. The associations between the elements 
have cardinalities that say how many instances of one element that can be related to one 
instance of the other (example: "a stakeholder has at least one and maximum an infinite 
number of assets; and an asset belongs to only one stakeholder").  
Figure 41 – The original conceptual model of CORAS 
The concepts used in the model are defined as follows: 
x Stakeholders are those people and organizations who may affect, be affected by, or 
perceive themselves to be affected by, a decision or activity regarding the target system 
[7].
x An asset is something to which a stakeholder directly assigns value and, hence, for 
which the stakeholder requires protection [54]. A stakeholder wants to protect his/her 
assets from being compromised.  
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x An entity is a physical or abstract part or feature of the target of evaluation that 
becomes an asset when assigned value by a stakeholder, for example a service provided 
by the target [112]. 
x A vulnerability is a weakness of an asset or group of assets which can be exploited by 
one or more threats [76]. 
x An unwanted incident [54] is an event that may harm one or more assets and 
something one wants to prevent. An unwanted incident is the result of a threat 
exploiting a vulnerability.
x A threat is a potential cause of an unwanted incident [76] i.e. someone or something 
that wants to harm, remove or interfere with the asset. 
x A risk is the chance of something happening that will have an impact upon objectives 
(assets) [7]. A risk is the combination of an unwanted incident, the chance of it 
happening and its consequence.
x Consequence is the outcome of an event expressed qualitatively or quantitatively, 
being a loss, injury, disadvantage or gain [7]. 
x Frequency a measure of the rate of occurrence of an event expressed as the number of 
occurrences of an event in a given time [7]. 
x A treatment is the selection and implementation of appropriate options for dealing 
with risk [7].  
5.2 Investigating Concepts and Terminology 
5.2.1 The First Terminology Investigation 
As described in the previous section, the CORAS method and UML profile had a 
conceptual foundation defined in a UML class diagram. Several of its concepts and 
definitions are used in daily language, but often in a different meaning and with no link to 
its original context. For instance, many of us have probably used the phrase "I won’t take 
the risk" without giving the definition of risk any thought.
The purpose of the first terminology investigation was to identify the parts of the CORAS 
conceptual model that are particularly difficult (or straightforward) to understand. The 
assumption for our investigation was that a precisely defined conceptual model would 
reduce the misunderstanding related to ambiguous terminology in a security analysis 
method. The questionnaire that was used tested definitions of concepts, as well as how the 
different concepts relate to each other (for more about the set up we refer to Sect. 4.2.1).
The results showed that few subjects had problems with the relation between a stakeholder 
and an asset, or between a threat and a vulnerability. These concepts are part of the daily 
language and most people have an intuitive understanding of them. Concepts like 
frequency, consequence and probability created more confusion and a large majority was 
not aware that probability is kind of frequency. The results showed the importance of using 
terms that are intuitively understood, not conflicting with the daily language. 
On the basis of these results we propose a set of changes to the original model (Figure 41) 
which are implemented in Figure 42: 
x To avoid confusion about frequency, probability and consequence we have included 
probability as a specialization of frequency. 
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x In order to emphasize that a risk consists of a frequency value, consequence value and 
an unwanted incident, these terms have been grouped together in a logical manner that 
illustrates how they are components of a risk. The black diamond symbolizes that if a 
risk is eliminated this will also remove the frequency and consequence values 
(composition). The white diamond means that the unwanted incident is a part of the 
risk, but if the risk is eliminated the unwanted incident may still exist in other risks 
(aggregation). The direct relation between treatment and unwanted incident has been 
removed and instead we have connected treatment to risk. By doing this we specify 
that a treatment is directed towards a risk, but not whether it targets a vulnerability, a 
threat, an unwanted incident or a combination of these. 
x The association between asset and risk was a major source for misunderstandings. 
Nevertheless, we have decided to keep the relation because we believe it is important. 
The subjects seem to think of an unwanted incident in the way we use the term risk, 
and by removing the direct association between asset and unwanted incident we hope 
that this misunderstanding will be less common. 
x We chose to remove "entity" from the model. The term was often misunderstood 
(48.9% incorrect or uncertain answers). In addition, it is not natural to speak of 
general entities in a structured brainstorming, only entities assigned value which then 
are called assets. 
x The association between asset and vulnerability has been changed from a regular 
relation to become a part of the asset in the sense that an asset can have a 
vulnerability.
x In the original conceptual model it is not explicitly modeled that "a threat exploits a 
vulnerability to initiate an unwanted incident". This is an intuitive relation that 
achieved a high percentage of correct answers and we feel it is correct to make it 
clearer than it was in the original model. 
x The new model tries to emphasize that an unwanted incident is a part of a risk and 
therefore one or more threats are always associated with the risk through its unwanted 
incident.
x We have also chosen to highlight concepts grouped together in the form of 
compositions and aggregations, i.e. vulnerability is tightly connected to asset, and risk 
is a concept that includes three other concepts. 
Figure 42 – The first revision of the conceptual foundation 
5.2.2 The Second Terminology Investigation 
The second terminology investigation considered how the revised conceptual foundation 
was understood among professionals and students within software engineering and risk 
analysis. The subjects had various competences in one or more of the following domains:  
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(1) system modeling and design,  
(2) risk analysis and system development in the safety domain and  
(3) system development and security.  
The investigation used a similar set up as the first terminology investigation. The model in 
Figure 42 had after the previous investigation been extended with the concept likelihood.
Likelihood was in [7] defined as a qualitative description of probability or frequency, and 
we decided to include it as a specialization of frequency. 
The findings showed major differences between the various risk-related concepts. Asset 
and vulnerability related questions received the highest number of correct answers, while 
the frequency related obtained the lowest number. Many of the terms we have in our 
conceptual model (Figure 42) are well understood, even by people without training in risk 
analysis. Being more experienced in risk analysis, the professionals obtained a higher 
number of correct answers than the students. 
The results from this study show that the revised model successfully reflects the subjects’ 
common understanding of the risk analysis terminology. Nevertheless, we made some 
adjustments based on the findings from this investigation: 
x To increase the awareness of non-human threats we have specified threat into human 
threat and non-human threat.  
x The specialization of frequency into probability and likelihood was not satisfactory. 
According to [6] likelihood is a general descriptions of frequency or probability and 
can be expressed both qualitatively and quantitatively. Even though likelihood covers 
the other terms, it has turned out as one of the most difficult concepts to understand. 
The conceptual foundation will therefore not distinguish between the frequency 
measures (probability/frequency/likelihood), but leave it to the security analysis team 
to decide which one to use.
The UML 2.0 class diagram in Figure 43 shows the final model (the shaded areas are not 
part of the UML notation and merely highlight concepts that are closely related to each 
other).
Asset
Vulnerability
Unwanted incident
Treatment
ConsequenceLikelihood/
frequency/
probability
Risk
Threat
Stakeholder
111
1 1
1
1..*
1..*
*
*
1
*
*
1..*
*
*
*
1..*
*
1..*
Human threat
Non-human threat
Figure 43 – The final revision of the conceptual foundation 
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5.3 Investigating the Use of Specialized Graphical 
Symbols
In addition to the terminology investigations, we explored the effect of using graphical, 
risk related symbols in risk modeling. This investigation is called the icon experiment. 
The UML use case notation has its own set of standardized icons, but, the UML profile is 
recognized by its specialized graphical icons that symbolize the different terms in the 
conceptual model. The icons were believed to make the models easier to read and 
understand. Often graphical icons are seen as merely "decoration" just to make the models 
look nicer, but it is often believed that they may also improve the understandability of the 
models.
In this experiment we investigated whether the use of specialized icons make the models 
easier to understand. The difference between the standard UML icons and the specialized 
CORAS icons are shown in Figure 44. 
Figure 44 – Standard UML icons and the UML profile symbols 
The results from the icon experiment showed that stereotyping with CORAS icons vs. 
UML icons improves the speed of navigation, i.e. identification of specific model 
elements. The results showed a statistical significant difference in the number of questions 
completed in favor of the group using CORAS icons. The icons did not affect the 
correctness of interpretation of models. Hence, the number of misinterpretations did not 
increase. 
The conclusion from our icon experiment is that using the specialized graphical icons helps 
the participants in a structured brainstorming session to identify the same model elements 
faster than if standard icons are used without increasing the number of misinterpretations.
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6 Language Requirements Defined within a 
Quality Framework 
In this section we present our requirements to an ideal security risk modeling language in a 
framework that focuses on the quality of the language. This quality framework consists of 
two parts, first we describe the core modeling needs related to the different phases in the 
security analysis process. Then we use a quality evaluation framework for modeling 
languages called SEQUAL to structure and identify the detailed requirements. 
In the following terms like model, conceptual model, modeling language and diagram are 
used. A model is a collection of diagrams that describes a system. The diagrams can show 
different views of the system’s architecture, functions, processes etc. and are made with a 
modeling language. Figure 45 illustrates the relationships between these terms. A 
conceptual model is a description of important concepts, or terms, and how they relate to 
each other.
Figure 45 – Relationships between system, model and diagrams 
To our knowledge it does not exist any predefined "benchmarking" scenarios we can use to 
evaluate a security risk modeling languages, therefore we have defined a set of test 
scenarios representing typical modeling needs identified through experience from several 
industrial security risk analyses. The phases in CORAS have different purposes and 
therefore different modeling needs. In the following we give an overview of the general 
modeling needs for each of the phases and a description of the core modeling needs using a 
security risk case as a benchmarking test. This test case inspired by, but not similar to, the 
field trials and should therefore represent realistic security analysis information. The 
information is structured according to which phase it is gathered in, using the CORAS 
method. The idea is that a good security risk modeling language should be able to model 
all aspects of this information, which we call the core security risk scenarios. 
6.1 The Core Security Risk Scenarios 
In order to evaluate a security risk modeling language we need a benchmarking case 
representing core security risk scenarios to test the notation against. Through experience 
from several major security analyses in the SECURIS project we have gathered typical 
security analysis information into a complete set of scenarios from (1)-context 
establishment through (2)-risk identification, (3)-risk estimation, (4)-risk evaluation and 
(5) treatment identification. For each of the five phases we explain what the purpose of the 
phase is and what tasks it includes. Then we present relevant security analysis information 
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that may be modeled graphically using a security modeling language. The characteristics 
of the core security risk scenarios are among others: 
x There are two stakeholders of the system (one client, one other interested party. The 
distinction lies in whether the stakeholder is economically responsible for the analysis 
(e.g. a client like a company) or not (e.g. other interested party like the authorities). 
Multiple stakeholders in a security analysis makes it more complicated when it comes 
to judging: what are the assets of the analysis? And what risk level can be accepted?
x Assets may depend on each others, meaning damage to one asset may indirectly 
damage another asset. This has also been addressed in the core security risk scenarios. 
x Often the statistical material on which to make judgments about how often an incident 
may occur is limited. In the example case we have used an approach that does not 
require precise, numerical input for the likelihood of unwanted incidents. 
x When a risk is found acceptable, it should be documented but kept out of the treatment 
identification phase to ensure enough focus on the unacceptable risks. 
6.1.1 Phase I: Establishing the Context 
In this phase it is important to obtain an understanding of the target of analysis and its 
assets. The context establishment also focuses on the stakeholder’s main concerns 
regarding target vulnerabilities and threats. The following aspects needs to be modeled (in 
one or more diagrams) 
x Target overview diagram: an overview of the target (system or part of a system) that 
will be analyzed, annotated with the stakeholder(s), the assets, the main vulnerabilities 
and the main threats  
An overview diagram of this type will help scoping the analysis during the preliminary 
security analysis and ensure that the correct level of details is established at an early point 
in time.  
The assets are important in the CORAS method and therefore it can be useful to model 
them explicitly in a separate diagram: 
x Asset diagram: describing the assets, how they relate and a ranking of their perceived 
importance. Assets that are affected by risks often have relations to other assets which 
indirectly may be affected. Even if some assets are defined to be out of the scope of 
the analysis, it is useful to model them to see the overall asset-picture. 
6.1.1.1 Core Security Risk Scenarios in Phase I 
Target description: The target of analysis is a web portal that serves as a communication 
medium between ordinary citizens and various public entities. The information provided is 
confidential personal information. The company that develops the portal will gather 
information from several databases within the public entities. The users authenticate 
themselves to the web portal using a password and username, while the authentication 
mechanism is simpler for the developers. Inside the developers network one uses a simple 
"remember-this-computer" mechanism to access the portal without being prompted for 
username and password each time. The users are free to set their own passwords without 
restrictions. Due to the importance of the information provided to its users, the service 
must be available 24/7. The web portal will gradually put into service and the security 
analysis will look at the security during development, testing and maintenance.  
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Stakeholders, clients and other interested parties: There are two stakeholders in this 
case where the company management is the client of the analysis, i.e. the one paying for 
the analysis. The other stakeholder is the central authority who is considered to be one of 
the "other parties". Other parties are not paying for the analysis itself, but have the 
authority to set requirements to the risk acceptance levels. In this case the analysis has been 
initiated as a consequence of the security requirements from the central authorities and 
therefore they are included in the analysis: 
x Company management (CM) that develops and delivers the service, and therefore 
bears all the costs related to the development and maintenance. 
x Central authorities (CA) that regulate what information the service should provide 
and how it should be protected. They have the authority to close down the service if it 
fails to fulfill their regulations. 
Assets: The assets related to the target of analysis are ranged according to its values to the 
client and other parties. The potential damage a threat may cause to the asset (lost asset 
value) is not specified in details but described shortly in the parentheses:  
The company management’s assets: 
x CM1 – Users personal information (damage is measured by the type of information 
disclosure, for example major = the information is available to the public for one day, 
medium = the information is available to the public for one hour, minor = the 
information is available to an unauthorized employee in the company for a week) 
x CM2 – Company reputation (damage is measured by the type of negative media 
publicity in, TV, radio, large newspaper or small newspaper, negative rumors etc.) 
x CM3 – Availability of service (damage is measured as down time of the service)  
x CM4 – User efficiency (damage is measured as the increased effort needed to use the 
functions provided by the service) 
The central authorities’ assets:
x CA1 – Users personal information (measured as above) 
x CA2 – Availability of the service (measured as above) 
x CA3 – User efficiency (measured as above) 
The assets are not independent, meaning if one asset is harmed it may affect other assets. 
An in some cases an asset has to be harmed first before another asset can be harmed. In 
this case the first asset is called a direct asset and the second an indirect asset. The 
identified relations between assets are: 
x Company reputation (CM2) can only be harmed if one of the other assets is harmed 
first. This means that CM2 is an indirect asset. 
x Within the scope of the analysis, only damage to the availability of service may affect 
user efficiency (CM4, CA3), making User efficiency (CA3) an indirect asset. 
Measures: One needs to define several different measures like asset values, likelihood of 
risk and consequences of risks: 
x Assets: may be ranged according to their perceived importance, monetary values etc. 
but is not required. 
x Likelihood is measured qualitatively in three categories: seldom (= 1 time per 5 years 
or less), sometimes (= more than 1 time per 5 years and less than 1 time per year) and 
often (= 1 time per year or more). The categories may be mapped to intervals of 
probabilities if such data is available and appropriate to use.
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x Consequence is measured qualitatively in three categories: minor, moderate and
major. The consequence categories should to be mapped to actual damage for each 
asset. A "minor" damage could in some cases mean "system down in 2 minutes" while 
in other cases a minor consequence could be "system down in 4 hours". This should 
be specified in accordance with the client and other parties. In this generic case we 
will only use the category names since substituting them with numbers or text would 
have no impact on how it is modeled graphically. 
x Risk value is measured in three categories: low, medium and high. The risk value is 
based on a combination of likelihood and consequence, either as a risk matrix (like in 
this case) or a risk function that computes a value based on probability and 
consequence (this requires the consequence to be measured quantitatively). 
Likelihood 
Consequence Seldom Sometimes Often
Minor Low Low Medium 
Moderate Low Medium High 
Major Medium High High 
Figure 46 – Risk value matrix 
x Risk reduction is measured in terms of decreased risk value (based on reduction in 
consequence and/or likelihood). 
Risk evaluation criteria: The tolerance levels, or acceptance levels, for risks against 
specific assets are decided already at this stage in the analysis. In this case the two 
stakeholders, company management and the central authority value the assets differently, 
and consequently have different risk acceptance levels. These levels are later used during 
risk evaluation to decide which risks that can be accepted and which that need to be 
treated. 
Table 5 – Risk evaluation criteria 
Asset Max accepted risk level  
 CM (Client): CA (Other parties): 
User’s personal information low risk low risk 
Company’s reputation medium risk any risk 
Availability of service medium risk medium risk 
User efficiency high risk medium risk 
6.1.2 Phase II: Identifying Risks 
This phase needs models of two main types: system models (UML etc.) and risk models. 
The first type depends on the target type and is not part of the core modeling scenarios. 
The risk models must include one or more diagrams that include:  
x the threats and threat scenarios related to assets. 
x the vulnerabilities and which threats that can exploit them (i.e. the threat’s way "into" 
the target).  
x the unwanted incidents the threats may cause 
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6.1.2.1 Core Security Risk Scenarios in Phase II 
Threats: There are both human and non-human threats, that either can be threats by an 
accident or have more deliberate motives (these distinctions are in accordance with the 
security standard ISO/IEC13335 [76]): 
x Company employee (human, accidental): an employee may make a mistake causing 
an unwanted incident or unintentionally infect the server with malicious code during 
an update. 
x Company employee (human, deliberate): an employee may use his or her access 
rights to intentionally cause an unwanted incident.
x Hacker (human, deliberate): a hacker may want to harm the users or the company 
for fun or for economical reasons (e.g. blackmailing). 
x Internal infrastructure (non-human): hardware or software, part of the service, may 
fail and initiate unwanted incidents. 
x External resources (non-human): resources that deliver data to the service. 
x Virus attack (non-human): an environmental circumstance outside the company’s 
control.
x Web portal service user (human, accidental): a user may for example use the 
service incorrectly  
Vulnerabilities:
x Insufficient authentication mechanisms: within the company development team the 
authentication mechanism only requires a username and a password, no secure ID or 
similar identification. Inside the company network the user is not prompted for 
username or password when applying the "remember-me" function. 
x System design weakness: the development environment used by the company has 
very few restrictions on what an employee may modify and does not provide warnings 
related to critical updates. 
x Unsecured WLAN: the company has an open WLAN in their development 
environment which is possible to detect outside the company building.  
x Too simple password: there is no control on whether the user of the portal changes 
his initial password, and if he does there are no rules for how the new password 
should look like (length and combination of letters, numbers) 
x Shared infrastructure resources: the service runs on hardware or software that is 
shared with other less critical services. This means that if one of the other services 
encounter a problem it may affect the service. 
x Low robustness: in cases of high traffic to the portal, the server tends to degrade in 
performance and response time increases. 
x External resource failure: a resource that provides data to the web portal service 
may fail, and the service is dependent on the availability of these databases. 
x Internal hardware or software failure: the internal infrastructure may fail due to 
hardware or software errors. 
x Insufficient logging: access and modification of user’s personal information is 
insufficiently logged, meaning that one cannot be sure who has made the changes (i.e. 
the user or one of the company’s employees). 
x Unclear security update routines: security updates are communicated via e-mail or 
the intranet and the individual employee is responsible for keeping his or her 
computer updated.  
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Unwanted incidents: The unwanted incidents that may happen are listed below followed 
by a description of the threat scenarios that may lead to the incident (the threat is marked 
with bold fonts): 
U1: Disclosure of users’ personal information: 
1. An employee may unintentionally modify the system making it disclose personal 
information of one or more users to all the other users. 
2. An employee may use her or his job privileges to access users’ personal 
information and use it for blackmailing (no internal logging in the company).  
3. An employee in the company may use another employee’s computer that has the 
"remember-me" function enabled and thereby get access to users’ personal 
information. 
4. A hacker may attack the service via the WLAN and eavesdrop to the data 
transmission. 
5. A hacker may exploit the simple password policy to access users’ personal 
information. 
U2: Unauthorized modification of users’ personal information: 
1. An employee may use her or his job privileges to modify users’ personal 
information without being logged. 
2. An employee may unintentionally update the system causing it to modify or delete 
users’ personal information. 
3. A user may enter information repeatedly if the service’s response time is too long, 
accidentally making the information incorrect. 
4. A hacker may attack the data transmission via the WLAN and tamper with users’ 
personal information. 
5. Virus attack on the service may cause the server to crash, deleting all active user 
sessions and their previous data modifications leaving the information partly 
incorrect.
6. A user may unintentionally enter wrong or incomplete information to the service, 
affecting already stored data. Without any logging it is impossible to prove who is 
responsible for the changes. 
U3: Unavailability of service due to hackers: 
1. A hacker may cause a denial-of-service-attack to the service making it unavailable 
to both customers and employees. 
2. A hacker may use the WLAN to obtain a password and a username and then use 
this to log in as an employee with authorized access to servers, and therefore be 
able to tamper with the server or databases.  
U4: Unavailability of service due to infrastructure failure: 
1. Hardware or software, part of the service infrastructure, may fail or malfunction 
and make the service fully or partly unavailable. 
2. External sources of information may fail or malfunction making the service 
unavailable.
U5: Unavailability of service due to malicious code: 
1. An employee may unintentionally infect the server with malicious code using a 
false security or operative system patch. 
2. A virus attack may cause extensive traffic and thereby make the service 
unavailable.
6 – Language requirements 
A graphical approach to security risk analysis 71
U6: Damage to company reputation: 
1. If users’ personal information is disclosed to media it may harm the company’s 
reputation.
2. If the possibility to modify users’ personal information is disclosed to the press it 
may harm the company’s reputation. 
3. If the service is unavailable it may harm the company’s reputation. 
U7: Reduced user efficiency: 
1. If the service is unavailable it may reduce the users’ efficiency. 
6.1.3 Phase III: Estimating Risks 
Estimating risks is to provide likelihood and potential consequence estimates for each risk. 
The modeling needs in this phase are: 
x A description of the risks that includes both the threat’s method(s) and which assets 
that are harmed. (giving a possibility to annotate threat scenarios and unwanted 
incidents with likelihood estimates.)  
x A description of the associations between an unwanted incident and an asset, 
representing risks. This can be annotated with the most likely consequence value 
(e.g. "loss of 1-10K €", "10-20% reduced user efficiency") reflecting the scale the 
asset is measured in.  
If the proper data is available one can apply statistical methods and conventional modeling 
notations like fault trees [66] and event trees [64].
6.1.3.1 Core Security Risk Scenarios in Phase III 
Each risk is given a consequence and likelihood estimate as shown in the following table. 
Table 6 – Risks with consequence and likelihood estimates 
Risks Asset 
harmed
Consequence 
estimate
Likelihood
estimate
R1CM) Disclosure of users’ personal 
information
CM1 Major Sometimes 
R1CA) Disclosure of users’ personal 
information
CA1 Major Sometimes 
R2CM) Unauthorized modification of 
user’s personal information 
CM1 Major Seldom 
R2CA) Unauthorized modification of 
user’s personal information 
CA1 Major Seldom 
R3CM) Unavailability of service due to 
hackers 
CM3 Major Seldom 
R3CA) Unavailability of service due to 
hackers 
CA2 Major Seldom 
R4CM) Unavailability of service due to 
infrastructure failure 
CM3 Moderate Sometimes 
R4CA) Unavailability of service due to 
infrastructure failure 
CA2 Moderate Sometimes 
R5CM) Unavailability of service due to 
malicious code 
CM3 Moderate Seldom 
R5CA) Unavailability of service due to 
malicious code 
CA2 Moderate Seldom 
R6CM) Damage to company reputation CM2 Moderate Seldom 
R7CM) Reduced user efficiency CM4 Minor Sometimes 
R7CA) Reduced user efficiency CA3 Moderate Sometimes 
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6.1.4 Phase IV: Evaluating Risks 
When evaluating the risks one decides which ones that are most serious. The risks are 
prioritized according to their gravity and the ones that cannot be tolerated are subject to 
treatment identification. 
In this phase we need to model an overview of the acceptable and unacceptable risks. 
6.1.4.1 Core Security Risk Scenarios in Phase IV 
Table 7 – Risks with risk values 
Risks Asset harmed
Computed risk 
value* 
R1CM) Disclosure of users’ personal information CM1 High risk 
R1CA) Disclosure of users’ personal information CA1 High risk 
R2CM) Unauthorized modification of user’s personal 
information CM1 Medium risk 
R2CA) Unauthorized modification of user’s personal information CA1 Medium risk 
R3CM) Unavailability of service due to hackers CM3 Medium risk 
R3CA) Unavailability of service due to hackers CA2 Medium risk 
R4CM) Unavailability of service due to infrastructure failure CM3 Medium risk 
R4CA) Unavailability of service due to infrastructure failure CA2 Medium risk 
R5CM) Unavailability of service due to malicious code CM3 Low risk 
R5CA) Unavailability of service due to malicious code CA2 Low risk 
R6CM) Damage to company reputation CM2 Low risk 
R7CM) Reduced user efficiency CM4 Low risk 
R7CA) Reduced user efficiency CA3 Medium risk 
*The risk value is set using the risk matrix in Figure 46. 
Comparing the risk values with the risk tolerance levels from phase 1 (Table 5) gives the 
following risk evaluation (shown in Figure 47):
x Company management: R1CM and R2CM are higher than the accepted risk level. 
x Central authorities: R1CA and R2CA are higher than the accepted risk level. 
Likelihood
Consequence Seldom Sometimes Often
Minor  R7CM  
Moderate R5CM, R5CA, R6CM 
R4CM, R4CA,
R7CA 
Major R2CM, R2CA,R3CM, R3CA R1CM, R1CA 
Figure 47 – Risks placed in the risk evaluation matrix 
6.1.5 Phase V: Identifying Treatments 
The purpose of this phase is to decide which risks that need treatments, i.e. are too serious 
to be left unattended and what kind of treatments. In this phase it is useful to have an 
overview diagram of the risks (including the vulnerabilities, threats and unwanted incidents 
involved) with risk values as input and extend it with various treatments options.  
One uses the risk value to decide which risks that needs to be treated. The client (the 
person or organization that initiated the analysis in the beginning, often identical to the 
stakeholder, but not always) decides the risk tolerance level. 
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6.1.5.1 Core Security Risk Scenarios in Phase V 
Treatment options: 
x TO1: Upgrade to more robust infrastructure solution that have lower failure rate. 
x TO2: Install redundant system that will take over in case of infrastructure failure or 
attack. 
x TO3: Install improved firewall that will make it more difficult for a hacker to find 
vulnerabilities.
x TO4: Install intrusion detection system that will detect the attack rapidly and make 
it possibly to switch to manual routines. 
x TO5: Remove the possibility employees have to access other users’ personal 
information.
x TO6: Remove the unsecured WLAN.
x TO7: Remove the "remember me"-function for employees. 
x TO8: Involve users in the development of an improved system.  
x TO9: Implement logging facilities.
x TO10: The user and the service provider should share the responsibility for 
modification of data due to user errors in combination with slow response from the 
service. This should be stated in a legal contract.
Treatment effects: Estimated effects on likelihood and/or consequence are shown in the 
table below. These are only for example purposes and have not been estimated on basis of 
any expert judgments or other sources of information.  
Table 8 – Treatment effects 
R1CM R1CA R2CM R2CA 
TO1 - - Reduce likelihood Reduce likelihood 
TO2 - - Reduce consequence Reduce consequence
TO3 Reduce likelihood Reduce likelihood Reduce likelihood Reduce likelihood 
TO4 Reduce consequence Reduce consequence Reduce consequence
Reduce likelihood 
Reduce consequence
Reduce likelihood 
TO5 Reduce likelihood Reduce likelihood Reduce likelihood Reduce likelihood 
TO6 Reduce likelihood Reduce likelihood Reduce likelihood Reduce likelihood 
TO7 Reduce likelihood Reduce likelihood Reduce consequence Reduce consequence
TO8 Reduce likelihood Reduce likelihood Reduce likelihood Reduce likelihood 
TO9 Reduce likelihood Reduce likelihood Reduce consequence
Reduce likelihood 
Reduce consequence
Reduce likelihood 
TO10 - - Reduce consequence Reduce consequence
The individual treatment options’ effects on risk values are shown in the table below (unc 
hanged risk values means that the single treatment is not sufficient to reduce the risk value, 
"-" means the treatment is not applied for the risk). Since these estimates are included in 
the core security risk scenarios with the purpose of showing how they are dealt with in the 
models, they are only example estimates without a thorough rationale.
Table 9 – Treatment effects on risk values 
R1CM R1CA R2CM R2CA 
TO1 - - medium Æ low medium Æ low 
TO2 - - medium Æ low medium Æ low 
TO3 highÆ high high Æ high medium Æ medium medium Æ medium 
TO4 highÆ high high Æ high medium Æ medium medium Æ medium 
TO5 highÆ high high Æ high medium Æ medium medium Æ medium 
TO6 highÆ low high Æ low medium Æ low medium Æ low 
TO7 highÆ high high Æ high medium Æ medium medium Æ medium 
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TO8 highÆ medium high Æ medium medium Æ medium medium Æ medium 
TO9 highÆ medium high Æ medium medium Æ low medium Æ low
TO10 - - medium Æ medium medium Æ medium 
The final treatments selected for implementation are typically decided upon after a cost-
benefit assessment of each of the treatment options. However, such an assessment is 
outside the scope of this core security risk scenario example. 
6.2 Quality Requirements 
Modeling is a commonly used technique within system development and there exist a 
number of modeling languages which are more or less suitable for this purpose. Graphical 
models are often used to ease the understanding of complex systems. In security analyses 
one deals with critical systems that may contain confidential data, provide critical services 
or have a high demand for availability. A correct understanding of the system and its risks 
is highly important, and this is where graphical models are found useful. The participants 
in the analysis normally have much competence on different parts of the target and may 
therefore view it differently. This may cause problems in understanding each other or 
problems in agreeing on the appropriate level of precision or scope of the analysis. By 
graphically modeling the target with its threats, assets and risks one can easily reduce the 
number of misunderstandings since this clarifies these aspects. The challenge is to find a 
modeling language that people understand, preferably suitable for use in a computerized 
modeling tool.
The quality of a modeling language depends on several factors, a language which is 
excellent for one task may be inappropriate for a different task. Through our experience 
with modeling in industrial security risk analyses, we have developed a set of detailed 
requirements to this kind of modeling language. To structure these requirements we have 
implemented them in the quality framework for modeling languages called SEQUAL 
developed by Krogstie, Sindre, Lindland and Sølvberg [100-104]. The framework can be 
used when selecting between different languages, investigating possible improvement 
areas for a language, or as the basis requirements to a new modeling language. The 
framework deals with both the quality of a particular model, and with the quality of 
modeling languages. In this work we will only use the part related to modeling languages, 
or what we call the language’s "appropriateness factors".  
The appropriateness factors of a modeling language are related to the modeling task 
definition, i.e. the goal of the modeling task (G), its domain (D), the knowledge of the 
people involved in the modeling task (Ks, Km), the interpretation of the models (I), the 
language that is used (L) and the tools (T) (illustrated in Figure 48). Figure 48 also shows 
the graphical model (model externalization, M), but as mentioned above, this work will not 
go into the quality aspects of a concrete model. In this evaluation, the purpose is to 
evaluate the UML profile’s appropriateness factors for security risk modeling in structured 
brainstorming sessions.  
The six appropriateness factors are: 
x Domain appropriateness: to be appropriate for the domain, the language should 
include all concepts necessary to express anything within the domain it is meant 
for.
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x Participant language knowledge appropriateness: to be appropriate for the 
participants’ language knowledge, the concepts and constructs in the languages 
should be as close as possible to the participants’ understanding of the "real world". 
x Knowledge externalizability appropriateness: to be appropriate for the knowledge 
externalizability the language should be able to express all aspects of the domain 
that the users are interested in. 
x Comprehensibility appropriateness: to have an appropriate comprehensibility the 
language should be understandable for the users. 
x Technical actor interpretation appropriateness: to be considered appropriate for the 
technical actors the language should have a syntax and semantics that a 
computerized tool can understand. 
x Organizational appropriateness: to be appropriate for the organization the language 
should fit into existing technology, work processes and modeling methods that are 
used by the organization. 
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Figure 48 – The quality framework  
6.3 Adapting SEQUAL to the Security Analysis Setting 
Before assessing the appropriateness of a language, it is necessary to define the modeling 
task for which the modeling language should be used. 
Table 10 – SEQUAL aspects 
The goal of modeling (G) the goals of the modeling task (normally organizational) 
The modeling domain (D) the domain, i.e., the set of all statements which can be stated about 
the situation at hand. 
The relevant explicit 
knowledge (Ks)
Km (a subset of Ks)
the relevant explicit knowledge of the set of stakeholders being 
involved in modeling (the audience). A subset of the audience is those 
actively involved in modeling, and their knowledge is denoted Km. 
The social actor 
interpretation (I)
the social actor interpretation, i.e., the set of all statements which the 
audience thinks an externalized model consists of. 
The model externalization 
(M)
the externalized model, i.e., the set of all statements in someone’s 
model of part of the perceived reality, written in a language. 
The language extension 
(L)
the language extension, i.e., the set of all statements that are possible 
to make according to the graphemes, vocabulary, and syntax of the 
modeling languages used 
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The technical actor 
interpretation (T)
the technical actor interpretation, i.e., the statements in the model as 
‘interpreted’ by different model activators (for example modeling tools).
In order to reflect the security analysis setting, or more specifically the structured 
brainstorming setting, the definition in Table 10 is translated from its general form into a 
more specialized form (Table 11). A structured brainstorming is a methodical "walk-
through" of a target system with purpose of identifying as much information about the 
target as possible for each step. The brainstorming is a group exercise involving highly 
skilled people with competence of relevant parts of the target of analysis. 
Table 11 – Modeling task definition in a security analysis setting 
G: to reduce the effort needed to identify and understand the overall risk picture for the system 
assessed in a structured brainstorming, and thereby contribute to increased control of the risks for 
the organization 
D: the security risks towards the system assessed.  
Ks: the knowledge of the people who contributes to the models in the structured brainstorming. 
This will typically be experts on various parts of the system assessed, in addition to the analysis 
leader and the secretary.  
Km: the knowledge of the security analysis leader (or analysis secretary) which gathers information 
from the participants and models it during the structured brainstorming.  
I: the interpretation of models seen from the participant’s point of view (e.g. system owner’s, 
developer’s and user’s). 
M: the model of the system’s risks.  
L: all the statements that is possible to make in the UML profile according to its definition. 
T: the statements in the model that can be interpreted by other modeling tools or specialized 
security analysis tools. 
In the following we discuss our requirements to a security risk modeling language for each 
of the appropriateness factor categories. Throughout the evaluation we will refer to the 
modeling task definition using the letters from Table 11 (modeling domain = D, modeling 
goal = G etc.). Within each category we have included a number of extra requirements 
based on experiences with the CORAS security analysis method in industrial field trials.  
The requirements are not assigned explicit weights to show their importance since they all 
represent desired language features, instead we use the terms "must" and "should" to 
indicate their importance (requirements described with "must" are more required than those 
explained with "should"). The requirements are numbered sequential and "S-x" means that 
the requirement originates directly from SEQUAL, while "C-x" means that the requirement 
comes from user-experiences with the CORAS method.
6.3.1 Domain Appropriateness 
The domain appropriateness of a modeling language relates to how much of a domain one 
is capable of modeling (defined in the language’s internal representation) and how it is 
expressed in a diagram (defined in the language’s external representation).
In information modeling there are several types of modeling perspectives to choose 
between. According to [104] there are 7 general modeling perspectives: structural,
functional, behavioral, rule-oriented, object-oriented, language-action-oriented [168] and 
role & actor-oriented modeling perspective. Security risk modeling has many similarities 
6 – Language requirements 
A graphical approach to security risk analysis 77
with information modeling. Information modeling often describes the behavior of a 
workflow or process, whereas security risk modeling deals with describing the "workflow" 
of a threat that initiates an unwanted incident. For security risk modeling we have 
identified the need of describing how incidents can happen, who is initiating them and what
will be affected. There is also a need for showing more static relations that can specify 
dependencies between assets, treatments, risks and more. Based on this we require our 
modeling language to provide the following modeling perspectives:  
Table 12 – Domain appropriateness: modeling perspectives 
Requirements Explanation 
C-1 Structural 
modeling  
L must provide a structural modeling perspective. Structural modeling is used 
to illustrate for example how assets relate to each other, how one can group 
similar risks or treatments, how vulnerabilities relate to assets and more. 
C-2 Behavioral
modeling  
L must provide a behavioral modeling perspective. The behavior modeling 
perspective shows how a threat can initiate one or more unwanted incidents to 
harm assets, or how various treatments can be applied to risks and more. 
SEQUAL distinguishes between symbol and concept: a concept is a phenomena/something 
one wants to express, while a symbol is the graphical notation used to model the concept. 
In terms of requirements to domain appropriateness, L must support the concepts and 
relations according to the revised CORAS conceptual model for security analysis 
terminology (specified in Chapter 5). By enforcing this requirement we will insure that L
covers all terms and relations that we find relevant for security analysis. To fulfill this 
requirement L must be able to express what is described in the explanation of the 
conceptual model, i.e. which concepts relate to each other and in what way. 
Table 13 – Domain appropriateness: concepts 
Requirements Explanation 
C-3 Asset L must include the concept "asset". An asset is something to which 
an organization directly assigns value and, hence, for which the 
organization requires protection [55]. The concept is very central in 
a security analysis. It should be up to the modeler to decide how 
much details the specification of an asset should include. Often an 
asset can be affected by other assets, for example a company’s 
reputation is affected by the quality of the product they deliver, the 
service they provide, the employee’s satisfaction etc. The modeler 
should have the option to create groups of assets that are similar or 
affect each other.
C-4 Vulnerability L must include the concept "vulnerability". A vulnerability is a 
weakness with respect to an asset or group of assets that can be 
exploited by one or more threats [76]. Vulnerabilities are critical 
parts of the system and important to establish early in the security 
analysis. Vulnerability can be composed into composite 
vulnerabilities according to the chosen level of detail. It would be 
useful to group similar vulnerabilities since they may be treated in 
the same way. 
C-5 Risk  L must include the concept "risk". A risk is the chance of 
something happening that will have an impact upon objectives [6]. 
Similar risks may be grouped and risk can be composed into 
composite risks. 
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C-6 Stakeholder L must include the concept "stakeholder". Stakeholders are those 
people and organizations who may affect, be affected by, or 
perceive themselves to be affected by, a decision or activity [6]. By 
identifying a system’s stakeholders one gets an overview of for 
example which people or systems that use it or depend on its 
functions. 
C-7 Threat  L must include the concept "threat". A threat is a potential cause of 
an (unwanted) incident which may result in harm to a system or 
organization [76]. It should be possible to specify whether a threat 
is human or non-human. Other more specified threats can be 
specified within these categories, e.g. deliberate threats and non-
deliberate (accidental), but we do not find it necessary to define 
these as separate concepts in L.
C-8 Unwanted incident L must include the concept "unwanted incident". An unwanted 
incident may result in harm to a system or organization [55]. In [76]
called information security incident. An unwanted incident can vary 
in the level of details and L should provide the possibility to model 
both very detailed and more general. An unwanted incident may 
very well consist of more incidents. 
C-9 Treatment L must include the concept "treatment". A treatment is the 
selection and implementation of appropriate options for dealing with 
risk [55, 76]. It should be possible to specify the treatment strategy. 
According to [76] treatment strategies can be categorized into four 
groups: 1) reduce likelihood of risk, 2) reduce consequence of risk, 
3) transfer risk in full or part, 4) avoid risk or 5) retain risk. We do 
not require L to support exactly these categories, but there should 
be an option to specify a treatment in more detail if the user finds it 
necessary. 
In our opinion treatment strategies are of two types, either their 
purpose is to reduce the likelihood of a risk, or reduce its 
consequence(s). Transferring a risk partly or full can for example 
mean outsourcing the risky part to someone more qualified (reduce 
the likelihood of risk) or buying insurance against the risk (reduce 
the consequence of the risk). The strategy of avoiding a risk is 
really reducing its likelihood or consequence to zero. Based on this 
a treatment can either be regarded as preventive (i.e. reduce the 
likelihood) or repairing (i.e. reduce the consequence) and these 
interpretations should be included in the treatment concept in L.
The term safeguard defined as a practice, procedure or 
mechanism that reduces risk [55] are sometimes used instead of 
treatment. These terms are two names for the same concept. One 
could possibly argue that safeguard is more representative for a 
protection mechanism against threats that already exist in the 
system than treatment, which sounds like something applied after 
an unwanted incident. Establishing existing safeguards is relevant 
both in context- and treatment identification. 
C-10 Likelihood/ frequency/ 
probability
L must include the concepts "likelihood, frequency, probability". 
Likelihood, frequency and probability are all measures for variants 
of "how likely is it that this will happen". L must support all these 
measure-types. Likelihood is a qualitative or quantitative 
description of frequency or probability [6]. Frequency and 
probability is quantitative measures with a higher degree of 
precision. Frequency is an exact number of occurrences, while 
probability is a number between 0-1 where 0 = unlikely and 1 = will 
happen (in practice one normally says 50% instead of 0.5). 
Depending on the statistical data available for the security analysis 
the user should decide which measure to use. 
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C-11 Consequence L must include the concept "consequence". A consequence is the 
outcome of an event expressed qualitatively or quantitatively, being 
a loss, injury, disadvantage or gain. There may be a range of 
possible outcomes associated with an event [6]. Sometimes 
consequence is called "Impact" but have the same meaning: the
result of an unwanted incident [76]. 
C-12 Threat scenario L must include the concept "threat scenario". A threat scenario is 
a description of how a threat may lead to an unwanted incident by 
exploiting vulnerabilities. A threat scenario must be able to express 
all from very detailed scenarios to vaguer scenario descriptions. A 
threat scenario can be a chain of threat scenarios, meaning that a 
threat scenario can lead to one or more scenarios depending on 
the level of details required. A threat scenario may be given a 
likelihood estimate. This is used in cases where the likelihood of an 
unwanted incident cannot be decided precisely but is best 
estimated from the likelihoods of each threat scenario that may 
lead to the incident. 
C-13 The relations in our 
conceptual model 
(Chapter 5) 
L must support the explicit relations in the conceptual model, but it 
must also be possible to specify relations between concepts that 
are not part of the model (e.g. threat scenario). The symbols used 
to represent these relations are discussed in the symbol section.  
The following relations must be supported: 
1. A stakeholder can be associated with one or more assets, 
but an asset can only be associated with one stakeholder 
2. An asset is associated with at least one vulnerability, a 
vulnerability can be associated with more than one asset. 
3. A threat must exploit (go via) at least one vulnerability in 
order to harm an asset. 
4. A threat is associated with at least one unwanted incident 
via one or more threat scenarios. An unwanted incident is 
associated with at least one threat. 
5. A threat is associated with at least one asset via threat 
scenario(s) and unwanted incident. An asset is associated 
with at least one threat via unwanted incident and threat 
scenario(s).  
6. A threat is indirectly associated with a risk through its 
relation to unwanted incident (not explicitly shown in the 
model). This means that all threats are associated with at 
least one risk and every risk is associated with at least one 
threat.
7. An unwanted incident is indirectly associated with at least 
one asset through risk. In special cases one may 
experience that an asset is not related to any unwanted 
incidents, meaning that it has not been identified any risks 
for this asset.  
8. A treatment is always related to one or more risks.  
9. A treatment is indirectly related to an unwanted incident, 
threat, or vulnerability (or a combination of these) via risk 
(not explicitly shown in the model). Still it should be 
possible to model a treatment towards one of these 
concepts. 
10. A risk is always associated with one asset, while an asset 
may be affected by many risks. 
11. A risk always includes estimates of likelihood and 
consequence. 
12. A risk always includes one unwanted incident, while an 
unwanted incident may participate in several risks, 
meaning that there must be a relation between risk and 
unwanted incident. 
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C-14 And/or operators There must exist and/or operators in L. In practice an unwanted 
incident often requires two or more threat scenarios to occur 
simultaneously before it occurs. To handle these cases we require 
L to provide "and" and "or" operators. If the outcomes of two or 
more events are joined in an and-operator they all are required to 
initiate a new event. If the operator is an or-operator it is sufficiently 
that only one event occurs to initiate a new event. Operators will 
provide additional information about the behavior in the threat 
scenarios, specifying the alternative ways a threat can behave. 
Operators will also increase the possibilities of using conventional 
fault tree techniques to compute the likelihood of risks.  
C-15 L must be independent 
of the target that is 
assessed  
This requirement means that L must be useful for describing any 
type of security critical system. It should not have any concepts that 
depend on a specific system type or technology. Since the CORAS 
method can be applied to any security critical target, the modeling 
language should have the same level of flexibility. 
C-16 Region There must exist a concept similar to region. A region is a logical or 
physical part of the target that can be used as the link between the 
risk specific documentation and the target documentation. This is 
useful for structuring the documentation and helps the reader 
understand the risk models. 
As already mentioned, SEQUAL distinguishes between concepts and symbols. To be a 
language with high domain appropriateness L must provide symbols for the set of the 
concepts identified in the discussion above: 
Table 14 – Domain appropriateness: symbols 
Requirements Explanation 
C-17 Asset There must be a symbol for asset.  
C-18 Vulnerability There must be a symbol for vulnerability.
C-19 Aggregated vulnerability There should be symbols for aggregated vulnerabilities 
C-20 Risk  There must be a risk symbol that can show a risk value. 
C-21 Risk theme There should be symbols for risk themes (similar types of risks). 
C-22 Aggregated risk There should be symbols for aggregated risk. 
C-23 Stakeholder There must be a stakeholder symbol. 
C-24 Threat  There must be a general threat symbol.  
C-25 Human threat 
C-26 Non-human threat 
L should provide symbols for human- and non-human threat. Any 
other type of threat can be specified within one of these categories 
and extra symbols can be added if desired. 
C-27 Threat scenario  There must be a symbol for threat scenario. The symbol should 
have the option to illustrate its estimated likelihood. 
C-28 Unwanted incident  There must be a symbol for unwanted incident. 
C-29 Treatment There must be a symbol for treatment.  
C-30 Treatment type It should be possible to specify the type of treatment (e.g. 
preventive or repairing) 
C-31 Likelihood, frequency, 
probability
There should be a symbol for likelihood/frequency/probability that 
could be used if particular attention to this concept is required. 
C-32 Consequence There should be a symbol for consequence that could be used if 
particular attention to this concept is required. 
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C-33 Association type We must have both directed (arrow) and undirected associations 
(line only). A concept may initiate another, a concept may affect 
another, or one concept has some relation to another without 
specifying direction. It should also be possible to assign these 
relations with a description. We need: 
a) a undirected association between two symbols (a line with 
no arrow ends): 
b) a directed association pointing from X to Y, with the option 
to annotate it with a description (e.g. "initiates", "affects", 
"reduces frequency" etc.): 
C-34 Operators a) There must be an and-symbol for fault tree modeling 
where two or more relations are joined together and initiate 
a new event(s) in the meaning "if both A and B, then C". 
b) There must be an or-symbol for fault tree modeling where 
two or more relations are joined and initiate to a new 
event(s) in the meaning "if either A or B, then C". 
C-35 Region There should be a symbol for logical or physical regions that can 
be used to specify target. 
6.3.2 Participant Language Knowledge Appropriateness 
Participant language knowledge appropriateness is 
related to L and Ks. Ks is the participant’s 
knowledge about D and L (including all other 
modeling languages). M (the external 
representation) is made on the basis of Ks. In this 
setting "participants" means those who are involved 
in modeling, but without doing the actual modeling 
(for example expert participants in the 
brainstorming). In order for L to be appropriate for 
the participant’s language knowledge, L’s internal representation should not conflict with 
the participants understanding of D, and M should relate to D in an intuitive manner (this is 
also relevant for comprehensibility appropriateness). 
With respect to participant knowledge appropriateness we have identified the following 
requirements: 
Table 15 – Participant language knowledge appropriateness 
Requirements Explanation 
S-1 L’s external 
representation must 
imitate the real world 
If the interpretation of M corresponds to the participants’ 
understanding of the real world (Ks) there will be less confusion and 
misunderstandings. An example is: "an unwanted incident affects 
three assets simultaneously" this can be modeled several ways but 
to avoid conflicts with the modelers understanding of the real world it 
should clearly illustrate the "simultaneously" aspect. 
S-2 The symbols used in L
must be based on most 
common interpretation 
of concept-symbol 
This means that the symbols used in L represent D better or are 
more intuitive than other symbols that could have been used. 
C-36 L must be 
understandable for 
people unfamiliar with 
modeling and without 
specific training 
M made with L should be easy to understand (read), even for people 
without modeling experience. To find how much effort is needed to 
learn L, one should base oneself upon experiences with similar 
modeling languages like UML use cases, activity diagrams or flow 
charts.  
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6.3.3 Knowledge Externalizability Appropriateness 
This appropriateness factor focuses on how Km (relevant 
modeler knowledge) may be articulated in L (the modeling 
language). Is it possible for the modeler to express his or her 
knowledge about for instance the target threats with L? To 
achieve high score on knowledge externalizability 
appropriateness the modeler (the one who creates the actual 
model M) should be able to use Km to learn L faster, be able to 
express all Km with L, and design better M.
Table 16 – Knowledge externalizability appropriateness 
Requirements Explanation 
S-3 L must help externalize 
tacit knowledge 
This means that L should use well-known metaphors/analogies to 
explain/model more complicated relations to lower the effort needed 
to understand the models 
S-4 It must be easy to 
model as part of actual 
work 
The modeling should not require extensive training and heavy tool-
support. The models should be easy and quick to create as part of 
the security analysis, and update during maintenance of the system. 
This means that modeling should not only be done before (planning) 
or after (post-hoc rationalization), but support interactive modeling. 
C-37 It must be possible to 
model fault trees with L
Fault tree analysis (FTA) (Sect. 3.4.4) is a well known risk analysis 
technique and it must be possible to draw fault tree diagrams using 
L. A conventional fault tree diagram has a restricted expressiveness 
which means that the notation is a subset of L.
C-38 It should be possible to 
model event trees with 
L
Event tree analysis (ETA) (Sect. 3.4.5) is a well known risk analysis 
technique and it should be possible to draw event tree diagrams 
using L ( see Figure 9 – Event tree example).
6.3.4 Comprehensibility Appropriateness 
Comprehensibility appropriateness relates L (the 
modeling language) and I (the social actor’s 
interpretation) and focuses on how easy it is to interpret 
M (models) made with L. There are requirements both 
to the internal and external representation of L.
Table 17 – Comprehensibility appropriateness: internal representation 
Requirements Explanation 
C-39 L must build on most-
common I of risk 
specific concepts 
If the interpretation of the terms corresponds to the participants’ 
intuitive understanding of security analysis specific terms, there will 
be less confusion and misunderstandings. 
Threats 
towards 
system
Modeling 
with the 
CORAS
language
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S-5 The concepts in L must 
be general rather than 
specialized  
The more delimited D is the more specialized concepts can be used, 
but the use of specialization should correspond to the specialization 
level in the security analysis, i.e. if the analysis has a high-level 
scope, M should also be high-level. The security analysis domain is 
in itself specialized, but within this domain we want L to be general 
(i.e. independent of target type, analysis scope and technology).   
S-6 The concepts in L must 
be composable 
L should make it possible to group related statements in a natural 
way. This means that we use compose in the sense "aggregate", 
meaning a form for grouping, e.g. vulnerabilities may be aggregated 
into a group of vulnerabilities etc. 
S-7 L must be flexible in 
precision 
L must be able to express both precise knowledge and more vague 
information, meaning it must include both precise and vague 
constructs. Initially in a security analysis one often deals with 
incomplete or incorrect information about threats or assets, but they 
still must be modeled to provide an overview (even though they may 
be changed as more information is gathered). In some cases the 
natural language description of the modeling element will decide the 
model’s precision level.  
S-8 If the number of 
concepts has to be 
large, the phenomena 
must be organized 
hierarchically 
In D there exists many types of threats, vulnerabilities, assets and so 
on, but it should be possible to see these concepts as a hierarchy 
where the top concepts are more general than the ones on the lower 
levels.
S-9 The concepts of L must 
be easily 
distinguishable from 
each other. 
By using easily distinguishable concepts the models will be easier to 
understand. 
S-10The use of concepts 
must be uniform 
throughout the whole 
set of statements that 
can be expressed within 
L
Meaning that a concept like ‘risk’ is to mean the same thing every 
time it is used 
S-11L must be flexible in the 
level of detail 
This is especially relevant early in the security analysis, for example 
it must be possible to specify some threat scenarios very detailed, 
while others will be more high level. In architectural descriptions one 
has different viewpoints of the architecture that shows specific parts 
or aspects of the architecture. The same idea can be used in 
security risk modeling, some diagrams may show the overall risk 
picture, some are dedicated to show details about threats etc. 
Modeling tools often have functions for showing/hiding diagram 
details, and the idea can also be used even without computerized 
tool. E.g. L should be able to provide an overall risk picture for a 
system, describing risks and threats that can harm the various 
assets in the system without details about "how" (threat scenarios + 
unwanted incidents) 
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Table 18 – Comprehension appropriateness: external representation 
Requirements Explanation 
C-40 It should be possible 
to associate the 
overall threat picture 
to target 
descriptions  
It must be possible to specify a general target with boundaries, its 
threats, assets and vulnerabilities in an abstract manner to facilitate 
integration with target documentation. This will typically be useful in the 
preliminary security analysis where it can help guiding the scope of the 
analysis. The target specification should initially contain as little as 
possible technology related aspects (only a logical or physical region 
can sometimes be sufficient), but be extended with more details as the 
analysis progresses. If the threat diagrams can be mapped to target 
descriptions they will increase their value and not be a "stand-alone" 
documentation type. 
S-12L must contain 
constructs that can 
represent the 
intention of the 
underlying 
conceptual model 
This means that there should be possible to externally represent the 
concepts and relations in the underlying conceptual model. This 
requirement is covered by the requirements in the domain 
appropriateness section. 
S-13Symbol
discrimination in L
must be easy. 
To avoid confusion, misunderstandings, irritation and frustration the 
symbols must be easy to distinguish. 
S-14 It must be easy to 
distinguish which of 
the symbols in L any 
graphical mark in M
is part of
These are means to achieve what Goodman [49] terms syntactic 
disjointness: 
x The use of symbols should be uniform, i.e. a symbol should not 
represent one concept in one context and another one in a 
different context. Neither should different symbols be used for the 
same concept in different contexts. 
x One should strive for symbolic simplicity. 
x One should use a uniform writing system for concepts at a 
comparable level. All symbols (at least within each sub-language) 
should be within the same writing system (e.g. non-phonological 
such as pictographic, ideographic, logographic, or phonological 
such as alphabetic). Obviously a modeling language contains both 
graphics and text, but then the text is labels to concepts, not 
1.order concepts. 
x If using colors to mark semantics, one should not use more than 5-
6 different colors in a given view [142]. The color of the label-text 
will depend on the color of the symbol. One also should have in 
mind how a model with colored symbols will look when printed (i.e. 
if the semantic differentiation meant to be carried by the coloring is 
retained) 
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S-15The use of emphasis 
in L must be in 
accordance with the 
relative importance 
of the statements in 
the given M
x Size (the big is more easily noticed than the small) 
x Solidity (e.g. bold letters vs. ordinary letters, full lines vs. dotted 
lines, thick lines vs. thin lines, filled boxes vs. non-filled boxes) 
x Difference from ordinary pattern (e.g. slanted letters, a rare symbol 
will attract attention among a large number of ordinary ones) 
x Foreground/background differences (if the background is white, 
things will be easier noticed the darker they are) 
x Color (red attracts the eye more than other colors).  
x Change (blinking or moving symbols attract attention) 
x Pictures vs. text (pictures usually having a much higher 
perceptibility, information conveyed in pictures will be emphasized 
at the cost of information conveyed textually) 
x Position (Westerners tend to read it from left to right) 
x Connectivity (objects able to connect to many others (having a 
high degree) will attract attention compared to objects making few 
connections) 
S-16Composition of 
symbols should be 
made in an 
aesthetically 
pleasing way 
These are means for achieving an aesthetically pleasing M (according 
to [154]): 
x Angles between edges should not be too small 
x Minimize the area occupied by the drawing  
x Balance the diagram with respect to the axis 
x Minimize the number of bends along edges 
x Maximize the number of faces drawn as convex polygons 
x Minimize the number of crossings between edges 
x Place nodes with high degree in the centre of the drawing 
x Minimize differences among nodes' dimensions 
x Minimize the global length of edges 
x Minimize the length of the longest edge 
x Have symmetry of sons in hierarchies 
x Have uniform density of nodes in the drawing 
x Have verticality of hierarchical structures 
S-17L should not have 
empty symbols. 
Symbols that are not related to a specific concept should not be used. 
This does not mean that L should incorporate all the principles listed 
below, but rather avoid direct violation of them. Within the area of 
gestalt psychology, a number of principles for how to convey meaning 
through perceptual means is provided [160]: 
x A closed contour in a node-link diagram 
generally represents a concept of some 
kind.
x The shape of a closed contour is 
frequently used to represent a concept 
type.
x The color of an enclosed region represent 
a concept type 
x The size of an enclosed region can be 
used to represent the magnitude of a 
concept. 
S-18M must adhere to 
the most common 
principles from 
gestalt psychology 
x Lines that partition a region within a 
closed contour can delineate subparts of a 
concept 
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x Closed-contour regions may be 
aggregated by overlapping them. The 
result is readily seen as a composite 
concept  
x A number of closed-contour regions within 
a larger closed contour can represent 
conceptual containment  
x Placing closed contours spatially in an 
ordered sequence can represent 
conceptual ordering of some kind 
x A linking line between concepts 
represents some kind of relationship 
between them 
x A lined linking closed contours can have 
different colors, or other graphical qualities 
such as waviness, and this effectively 
represents an attribute or type of 
relationship 
x The thickness of a connecting line can be 
used to represent the magnitude of a 
relationship (a scalar attribute)  
x A contour can be shaped with tabs and 
sockets that can indicate which 
components have particular relationships 
x Proximity of components can represent 
groups  
S-19The most common 
modeling tasks 
should be as 
efficient as possible 
Meaning that the most common modeling tasks should take less effort 
to model than more unusual tasks. "Common" in a CORAS setting must 
be interpreted as the most high-level modeling tasks, or the minimal 
modeling effort required by the method. The modeling test case in 6.1 
provides an example of the minimum amount of information that needs 
to be modeled using the CORAS method.  
C-41 There must be a 
reasonable number 
of diagram types  
L must not include numerous different diagram types, ideally it should 
concentrate on one main diagram type with the possibility of specify 
details of this diagram in separate diagrams. 
C-42 L must have a 
precise semantics
To ensure that the language is understood in the same manner by all 
readers, L should have a precise textual semantics. 
6.3.5 Technical Actor Interpretation Appropriateness 
Technical actor interpretation appropriateness relates to how well L can be used in 
computerized tools. With respect to this, we have identified the following requirements: 
Table 19 – Technical actor interpretation appropriateness 
Requirements Explanation 
S-20L must have a formal 
syntax.
Formal syntax defines what a modeler is permitted and prohibited 
from drawing. Having a formal syntax insures that M made by 
different modelers have consistent notation.  
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S-21L should have a formal 
semantics. 
A formal semantics defines what the elements in the syntax means, 
described in a mathematical way. Having a formal semantics will 
make T consistent in different modeling tools, making automatic 
reasoning like consistency checks, translation of models to tables 
(and vice versa) and more. 
6.3.6 Organizational Appropriateness 
According to SEQUAL, this section should be based upon requirements from a specific 
organization that evaluates a language. In this report we do not have one particular 
organization in mind, but we present some general requirements drawn from our 
experience with industrial risk analyses. With respect to organizational appropriateness we 
have identified the following requirements: 
Table 20 – Organizational appropriateness 
Requirements Explanation 
S-22L must contribute to 
reach G
M must contribute to G, meaning it must reduce the effort needed to 
identify and understand the overall risk picture for the system 
assessed in a security analysis, and thereby contribute to increased 
control of the risks for the organization 
C-43 M must ease the 
explanation of risks 
M must ease the explanation of security risks related to the system 
assessed 
C-44 L must be usable 
without investing in 
expensive software 
There should be a version of L that can be used in general drawing 
or modeling tool (i.e. a version providing the symbols only, a plug-in 
or L must come with its own, free modeling environment). The 
simple version must not require the organization to purchase a new 
and different modeling tool if it already has one. 
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7 Evaluation of the UML Profile 
This section summarizes the results evaluating the UML profile using the quality 
framework in Chapter 6. We first summarizes the findings regarding modeling the core 
security risk scenarios, and then the results from evaluating against the SEQUAL-based 
quality requirements. For the full version of the evaluation we refer to the technical report 
[57].
7.1 Modeling the Core Security Risk Scenarios 
(summary)
In order to evaluate a security risk modeling language we needed a benchmarking case 
representing core security risk scenarios to test the notation against. Through experience 
from several major security analyses in the SECURIS project we have gathered typical 
security analysis information into a complete set of scenarios covering all the phases in a 
security analysis. In the following sections we summarizes whether the UML profile was 
able to model the information. 
Phase 1 - Context establishment: 
It was unclear how to model the he distinction between direct and indirect assets within the 
asset diagram. This means that one cannot specify how damage to one asset may cause 
damage to other assets. However, the UML profile provides an option to model 
relationships between concepts like assets by using other UML notations, e.g. class 
diagrams. The standard does not provide any examples of this, but it means that one can 
create a hierarchy of assets and show the relationships between them. The UML profile 
does not let you model the risk acceptance level set by each client for each asset.
Phase 2 - Risk identification 
It was no obvious way of modeling the indirect assets in threat and unwanted incident 
diagrams. If modeled as ordinary direct assets, we would loose the extra information about 
their status as indirect. If left out of the diagrams they have to be remembered or dealt with 
in some other way. Modeling this fairly small example of security analysis information 
resulted in five diagrams that are partly overlapping. To follow the path from the threat 
"Hacker" to the asset "CM2-Company reputation", it is necessary to look at as many as 
three diagrams. 
Phase 3 - Risk estimation & Phase 4 - Risk evaluation 
All the information about the risks and their consequence and likelihood estimates was 
modeled using the UML profile’s risk diagrams. The thirteen risks resulted in as many as 7 
figures. Also in these diagrams, information that already has been modeled is repeated 
(vulnerabilities). To find out which threats that may cause a risk one has trace the path 
backwards from unwanted incident via each of its threat scenarios to find the initiating 
threats. This makes it difficult to get a complete overview of the risk picture. The UML 
profile also lacks the option for differentiating between acceptable and non-acceptable 
risks.
Phase 5 - Treatment identification 
On the positive side, the UML profile was able to express all the information in this phase, 
but on the negative side it was necessary to use 14 figures (approx. 9 pages) for the 
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information that is presented on 1,5 A4 page in Chapter 6. If we were to complete the 
diagrams (i.e. include R2CA) it would have required another five figures. 
7.2 Evaluation of the Language Quality (summary) 
The table below summarizes the average scores for each appropriateness factor discussed 
in Chapter 6. The scores provides an indication of weak and strong aspects of the UML 
profile, but since the level of details in the requirements can vary and no weighting has 
been included to adjust the score for this, we only use this as an indication of how well the 
language meets our requirements. 
Table 21 – Evaluation scores  
Category Must-requirements Should-requirements
 Score # req. Avg. Score # req. Avg.: 
Domain appropriateness:  
x modeling perspectives 
x concepts 
x symbols 
5
34,7
21,5
2
14
10
2,5
2,5
2
4
-
-
3*
-
-
1,3
Participant language knowledge appropriateness 5 3 1,7  - -
Knowledge externalizability appropriateness 4 3 1,3 0 1 0
Comprehensibility appropriateness:  
x internal representation 
x external representation 
18
8
7*
6*
2,6
1,3 3
-
2
-
1,5
Technical actor interpretation appropriateness 3 1 3 0 1 0 
Organizational appropriateness 5 3 1,7  - -
* one or more requirements were omitted, see Sect. 6.7.1 in [57] 
As we can se from Table 21, the UML profile has both weak and strong aspects.
The knowledge externalizability appropriateness receives a low score due to the illogical 
representation of the threats’ paths via threat scenarios to the unwanted incidents where 
they cause harm to assets. The natural way of describing this is a logical sequence of 
events starting with the threat that initiates a threat scenario which leads to an unwanted 
incident that harms an asset. This idea is part of the language, but unfortunately the 
external representation fails to show its logical order. The UML profile makes use of the 
UML construct "include" which intend to show how a use case is included in another use 
case, but at first glance they look like they are on the same "level". In the unwanted 
incident diagram (Figure 20) in Sect.3.5.1, the threat scenario is included in the incident 
scenario "Denial-of-service", but for an untrained reader they seem like two equal entities, 
a clear violation of common gestalt principles. The language also fails to show which 
vulnerabilities a threat may exploit since these are only modeled as properties of the asset. 
The fact that more than one threat potentially can harm the same asset using different 
vulnerabilities is not possible to model. 
Often a risk picture includes several dependencies, i.e. events that simultaneously may lead 
to an unwanted incident. This is traditionally modeled using fault trees, but the lack of 
AND/OR-operators in the UML profile makes fault tree modeling impossible.  
Comprehensibility appropriateness of the external representation receives a low score, 
mainly related to the lack of adherence to common gestalt principles. The use of colors and 
size are not well considered and the include arrow in threat diagrams can easily be 
misunderstood. When it comes to judging the modeling effort required to make diagrams 
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as a natural part of the analysis process there are differences between the various diagram 
types. While threat and unwanted incident diagrams are fairly straightforward and does not 
take much effort, the rest of the diagrams are unnecessarily time- and space consuming 
from a usability perspective. To ensure a common understanding of the diagrams, a precise 
mapping from diagrams to text should be used. This mapping is not defined for the UML 
profile.
The rather low score for participant language knowledge appropriateness is caused by the 
symbols (icons) used. The UML profile symbols we have evaluated are based on standard 
UML use case symbols, but they are neither uniform, intuitive nor well designed and give 
an amateurish impression. Since the symbols are not finalized and just sketches of possible 
representations, the low score for this factor should not be emphasized as much as the other 
appropriateness factors of the language. 
The UML profiles organizational appropriateness could have been better. It will probably 
provide a consistent and complete way of documenting the analysis information, but used 
as defined in [124] would not help reducing the effort needed to understand the 
organization’s overall risk picture. Creating and understanding the models requires 
thorough knowledge of the target and the modeling notation itself and is not suitable for 
bridging the gap between system modelers and more ordinary system users. The ideas 
behind the various diagrams are on the other hand good, but they need to become simpler 
and more manageable in terms of complexity. 
7.3 Conclusion 
As we summarize in Sect. 7.1 it was possible to model almost all the information in the 
core security risk scenarios with the UML profile. However, being able to express the core 
security risk scenarios is not sufficient. The models should also present the information in 
the core security scenarios in a better way than the textual description alone. The diagrams 
should be understandable and manageable in terms of complexity, and provide a good 
overview of the information. With respect to this, many of the diagram types are not 
suitable for presentation of security risk analysis information. They are often characterized 
by duplication of information, and information that is spread out over several diagrams 
which makes it difficult to get an overview. The diagrams tend to be extremely space 
consuming (particularly the treatment effect and risk evaluation diagrams), and require the 
modeler to repeatedly model almost identical diagrams. 
Also the quality evaluation points at the language’s external representation as its main 
weakness. Its internal representation and underlying concepts related to expressing the 
domain are appropriate for the security analysis setting. Also its technical actor 
appropriateness receives a high score. The language should be a tool that helps visualizing, 
explaining and documenting the security risk analysis and this highly depends on its 
external representation. Unfortunately, some of the weaknesses are related to the 
underlying UML notation itself. This makes it difficult to redesign the language without 
violating fundamental UML constructs. There seems to be an inevitable choice to make, 
either use a non-optimal language with a notation that conforms to UML, or develop a new 
language without the restrictions from UML. A new language will on the one side not have 
the support and strength from UML, but on the other side it can have its main focus on 
understandability and usability. The two languages could be seen as two different versions 
based on the same underlying basis and with different strengths and application areas. 
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8 The CORAS Security Risk Modeling 
Language and Guideline 
This section presents the syntax and semantics of the CORAS language and the guideline 
that explains how to use the CORAS language during the security analysis.
8.1 The Syntax and Semantics 
For the CORAS language, we have the following syntaxes and semantics: the conceptual 
foundation (abstract syntax), the graphical syntax, and the textual syntax with its precise 
semantics in the form of translation rules into paragraphs in English. 
8.1.1 The Conceptual Foundation 
The conceptual foundation of the CORAS language can be seen as an abstract syntax 
where the concepts in the language match this syntax. The development of this foundation 
is described in Chapter 5, but the model (Figure 49) and its definitions are briefly repeated 
here. The class diagram notation is read as follows: "a threat is associated with at least 1 
asset and maximum infinite assets, while an asset may have from 0 to an infinite number of 
associated threats". 
Figure 49 – The conceptual foundation 
Figure 49 can be explained as follows: Stakeholders are those people and organizations 
who may affect, be affected by, or perceive themselves to be affected by, a decision or 
activity regarding the target of analysis [6]. In practice we often use the term "client" for 
the organization that is paying for the actual analysis, while other stakeholders are called 
"other interested parties" for instance authorities, interest groups etc. An asset is something 
to which a stakeholder directly assigns value and, hence, for which the stakeholder requires 
protection [55]. Assets are subject to vulnerabilities, which are weaknesses which can be 
exploited by one or more threats [76]. A threat is a potential cause of an unwanted 
incident [76]. According to [6, 76], threats can be categorized as either human or non-
human (environmental). Human threats can also be said to have accidental or deliberate 
origin. An unwanted incident is an event that may harm or reduce the value of assets and 
is something we want to prevent [55]. A risk is the chance of something happening that 
will have an impact upon objectives (assets) [6]. Our model captures this interpretation by 
defining a risk to consist of an unwanted incident, a likelihood measure and a consequence. 
The abstract concept "risk", the more concrete "unwanted incident", and their respective 
relationships to "asset" require some explanation. In our definition, an unwanted incident 
that harms more than one asset gives rise to one unique risk for each asset it harms. This 
enables us to keep the consequences for different stakeholders separate, since an asset is 
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always defined with respect to a single stakeholder. The level of risk is measured by a risk 
value (e.g. low, medium, high or other scales) which is based upon the estimated 
likelihood (a general description of frequency or probability), frequency or probability
for the unwanted incident to happen and its consequence in terms of damage to an asset 
[6]. A treatment is the selection and implementation of appropriate options for dealing 
with risk [55, 76]. 
8.1.2 The Graphical Syntax 
Figure 50 presents the syntactical representation of the conceptual foundation that is used 
in the CORAS diagrams, i.e. the graphical syntax. The stapled arrow is used for treatments, 
while the solid arrow is used between threats, vulnerabilities, threat scenarios, unwanted 
incidents and assets. The logical and/or gates are used when drawing fault trees [66] with 
the CORAS language. 
Threat 
(accidental)
Threat 
(deliberate)
Threat (non-
human)
Asset Vulnerability
and orThreat 
scenario
Unwanted 
incident Risk
Stakeholder
Logical or 
physical 
region
Treatment
Figure 50 – The graphical syntax 
The graphical syntax is further described in the example driven introduction in the 
modeling guideline in Sect. 8.2. 
8.1.3 The Textual Syntax  
The textual syntax of the CORAS language [36] (full details in Appendix D) has been 
defined for the elements in Figure 50, except for the AND/OR gates and the region. 
Ongoing research [21] is investigating the concept of region and this work may be included 
into the textual syntax in the future. Defining a textual syntax for the logical gates has so 
far been out of the scope of our work, but it may be a subject for future work. 
To characterize the textual syntax for the CORAS language, we have used the ISO 
standardized Extended BNF notation [81]. The vertical bar _|_ represents options, braces 
{_} (respectively {_}í) means an ordered sequence of zero (respectively one) or more 
repetitions of the enclosed element, and square brackets [_] denotes optional features. The 
terminal operators are surrounded by quotes: ‘_’. 
To improve readability, we do not resolve all the EBNF definitions completely into 
terminal operators, but stop at the level of identifier, linguistic term and numerical value.
An identifier is a name or a natural language description of an element, i.e. a finite 
sequence of upper- and lower-case letters, numbers, spaces and punctuation marks. Its 
precise definition in EBNF is: 
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Linguistic terms are identifiers that are members of a totally ordered set, for example 
likelihoods given as 'high', 'medium' and 'low'. Numerical values are just that: numbers 
allowing precise calculations of likelihoods, consequences and risk values. In the 
translation rules, we use  to denote the translation from graphical to textual syntax. The 
CORAS diagrams consist of two kinds of elements: vertices and relations between these. 
The elements may be annotated with additional information. The translation rules for the 
vertices and annotations of the diagrams are given by the naming conventions in Table 22.
Table 22 – Naming conventions 
When there is more than one instance of a type, we use subscripts, for example dt1, dt2 if 
there are two deliberate threats. The translation from the textual syntax into English is 
defined by a function [[ _ ]] on textual expressions. We use _ := _ to denote "defined as". 
Each diagram type has its own textual syntax described in Appendix D. In Figure 51 we 
provide an example of an asset diagram and its graphical syntax (note that stakeholder in 
Appendix D is named party, and therefore is denoted with a p in the diagram). 
Figure 51 – The graphical syntax of asset diagrams 
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Below we describe the textual syntax of the asset diagram in Figure 51: 
8.1.4 The Structured Semantics 
The translation of each diagram type from its graphical syntax to its textual syntax is 
described in full details in Appendix D. In this section we provide an example based on the 
asset diagram above. The translation is done schematically, vertex by vertex and relation 
by relation. The set of textual expressions we obtain is the translation of the complete 
diagram. 
The translation of a vertex in the textual syntax is the label of the icon representing it in the 
graphical syntax. For example, the translation of the set of vertices in Figure 51 is the set: 
Note that in this translation, the type of each node is preserved through the naming 
conventions from Table 22. When the naming convention is not used we need to type each 
vertex, for example in a type table, or decompose the diagram into three sets: sets of 
parties, sets of assets and sets of relations. 
There are two kinds of relations in the asset diagram in Figure 51: 
Figure 52 – Protect relation Figure 53 – Indirect harm relation 
The translation of the protect relation similar when the relation is annotated with a risk 
function or a likelihood and consequence pair instead of a risk value. In either case, replace 
rv with the appropriate annotation. If the protect relation is not annotated, then remove rv
altogether.
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Translation from the Textual Syntax to English: 
A diagram D := ({v1, . . . , vn} , {r1, . . . , rm}), n > 0, m t 0, is translated by translating each 
of its vertices and relations. Note that the logical conjunction implicit in the commas of the 
sets of vertices and relations translates into the period at the end of each English sentence 
representing a vertex or relation: 
The vertices: 
The protect relation: 
The second expression is the translation of a protect relation annotated with a maximum 
acceptable risk level. The rl for risk level is replaced by either rv, rf(l, c) or (l, c) depending 
on how the risk level is formulated. 
The indirect harm relation: 
The annotations: 
We illustrate the translation of asset diagrams with the following small example: 
Govermental Data 
Inspectorate (GDI)
Low risk
Data privacy 
(GDI)
Figure 54 – Example of an asset diagram 
A translation of the diagram above consists of two steps: first, we translate the vertices of 
the diagram: 
x Governmental Data Inspectorate (GDI) is a party. 
x Data privacy (GDI) is an asset. 
Then we translate the relation using the vertices above: 
x Governmental Data Inspectorate (GDI) wants to protect the value of Data privacy 
(GDI), but accepts risk value Low risk or less. 
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8.2 The Guideline (an Example Driven Introduction) 
This guideline follows the CORAS security analysis approach from the context 
establishment, via the risk identification, estimation and evaluation, and ending with the 
risk treatment. Within these phases there are a total of seven steps, summarized in Table 
23:
Table 23 – Steps within the different phases in the CORAS approach 
Phases Steps 
1. Context 
establishment: 
Step 1: The first step involves an introductory meeting. The main item on the 
agenda for this meeting is to get the representatives of the client to present their 
overall goals of the analysis and the target they wish to have analyzed. Hence, 
during the initial step the analysts will gather information based on the client’s 
presentations and discussions. 
Step 2: The second step also involves a separate meeting with representatives 
of the client. However, this time the analysts will present their understanding of 
what they learned at the first meeting and from studying documentation that has 
been made available to them by the client. The second step also involves a 
rough, high-level security analysis. During this analysis the first threats, 
vulnerabilities, threat scenarios and unwanted incidents are identified. They will 
be used to help directing and scoping the more detailed analysis still to come. 
Step 3: The third step involves a more refined description of the target to be 
analyzed, and also all assumptions and other preconditions being made. Step 
three is terminated once all this documentation has been approved by the client.
2. Risk 
identification: 
Step 4: This step is organized as a workshop gathering people with expertise on 
the target of analysis. The goal is to identify as many potential unwanted 
incidents as possible, as well as threats, vulnerabilities and threat scenarios. 
3. Risk 
estimation:
Step 5: The fifth step is also organized as a workshop. This time with the focus 
on estimating consequences and likelihood values for each of the identified 
unwanted incidents. 
4. Risk 
evaluation:
Step 6: This step involves giving the client the first overall risk picture. This will 
typically trigger some adjustments and corrections. 
5. Risk 
treatment:
Step 7: The last step is devoted to treatment identification, and one may address 
cost/benefit issues of the treatments. This step is also best organized as a 
workshop.
Throughout this section we give an example of how information from a security analysis 
may be modeled with the CORAS language, and guidelines for how and where in the 
process the diagrams are made. The guideline also provides instructions for modeling the 
target of analysis, and it suggests which roles that should be present at the different steps of 
the analysis. In the end of the guideline we present a selecting of useful recommendations, 
tips and hints from our experiences with CORAS in industrial field trials. 
The target of analysis in our example is a web-based application that communicates 
confidential information between an insurance company and its customers. The 
development project is expensive and prestigious to the company, but the governmental 
data inspectorate is concerned whether the level of privacy is sufficient. 
8.2.1 Context Establishment 
The purpose of the context establishment is to characterize the target of the analysis and its 
environment. In our example the web application is represented as a logical region 
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(inspired by [141]) with two independent stakeholders: the company management, which is 
the "client", and the governmental data inspectorate which represents "other interested 
parties". The governmental data inspectorate has "Data privacy" as its only asset, while the 
company management identifies three additional assets: "Application availability", 
"Application interface usability" and "Company brand & reputation". "Company brand & 
reputation" is the only "indirect" asset which means that the asset can only be harmed if 
one of the direct assets is harmed first (Figure 55). The separation between indirect and 
direct assets implies that in risk identification should be at least one threat diagram for the 
direct assets, and one for the indirect assets.  
Figure 55 – Asset diagram: indirect and direct assets 
The company management and the governmental data inspectorate value the assets 
differently. The company management wants to protect all assets, while the governmental 
data inspectorate is mainly interested in "Data privacy". The difference is described in the 
asset diagram in Figure 56, showing which assets each of the stakeholders are interested in 
and the risk value they are willingly to accept. If one has specified more detailed risk 
acceptance levels like maximum acceptable likelihood- and consequence values, they may 
be used instead of the risk values.
Figure 56 – Asset diagram: risk acceptance values 
Since the two stakeholders value "Data privacy" differently, the asset is represented as two 
separate assets "GDI1. Data privacy" and "CM2. Data privacy" (Figure 57). The rest of the 
assets are also numbered to reflect their stakeholder: "CM1. Company brand & reputation", 
"CM3. Application availability" and "CM4. Application interface usability". 
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Web application
Govermental Data 
Inspectorate (GDI)
MEDIUM RISK
one incident a month
50 received phonecalls to support
LOW RISK
MEDIUM RISKLOW RISK
Company
Management (CM)
CM1. Company 
brand & reputation
CM2. Data 
privacy
CM3. Application 
availability
CM4. Application 
interface usability
GDI1.Data 
privacy
Figure 57 – Asset diagram: complete with all details 
If the analysis has several assets and stakeholders with conflicting concerns, it may be a 
good idea to keep the asset related information in two separate diagrams. One diagram may 
show the assets (direct & indirect) and the relations between these, and the other diagram 
may specify the stakeholders' risk acceptance values for each asset (without relations 
between the assets). When combining these two views, one faces the risk of having a 
potential confusing and cluttered diagram. 
Each phase in this guideline summarizes the instructions in a table like the one shown 
below. Since the context establishment includes three steps, there are also three sections in 
this table: 
The introductory meeting step  
Analysis tasks: People that should participate: 
•
•
•
•
The security analysis method is introduced. 
The client presents the goals and the target of 
the analysis. 
The focus and scope of the analysis is set. 
The meetings and workshops are planned. 
•
•
•
Analysis leader (required) 
Analysis secretary (required) 
Representatives of the client: 
- Decision makers (required) 
- Technical expertise (optional) 
- Users (optional) 
Modeling guideline:
1.
2.
At this early stage of the analysis it can be useful to describe the target with informal like 
drawings, pictures or sketches on a blackboard. 
The presentation can later be supplemented with more formal modeling techniques such as UML 
or data flow-diagram. 
The high level analysis step  
Analysis tasks: People that should participate: 
•
•
•
The target as understood by the analysts is 
presented. 
The assets are identified. 
A high-level analysis is conducted. 
•
•
•
Security analysis leader (required) 
Security analysis secretary (required) 
Representatives of the client: 
- Decision makers (required) 
- Technical expertise (required) 
- Users (optional) 
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Modeling guideline: 
Asset diagrams: 
1. Draw a region that logically or physically represents the target of analysis. 
2. Place the assets within the region. 
3. Indicate with arrows which assets may affect other assets. 
4. Move assets, that are found to be indirect, outside the region. Indirect assets are only harmed as 
a consequence of a direct asset being harmed first. 
5. Associate stakeholders (clients and other interested parties) with their assets. 
6. Annotate each stakeholder-asset-relation with the maximum acceptable level of risk the 
stakeholder is willingly to accept. 
Target descriptions: 
1. Use a formal or standardized notation such as UML, but ensure that the notation is explained 
thoroughly so that the participants understand it. 
2. Create models of both the static and the dynamic features of the target. Static may be hardware 
configurations, network design etc., while dynamic may be work processes, information flow etc.
3. For the static parts of the description, UML class diagrams and UML collaboration diagrams (or 
similar notations) are recommended. 
4. For the dynamic parts we recommend UML activity diagrams and UML sequence diagrams (or 
similar notations) 
The approval step  
Analysis tasks: People that should participate: 
•
•
•
•
•
The client approves target descriptions and 
asset descriptions. 
The assets may be ranked according to 
importance (optional). 
Consequence scales must be set for each 
asset within the scope of the analysis. 
A likelihood scale must be defined. 
The client must decide risk evaluation criteria 
for each asset within the scope of the analysis.
•
•
•
Security analysis leader (required) 
Security analysis secretary (required) 
Representatives of the client: 
- Decision makers (required) 
- Technical expertise (required) 
- Users (optional) 
Modeling guidelines:
- Modeling is not part of this step. 
8.2.2 Risk Identification 
In the risk identification phase the security analysis leader and the brainstorming 
participants must find answers to questions like: what are you most concerned about with 
respect to your assets (modeled as threat scenarios and unwanted incidents), who/what
initiates these (threats), and what makes this possible (vulnerabilities). This information is 
modeled in CORAS threat diagrams.
Consider the threat diagram in Figure 58 (and the extracted threat diagram for indirect 
assets in Figure 59). The diagram in Figure 58 focuses on network related threat scenarios 
towards the direct assets. The asset "CM4. Application interface usability" is not affected 
by these kinds of incidents and therefore left out. We have two threats: employees who 
may cause incidents by accident (human, accidental) and IT-infrastructure (non-human 
threat). Since this is a small example, we model both human and non-human threats in the 
same diagram, but often it can be useful to keep these in separate diagrams. The company 
management and the governmental data inspectorate are concerned about the following 
unwanted incidents: "disclosure of data", "corruption of data", and "unavailability of 
application".  
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We now explain one chain of events from the initiation caused by a threat to the left, to its 
impact on an asset to the right. The threat "IT-infrastructure" may first exploit the 
vulnerability "hardware failure" to make the server crash. Then it uses the vulnerability 
"poor backup solution" to initiate the threat scenario "application database fails to switch to 
backup solution". This threat scenario may again lead to the unwanted incident 
"unavailability of application", which impacts the availability of the application.
Figure 58 – Threat diagram: direct assets 
To assess the indirect assets, the unwanted incidents that indirectly harm assets are 
specified separately (Figure 59). If they were to be modeled in the threat diagram above 
they would have been placed to the utmost right, but by extracting them into a separate 
diagram we can also include relevant incidents from other threat diagrams. Often indirect 
assets are of a more organizational or enterprise related kind, and therefore likely to be 
affected by several different types of incidents described multiple, different threat 
diagrams. To keep the unwanted incidents relation to their initiating threat, the threats are 
included in the diagram, while information about the vulnerabilities and threat scenarios 
are left out. 
Figure 59 – Threat diagram: indirect assets 
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The risk identification step 
Analysis tasks: People that should participate: 
The initial threat diagrams should be completed 
with identified threats, vulnerabilities, threat 
scenarios and unwanted incidents. 
•
•
•
Security analysis leader (required) 
Security analysis secretary (required) 
Representatives of the client: 
- Decision makers (optional*) 
- Technical expertise (required) 
- Users (required) 
*because this workshop often has a technical focus 
and the decision makers’ competence is more 
relevant in the next step. 
Modeling guideline: 
Threat diagrams: 
1. Use the region from the asset diagram. You may add more regions that group elements to 
increase the readability of the diagram. See also Sect.8.2.6 for further information about 
regions. 
2. Decide how to structure the threat diagrams. A diagram may either focus on one asset at the 
time, a particular aspect of the target, or different kinds of threats. For instance, deliberate 
sabotage in one diagram, mistakes in an other, environmental in a third etc. ([76] contains a 
useful classification). This makes it easier to generalize over the risks, for example "these risks 
all harm asset X", "these risks are caused by human errors" or "these risks are related to the 
network". 
3. Threats are placed to the left in the region; threats that can be classified as external to the 
target (hackers, intruders, third party services etc.) are placed outside the region. 
4. Assets are listed on the right. 
5. Unwanted incidents are placed within the region with relations to the assets they impact.  
6. Assets that are not harmed by any incidents can be removed from the diagram.  
7. Add threat scenarios between the threats and the unwanted incidents in the same order as 
they occur in real time (i.e. in a logical sequence). See Sect. 8.2.6 for tips and hints. 
8. Insert the vulnerabilities before the threat scenario or unwanted incident they lead to. E.g.: a 
vulnerability called "poor backup solution" is typically placed before the threat scenario "the 
backup solution fails to run the application database correctly". 
9. If specifying indirect assets at the outmost right of the threat diagram makes it too complex, 
draw separate threat diagrams for the indirect assets that shows the threats, unwanted 
incidents and the indirect assets only. 
8.2.3 Risk Estimation 
The threat diagrams are input to the risk estimation where threat scenarios and unwanted 
incidents are assigned likelihood values and consequences. Likelihood values may be 
either qualitative (e.g. often, seldom etc.) or quantitative (e.g. 2 times per year, 50% 
probability etc.) depending on the type of analysis. If information on likelihood of threat 
scenarios and unwanted incidents is available, it may be added to the threat diagrams. For 
threat scenarios and unwanted incidents that are difficult to estimate, the analysis leader 
may give suggestions based on historical data like security incident statistics or personal 
experience. The likelihood of the threat scenarios can be used to extract a combined 
likelihood for unwanted incidents. In Figure 60 the final likelihood for "corruption of data" 
is based on the likelihood of the two threat scenarios "application servers malfunctioning" 
and "application database fails to switch to backup solution". Consequences are estimated 
for each "unwanted incident-asset" relation. The consequence value is taken from the 
asset's consequence scale that was defined during the context establishment. 
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There are different ways of computing the likelihood of an incident that may be caused by 
more than one threat scenario. If the estimates are suitable for mathematical calculations a 
computerized tool may be used. Since the likelihood scale in our case is in the form of 
intervals, the analysis leader decides to use an informal method that is quite straight 
forward and transparent, suitable for the brainstorming setting. For more precise 
calculation of probabilities fault tree analysis (FTA) [66] may be used. It is of course 
important that the combined estimates reflect reality, meaning that the combined estimates 
must be validated by the participants in the analysis. 
Table 24 – Example of how one may combine likelihood estimates 
Threat scenario  Likelihood  Unwanted incident  Combined likelihood 
Application servers 
malfunctioning 
1 occurrence per 5 
years (1:5y) 
Application database 
fails to switch to backup 
solution 
1 occurrence per 
year (1:1y) 
Corruption of data  (1:5y)+(1:1y) = 6:5y which is 
so close to 1:1y that this value 
is used as a combined 
likelihood estimate. 
We here use the consequence scale: large (3), medium (2) and small (1), but in a real 
security analysis more precise scales for each asset should be used. 
Figure 60 – Threat diagram (direct assets): likelihood and consequence estimation 
In the threat diagram showing indirect assets (Figure 61), there are no threat scenarios that 
can be used as input for estimating the likelihood of the unwanted incidents. Instead one 
uses the estimates from the equivalent unwanted incidents in the direct asset threat 
diagrams and adjusts them either up or down according to the participants judgments. With 
respect to estimating consequences, we also use the 1-3 scale in the example, but could 
very well use a scale that specify in more details exact consequences for "CM1. Company 
brand & reputation". It is also permitted to split an incident into two incidents if the 
initiating threats give rise to potentially different consequences. In Figure 61 
"Unavailability of application" is estimated to have a more serious consequence if it is 
caused by an employee, than if it is caused by IT-infrastructure. 
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Figure 61 – Threat diagram (only for the indirect asset): likelihood and consequence estimation 
The risk estimation step 
Analysis tasks: People that should participate: 
•
•
•
Provide likelihood estimates for the unwanted 
incidents 
Estimate consequences of the unwanted 
incidents. 
Estimate risks on basis of the likelihood and 
consequence estimates. 
•
•
•
Security analysis leader (required) 
Security analysis secretary (required) 
Representatives of the client: 
- Decision makers (required) 
- Technical expertise regarding the target 
(required) 
- Users (required) 
Modeling guideline: 
Risk estimation on threat diagrams: 
1. Add likelihood estimates to the threat scenarios if this kind of information is available.  
2. Add likelihood estimates to each unwanted incident, either directly, or based on the threat 
scenarios or unwanted incidents that lead up to it. 
3. Annotate each unwanted incident-asset relation with a consequence taken from the respective 
asset’s consequence scale. 
4. If there are extracted threat diagrams for the indirect assets, do step 2 and 3 also for these. If 
the consequences are different according to which threat that gives rise to the unwanted 
incident, one may split the incident. 
8.2.4 Risk Evaluation 
On the basis of the risk estimation we model the risks with their resulting risk values in 
risk diagrams, and optionally also in risk evaluation diagrams. Risk diagrams are used to 
give an overview of the magnitude of each risk, including the threats that are involved and 
the assets that are harmed. The risk evaluation diagram is similar, but shows whether the 
risks are acceptable or unacceptable according to the risk acceptance criteria defined 
during context establishment (Figure 57). 
The risk diagram for direct assets (left diagram in Figure 62) illustrates that there is a low 
risk for disclosure of data caused by an employee, towards the asset "CM2. Data privacy", 
but a medium risk for the same incident towards "GDI1. Data privacy". For the indirect 
assets (right diagram in Figure 62) we see that the risk value of "Unavailability of 
application" is different according to which threat that is initiating it.  
The preferred numbering convention is up to the modeler, we recommend that risks 
referring to the same unwanted incident start at the same number (e.g. "1.1 Disclosure of 
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data" and "1.2 Disclosure of data"). We also recommend that the risks in the diagram for 
indirect assets refer to their "parent incident" or origin, starting with the same number as its 
parent (e.g. "1.1.1 Disclosure of data" in Figure 62). 
Figure 62 – Risk diagrams 
To indicate those risks in the risk diagrams that are above risk acceptance criteria, one may 
draw a risk evaluation diagram. This is made by replacing the risk value with "acceptable" 
or "unacceptable" according to the risk acceptance criteria for each stakeholder and asset 
(Figure 63). We recommend that the difference between the two categories is also 
visualized using a color (in this case the acceptable risks are made gray). In a modeling 
tool this would typically be an automatic function. 
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Figure 63 – Risk evaluation diagrams  
The risk evaluation step 
Analysis tasks: People that should participate: 
•
•
•
Likelihood and consequence estimates should 
be confirmed or adjusted. 
The final adjustments of the acceptable risk 
levels should be made (if needed). 
An overview of the risk may be given in a risk 
diagram.
•
•
•
Security analysis leader (required) 
Security analysis secretary (required) 
Representatives of the client: 
- Decision makers (required) 
- Technical expertise regarding the target 
(required/optional*) 
- Users (required/optional*) 
*Depends on whether this step is included in risk 
estimation or not. If it is part of the risk estimation 
workshop, all representatives should be present; 
otherwise it may be sufficient with only the decision 
makers.
Modeling guideline: 
Risk diagrams: 
1. Use the threat diagrams and replace all unwanted incidents with risk symbols, showing the 
short risk description and the risk value. 
2. Remove threat scenarios and vulnerabilities, but keep the relations between the threats and 
the risks. 
3. If useful, split the risk diagrams into several diagrams according to type of threat, part of the 
target or asset importance (for instance, show all risks related to network, all risks for specific 
assets etc.).
4. If there are threat diagrams for indirect assets, do step 1 for these. 
5. You may indicate those risks that are acceptable using risk evaluation diagrams. Replace the 
risk value in the risk diagram with "acceptable" or "unacceptable" according to the risk 
acceptance criteria. We recommend that the difference between the two categories is 
highlighted using a color label.
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8.2.5 Treatment Identification 
During treatment identification, all the risks that are unacceptable are evaluated in order to 
find means to reduce their likelihood and/or consequence. Since treatments can be costly, 
they may be assessed with respect to their cost/benefit, before a final treatment plan is 
made.  
The initial treatment diagrams are similar to the final threat diagrams except that every 
relation between an unwanted incident and an asset representing an unacceptable risk is 
symbolized with a risk icon and an identifier. Threats, threat scenarios, vulnerabilities and 
unwanted incidents that constitute acceptable risks only, should not be part of the treatment 
diagram. 
Figure 64 shows the proposed treatments for the asset "GDI1.Data privacy": "Upgrade 
server", "Limit access to network" and "Increase awareness of security risks". The 
treatments in our example all address vulnerabilities, but one may also specify treatments 
for threats, threat scenarios or unwanted incidents. In our experience, the participants find 
it most intuitive to focus on treating vulnerabilities, using the analogy of closing a padlock 
in the meaning of closing the specific path through the diagram,. 
Figure 64 – Treatment diagram for the direct asset "GDI1.Data privacy" 
Similarly, the treatments for the indirect asset "CM1.Company brand & reputation" 
includes the already mentioned treatments, in addition to "New backup solution" (Figure 
65).
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Figure 65 – Treatment diagram for the indirect asset "CM1.Company brand & reputation" 
The treatments can be summarized in treatment overview diagrams shown in Figure 66 and 
Figure 67. To help avoiding cluttered diagrams we recommend gathering treatments that 
address the same risk in so called "junction points", and only use one arrow from the 
junction point to the particular risk. 
Figure 66 – Treatment overview: direct asset 
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Figure 67 – Treatment overview: indirect asset 
The risk treatment step 
Analysis tasks: People that should participate: 
•
•
•
Add treatments to threat diagrams. 
Estimate the cost/benefit of each treatment and 
decide which ones to use. 
Show treatments in risk overview diagrams. 
•
•
•
Security analysis leader (required) 
Security analysis secretary (required) 
Representatives of the client: 
- Decision makers (required) 
- Technical expertise (required) 
- Users (required) 
Modeling guidelines:  
Treatment diagrams: 
1. Use the threat diagrams as a basis and annotate all arrows from unwanted incidents to assets 
representing unacceptable risks with risk icons. Relations and elements representing 
acceptable risks can be removed (this includes unwanted incidents, vulnerabilities, assets, 
threats and threats scenarios that do not constitute unacceptable risks). 
2. Annotate the diagram with treatments, pointing to where they will be applied 
3. If several treatments points towards the same risks (a many-to-many relation) we recommend 
using "junction points" to avoid multiple, crossing lines 
Treatment overview diagrams: 
1. Use the risk diagrams as a basis; remove the acceptable risks (including threats and assets 
that are not associated with an unacceptable risk). 
2. Add treatments as specified in the treatment diagram(s). Treatments directed towards 
vulnerabilities or threat scenarios should point towards the risks they indirectly treat. 
3. If several treatments points towards the same risks (a many-to-many relation) we recommend 
using "junction points" to avoid multiple, crossing lines. 
8.2.6 Additional Explanations, Tips and Hints 
The following explanations and recommendations are based on experiences from the 
industrial field trials in the SECURIS project. They are meant as additional help to the 
user.
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Choosing the appropriate level of abstraction: this is often a difficult task for an 
inexperienced modeler. When identifying threat scenarios one should follow the strategy 
used in fault tree analysis. When modeling a fault tree, one starts with the top node (the 
unwanted incident) and works oneself down the tree by asking "what may cause this 
incident". When reaching an appropriate level of detail (i.e. manageable in complexity) the 
analysis stops. The same tactic should be used for threat diagrams. When adding an 
unwanted incident one should focus on identifying the threat scenarios that may cause the 
incident, thereby adding threat scenarios in a "backward" manner towards the threats. This 
way one avoids starting at a too detailed level by specifying extremely detailed initial 
threat scenarios, which may not contribute to the overall risk picture. 
Regions and asset types: the regions are used as the link between threat diagrams and the 
target description. When designing the threat diagrams they should have a clear link to the 
target description, preferably visualized through the use of regions. The threat diagrams 
should be a more abstract view of the target descriptions, that includes risk related 
information but suppresses detailed technical information. The target descriptions function 
as underlying documentation that can be consulted in cases where the participants are 
uncertain or need to refresh their memory with respect to the target. If the target consists of 
logical or physical parts with different security levels this may be considered as different 
regions (e.g. a company’s intranet and extranet). When the guideline recommends to place 
the direct assets within the region and the indirect outside, it really means that the modeler 
should separate between assets at different abstraction levels. An indirect asset is an asset 
that is not directly part of the target of analysis, but nevertheless may be indirectly harmed 
in cases where assets within the target are harmed. We will explain this with an example: 
the emergency preparedness instructions for a major, international company states that the 
director of communication should give a statement in a press release if information about 
security incidents leaks to the press. The communication director must appear trustworthy 
in order to regain public confidence in the company. In a security analysis of the 
company’s information handling system, which also includes the emergency preparedness 
related to security incidents, the trustworthiness of the communication director has been 
defined as an asset. One day it is disclosed that the communication director has a secret 
Swiss bank account that has been withheld from the national tax authorities. Suddenly the 
trustworthiness of the communication director is questioned, and indirectly also the 
trustworthiness of the company itself. Indirect assets are therefore part of the CORAS 
method to illustrate that the consequences of a harmed asset may have rippling effects 
beyond the scope of the analysis. When deciding upon the direct assets, it is important to 
have in mind that these are strongly related to the target of analysis. They may represent 
functions, services, data or other aspects of the target that are particularly valuable to the 
company. During a security analysis an indirect asset may change status and become a 
direct asset and vice versa if findings suggest so or the scope is changed.
To ensure a good understanding of terminology and notation one should: 
x Briefly repeat the meaning of central concepts in the beginning of each meeting to 
avoid confusion. 
x Limit the amount of information in one diagram, and rather split it according to threat 
type, scenario type or asset type. 
x Strive towards correctness from the very beginning. This means that the participants 
must be involved early, enabling them to adjust the diagram as they find appropriate. 
x Provide a proper introduction to the notation and the diagrams that will be presented to 
the participants. 
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x Keep the assets within the scope of the analysis at the same abstraction level. 
x Utilize checklists ensure that all relevant aspects are covered.  
x Check whether assets, consequence scales and likelihood scales from previous analyses 
are relevant and can be reused. 
x Document any changes to the diagrams during the brainstorming session including 
their rationale and origin since this represents important information. 
How to decide the correct level of abstraction for the analysis, especially for the 
consequence scale? This is related to the whole security analysis process, and not specific 
to the modeling language used. It depends on the scope of the analysis and the experience 
of the analysis team. Or recommendation is to consult other analysts and previous analyses 
if available, or study the example given in the guideline to get an impression of how this 
has been solved in other analyses 
How much time to spend on each step and how to prioritize between the activities? In 
general no analysis is the same, and the time spent depends on the target complexity, the 
competence of the participants and more. The guideline provides a suggestion for the 
number of meetings and workshops that is expected during a CORAS analysis. It is up to 
the analysis team to adjust this on a case to case basis. The analysts should consult 
examples or previous analyses to get an impression of how much information it is normal 
to handle during one meeting or workshop. 
How to structure the brainstorming session so that most of the participants would be 
actively involved? If the participants cannot contribute to each others areas, split the 
brainstorming session into sub sessions with different focus. If participants feel they waste 
time by being present, they will become demoralized and not contribute to a fruitful 
discussion. Also in this case it may be a good idea to split up in smaller groups. 
Is it necessary to follow all the steps in the guideline? If one chooses not to follow the 
guideline, it places more responsibility on the analysis team. In our opinion, the only 
situation where this may be an option is if the analysis team is highly competent in security 
analysis and thereby knows when to take short-cuts, but also recognize when certain 
aspects need more detailed analysis. However, for the non-experienced user we 
recommend following the guideline in detail. 
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9 Evaluation of the CORAS Language and the 
Guideline
This summarizes the results from the evaluations of the CORAS language and guideline. 
The evaluations are based on different approaches and have been conducted at different 
stages during design and development. 
Some evaluations were carried out initially to explore, and capture design 
recommendations. They were: 
x The quality evaluation of the UML profile using the quality evaluation framework 
described in Chapter 6. The UML profile was the starting point of our work. This 
evaluation has already been summarized in Chapter 7, and the full documentation is 
available in [57].
x The use of questionnaires on both students and professionals to evaluate the conceptual 
foundation on which our language has been built. See Chapter 5 for a summary and 
Appendices A and B for the full documentation. 
x The use of questionnaires on students to evaluate the use of risk related symbols vs. 
basic UML symbols. See Chapter 5 for a summary and Appendix A for the full 
documentation. 
Some evaluations were carried out during design and development. They were: 
x The use of a questionnaire to evaluate and select graphical constructs. The results from 
this are summarized in Sect. 9.1. See Appendix G for the full documentation. 
Some evaluations were carried out after, or when our approach was close to completion. 
They were: 
x The use of experience reports from field trials to evaluate the language and guideline in 
an industrial context. See Sect. 9.2. 
x The use of the quality evaluation framework described in Chapter 6 to evaluate the 
CORAS language. See Sect. 9.3 below and Appendix H for the full details. 
9.1 Evaluation Using Questionnaires 
As explained in full details in Appendix G, questionnaires filled in by a group of 
professional system developers were used to select between different syntactic alternatives. 
We looked for ways of improving the readability and comprehensibility of threat- and risk 
diagrams by adding information in terms of text labels or simple graphical means. From 
this study, one conclusion was that text labels are preferred over visualization mechanisms 
like size, color or line type. For our language, this meant for example that that we decided 
to tag a major risk with the text label "major", rather than representing it with a large risk 
icon. In the following, we summarize the most important decisions made, based on this 
study.
To assess threats in a security analysis, it is useful to describe the paths via which they are 
most likely to harm the assets. By highlighting (attract attention to) or "sublightning" 
(remove attention from) paths in the threat diagram, one may visualize the most or least 
likely paths. None of the alternatives we investigated for these purposes were preferred by 
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the subjects, except for the use of AND-gate symbols. The AND-gate is used to show how 
the occurrence of a threat scenario in a path depends on the preceding threat scenarios.  
There may be different reasons for why none of the alternatives in the other cases were 
clearly preferred. The alternatives we tested may have been too similar, which mean that 
the subjects considered them equally good or bad. It may also be the case that the subjects 
paid little attention to likelihoods of relations between threat scenarios, but were more 
interested in the likelihoods of the actual scenarios. The study resulted in the following 
decisions regarding the CORAS language: 
x the logical AND and OR-gate symbols from FTA and circuit design were included in 
the language (Figure 68 illustrates the use of the AND gate, for a full explanation of 
the figure we refer to Sect. 8.4 in Appendix G).
x the likelihoods of paths are not shown, likelihood estimates are only assigned to threat 
scenarios and unwanted incidents (Figure 68). 
Old firewall
Hacker
Employee
Power 
supply
Virus 
infection on PC
[4 times a year]
Virus spreads 
to email server
[once a year ]
Virus spreads 
to file server
[1 time per 5 years]
Email server 
unavailable
[once a year ]
File server 
unavailable
[once a year ]
Access to 
email
Access to 
company files
major
minor
Power failure
[once a year]
Small stand by unit
The Company’s information servers
and
Electrician
No electricians 
are available
[once a year]
Figure 68 – Example of the use of AND-gate in the threat diagram 
Vulnerabilities are interesting in two different settings: it is useful to get an overview of the 
vulnerabilities of each asset, and it may be interesting to get an overview of which 
vulnerabilities a threat may exploit along its way in a threat diagram. We did not find it 
preferred to illustrate both views in the same diagram. One may instead leave out threats, 
threat scenarios and relations between these when only interested in the assets and their 
vulnerabilities. Since the CORAS language should be able to express both views, the first 
should be covered in threat diagrams and the second in specialized asset diagrams. This 
resulted in the following design decision regarding the language: 
x vulnerabilities may annotate all relations in a threat diagram (Figure 68). This way of 
representing vulnerabilities attracts attention to the actual point where they are 
exploited. To identify which vulnerabilities an asset is exposed to, one may follow 
each path from the asset in question towards the threats. Nevertheless, we believe it is 
better to present this latter information in a specialized asset diagram (Figure 69). 
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The asset diagram in Figure 69 specifies which vulnerabilities each asset is subject to:  
Access to email Access to 
company files
Old firewall Small stand by unit
Figure 69 – Example of an asset diagram 
with particular focus on vulnerabilities 
Email server unavailable
[unacceptable ] Access to email
Employee
Hacker
Power 
failure
File server unavailable
[acceptable] Access to 
company files
Electrician
Figure 70 – Risk evaluation diagram illustrating whether 
the risks are acceptable or not 
The risk evaluation diagram in Figure 70 illustrates which risks that are 
unacceptable/acceptable, the threats that may cause them and the assets that may be 
harmed. As we see, the employee and the hacker may cause both risks, while power failure 
and the electrician may only make the file server unavailable. 
An important aspect of a security analysis is to identify the risks that are above the level of 
tolerance. The study indicates that it is preferred to use textual information labels to 
indicate the severity of risks and unwanted incidents, since size or color is too 
unambiguous. For the CORAS language, this means that textual information in the 
diagrams, possibly in combination with visual effects, is preferred over visual mechanisms 
alone. This resulted in the following design decisions regarding the language: 
x we use text labels to indicate whether a risk is acceptable or unacceptable (Figure 70). 
The severity of unwanted incidents is not specified explicitly, but these are implicitly 
shown via their textual consequence- and likelihood labels in the threat diagram 
(Figure 68).   
9.2 Evaluation Based on Experience Reports from Field 
Trials
In Chapter 2, we defined a set of success criteria for the thesis work. In this section, these 
are evaluated with respect to experience reports from industrial field trials. The field trials 
were carried out within the setting of the research project SECURIS (152839/220) funded 
by the Research Council of Norway. Each field trial consisted in a security analysis 
requiring about 250 person hours from the SINTEF analysis team, and 50-100 hours from 
the client. The analysis reports are confidential, but the scope and type of organization, and 
whether the author participated is shortly described in Table 25. 
Table 25 – Recent field trials  
Organization     
Name Year Type (Approx. # employees) Target of analysis 
Hogganvik 
participated?
DNV 2004 Vessel classification company (6400) 
Information
sharing service  
Yes 
NetCom 2004 Telecom company (700) Mobile access to personal 
Yes 
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information
Statnett 2005 Energy company (550) 
Control and 
supervisory 
system 
Yes 
Hydro CSI 2005 Metal production company (1000, on plant) 
Control and 
supervisory 
system 
Yes 
Hydro ICT 2006 
ICT division, (metal, oil & 
energy) in Hydro (33 000, world 
wide ) 
Information
sharing service 
No
FLO/IKT 2006 Military organization (1000) 
Procedures for 
handling 
restricted 
information
No
Statnett 20074 Energy company (550) 
Control and 
supervisory 
system 
No
Two reports document every field trial: one presents the results from the security analysis 
and one summarizes experiences with the analysis methods and tools that were used. The 
first report was made available to the client only. The second report was open to the whole 
consortium. In this evaluation we consider only experience reports from the last five field 
trials: Hydro-05 trial [22], Statnett-05 trial [58], Hydro-06 trial [40], FLO/IKT-06 trial 
[132] and Statnett-07 trial [20]. This is to ensure that the statements reported are of 
adequate relevance since the way of conducting security analysis according to the CORAS 
method has evolved over the years (for example, before 2005 only the UML profile was 
used).
The experience reports provide information on issues such as what worked well, what did 
not work and why. The reports also contain data on how well the participants understand 
the diagrams, method, concepts etc. The author of the thesis did not participate in the last 
three field trials, but played a major role in the others.  
The analysis team in the FLO/IKT-06 trial consisted of people with limited knowledge of 
the CORAS language. This field trial can therefore be seen as an exploration of the 
language and guideline by non-experienced modelers and their experiences are therefore 
extremely valuable. Some of their comments identified the need for additional explanations 
in the guideline that probably has been regarded as implicit by those familiar with the 
language. In most cases, their comments resulted in changes or the inclusion of new 
recommendations in the guideline.  
In Chapter 2 we defined the success criteria for the thesis work, targeting four main issues: 
the conceptual foundation, the language itself, the modeling guideline and the quality 
evaluation framework. In the evaluation based on the experience reports, only the first 
three are relevant. In the following, we discuss to what degree the validity of each success 
criterion is supported or not supported by the experience reports, and explain how 
identified problems have been addressed. All four success criteria are evaluated further in 
Chapter 10.
4 Partly overlapping with the FLO/IKT-06 trial 
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9.2.1 The Conceptual Foundation 
The following statements, relevant to the conceptual foundation, were found in the 
experience reports from the Hydro-05 trial [22], Hydro-06 trial [40], FLO/IKT-06 trial 
[132] and Statnett-07 trial [20] (nothing of particular relevance to the conceptual 
foundation was found in the Statnett-05 trial). Each statement is numbered, and followed 
by a discussion of its relevance including how we have dealt with it.
1. The CORAS terms used in the Hydro-05 trial were for instance threat, 
vulnerability, frequency, consequence and unwanted incident. Out of these, threat 
and unwanted incident were judged to be the easiest to grasp. Certain participants 
also found frequency quite understandable, while others thought this term was more 
problematic. Risk, consequence and asset were reported as less intuitive in the 
evaluation forms.  
The reported difficulties in understanding the term "asset" is in our view mainly related to 
the abstract nature of the term itself. We have not seen the need for changing the definition, 
but have updated the guideline with an explanatory section addressing assets and asset 
types. Since the term "consequence" depends on the understanding of the term asset, we 
believe this will also reduce problems related to the notion of consequence. Although the 
notion of risk has proved difficult to understand in empirical investigations (Chapter 5), it 
has not been reported to be a problematic term in other field trials than Hydro-05. We 
therefore assume that this was a problem specific to this trial. It is however advisable to 
provide a careful introduction to the various terms at the start-up of a new analysis session, 
maybe even a discussion of them, to reach a common understanding. This has been 
included as a general recommendation in the guideline.  
2. The asset identification and asset value estimation were found difficult during the 
Hydro-06 trial since the purpose of the activity and the asset-term itself were found 
difficult to understand. Also in the Statnett-07 trial and the FLO/IKT-06 trial, the 
analysis teams were uncertain of the difference between direct and indirect assets, 
and the purpose of this differentiation.
Our remarks regarding statement 1 with respect to the term assets is also relevant with 
respect to statement 2. The conceptual foundation does not distinguish between indirect 
and direct assets. In order to comply with international standards and be general enough to 
have interest beyond CORAS, the conceptual model is kept at a high level of abstraction. 
The differentiation between indirect and direct assets has been introduced in the guideline 
to help modelers achieve more precise diagrams, but is not really an issue of the conceptual 
model.
3. The ranking of assets according to importance created much discussion in the 
FLO/IKT-06 trial. The analysts assumed that this was the result of not all 
participants having a clear understanding of the concepts "asset", "consequence" 
and "frequency". There was a tendency to rank assets according to (expected) risk 
or frequency of related incidents, rather than importance.  
The statement above shows that not having a clear understanding of the asset concept may 
affect also the understanding of related concepts. When the assets are precisely understood, 
the consequences in terms of potential damage to the asset are much easier to define. The 
misunderstood use of frequency during the ranking process is probably related to 
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uncertainty with respect to the ranking of risks. Frequency is one of the most commonly 
used risk-related terms in the common language. We believe its definition is quite easy to 
understand, but assigning frequencies, or likelihoods, during an analysis is always difficult. 
Therefore, we assume the difficulties regarding frequency in this trial was related to 
identifying the correct frequency of threat scenarios and unwanted incidents, rather than 
understanding the definition itself. Sect. 9.2.3 also addresses the problem of ranking assets. 
4. In the FLO/IKT-06 trial, it was found useful to briefly repeat the meaning of central 
concepts in the beginning of each meeting to avoid confusion. 
Although this may appear obvious, it was included into the guideline to help non-
experienced security analysis teams. 
5. The analysis team in the Hydro-06 trial suggests that the assets within the scope of 
the analysis should be kept at the same abstraction level. 
Also this has later been included in the guideline since it may help non-experienced 
modelers to manage their challenges related to asset identification. 
Conclusion: The first success criterion for the thesis work is defined as follows: 
1. The work of this thesis should include a conceptual foundation for security analysis, 
that:
a. specifies the main security analysis concepts and their relationships 
b. uses a terminology that is easy to understand 
c. uses a terminology that is in accordance with international standards 
d. is described in a simple and understandable manner 
e.  provides a solid, underlying basis for a security risk modeling approach 
Of these only 1b and 1d are of relevance here. The main problem related to the conceptual 
foundation, which has been reported in the five experience reports addressed here, is 
related to the concept asset (statements 1, 2 and 3). Except from these statements, we have 
not found any complaints concerning the understandability of terms in the experience 
reports. This fact may actually suggest that the terminology used in CORAS is well 
defined and quite easy to understand. 
Statement 4 and 5 are not criticisms of the conceptual foundation itself, but rather 
recommendations based on practical use of the CORAS method that may be helpful to 
inexperienced users and therefore have been included in the guideline. 
9.2.2 The CORAS Language 
Statements relevant to the CORAS language were found in experience reports from these 
field trials: Hydro-05 [22], Statnett-05 [58], FLO/IKT-06 [132] and Statnett-07 [20]. Each 
statement is numbered, and then followed by a discussion of its relevance, including how 
we have dealt with it. 
1. The use of the graphical models made it easier to involve the participants actively, 
and helped ensure an effective communication between the analysis team and the 
participants [Hydro-05]. 
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This statement supports the appropriateness of the CORAS language for use in structured 
brainstorming sessions. 
2. The overall experience from the use of the threat-modeling tool5 during the 
Statnett-07 trial to model threats "on-the-fly" compared to the previous approach, 
where the analyst team made the threat diagrams between workshop 1 and 2, were 
good. The threat diagrams capture threat scenarios in an intuitive manner and it 
seemed easy for the participants to relate to the diagrams and provide input during 
the brainstorming sessions. The subjective experience of the analyst secretary is 
that threat diagrams are much better suited for storing threat related information 
during sessions than tables, as the notation is more compact and flexible and more 
suited to the format of the information obtained. 
This statement supports the appropriateness of the CORAS language for being used 
actively to model the findings during structured brainstorming sessions. The language is 
considered easy to understand by the participants, and in particular suitable for 
documenting the information that is gathered during each step of a security analysis. 
3. The participants emphasized that they need proper introduction to the notation and 
sufficient time to understand the information presented to them [Hydro-05]. 
Since one may schedule the meetings in a security analysis with weeks in between, the 
representatives of the client may not remember the details of the language from the 
previous meetings. Moreover, some representatives may be new to the analysis. We have 
therefore updated the guideline to remind the analysis team to repeat definitions of notation 
in each meeting.  
4. One should limit the amount of information in one diagram, and rather split it 
according to threat type, scenario type or asset type [Hydro-05]. 
It may be challenging to a non-experienced modeler to know how much information to 
capture in a single diagram. As a general recommendation, it is better to include too little 
information per diagram than too much. A rule of thumb is that the diagrams must be 
readable when projected on a whiteboard in a normal meeting room. To help non-
experienced modelers we updated the guideline to reflect this. 
5. It is important to strive towards correctness from the very beginning. This means 
that the participants must be involved early, enabling them to adjust the diagrams as 
they find appropriate [Hydro-05]. 
This is particularly important with respect to the target descriptions since they often are 
prepared before the meeting. The client should be able to recognize their intended target of 
analysis in the descriptions. One should not waste precious time in the meetings to correct 
erroneously diagrams since this draws attention away from the purpose of the meeting. To 
ensure this, it is advisable that the client reviews the target descriptions before the actual 
meeting. We later updated the guideline to reflect this. 
5 The CORAS tool for security analysis and threat modeling (http://coras.sourceforge.net)
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6. The diagrams capture information gathered during brainstorming sessions and one 
of the main concerns of the participants was whether the diagrams would be 
complete [Hydro-05]. 
To help overcome this we advice the analysis team to utilize relevant checklists to ensure 
that every important aspect is covered. This kind of checklist may be part of the CORAS 
method. This is a recommendation in the guideline. 
7. Any changes to the diagrams during the brainstorming session represent important 
information and the analysis secretary should capture their rationale [Hydro-05]. 
Gathering some notes on the decisions made during the analysis is an important task of the 
analysis secretary. Participants may be present at one meeting, but not the next and vice 
versa, and therefore it is necessary to capture the rationale behind each decision. This 
includes information about who provided the information, why and how it affected the 
diagrams. Depending on how the analysis is organized, it may be the responsibility of the 
analysis leader to take these notes so that the secretary may concentrate on modeling. To 
stress this issue, we have included it as a general recommendation in the guideline. 
8. In the Hydro-05 trial, the participants found the notation itself easy to understand 
and remember. It was considered to be a good way of visualizing threat scenarios 
and very suitable for presentations. According to one of the participants, this type 
of visualization emphasizes the "message" or the purpose of the analysis.
This statement supports the CORAS language’s appropriateness for brainstorming 
sessions. It also shows that the participants in the analyses perceive it to be easy to 
understand, and that it successfully supports and documents the findings from each step of 
the analysis process.
9. In the Statnett-05 trial, the client found the CORAS language of high value when 
conducting threat and vulnerability assessments of complex ICT systems. The 
visualization method was in particular suitable for presenting problems and 
alternative solutions, prior to a final decision. In fact, the graphical visualization 
provided by the threat diagrams revealed the need for some specific security 
measures that were directly accepted by the participants. The client also considered 
the method useful in training of personnel to increase their awareness of security 
related issues of complex ICT systems [9]. 
This emphasizes the previous statement since it is taken from a different field trial.
10. The client in the Hydro-05 trial considered the way the CORAS language helps 
specifying the relations between threats and the chain of events that they may 
cause, the various states of the target, and potential incidents, as one of its main 
benefits. According to the participants, the modeling method made them more 
conscious of the target of analysis and its risks by representing threats and 
vulnerabilities more explicitly than "just talking" about them. 
This statement supports one of the main goals of the CORAS language: to facilitate a 
precise documentation of the security analysis relevant information. It also shows that the 
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participants in the analyses consider our graphical way of illustrating risks to make the 
security analysis more effective.  
11. In the Hydro-05 trial, the participants said that the language provided an 
opportunity for documenting cause-consequence relations in a precise and detailed 
manner. 
This statement also supports one of the main goals of the CORAS language, which is being 
a precise way of documenting the security analysis. 
12. One of the hypotheses of the FLO/IKT-06 trial was that the use of CORAS 
diagrams facilitates the risk analysis process and documentation. The analysis team 
concluded that the hypothesis was confirmed, at least to the extent that it could be 
done without comparing the use of CORAS diagrams to alternative approaches. 
CORAS diagrams were used extensively in meetings #4 and #5 [risk identification 
and estimation]. The participants seemed to have a good understanding of the 
diagrams, and there were very little communication problems between the 
participants and the analysts. The analysis team assumed that one of the reasons for 
this was that the CORAS symbols are intuitive. The team also considered the 
technique of adding frequency values to the unwanted incidents, and consequence 
values to the unwanted incident-asset relations, during the risk estimation meeting 
to work very well. 
In addition to fit the nature of the brainstorming session, the CORAS language should be 
easily understandable for the participants, and support and document the findings from 
each step of the analysis process. The result from the hypothesis testing in the statement 
above suggests that the CORAS language meets these requirements. 
13. A justified question from the FLO/IKT-06 team is why threats but not 
vulnerabilities are included in the risk diagrams. As they point out, vulnerabilities 
are just as important as threats with respect to treatments.  
The risk diagram was developed to provide a simple overview of the risks, from the 
initiator to the affected asset without any unnecessary "clutter". We understand the analysis 
team’s concerns and recommend a feature like this to be implemented in the CORAS tool. 
This could for example be a function that lets the modeler right-click and choose "hide" on 
any element within a threat diagram.  
14. Representatives from the Norwegian Defense and Research Establishment (FFI) 
observed the use of the CORAS approach during the Statnett-05 trial. Their 
evaluation summary [10] with respect to the language concluded: "Modeling = 
useful! Facilitates a common understanding and makes it easier to communicate the 
results".
Also the independent observer of this field trial agreed that the CORAS language 
facilitated the analysis process. 
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Conclusion: The second success criterion for the thesis work is defined as follows: 
2. The work of this thesis should specify a language for describing security risks, that: 
a. is suitable for use in structured brainstorming sessions
b. is easily understandable for the participants in the brainstorming, including 
those who receive the analysis results afterwards 
c. has a precise syntax, meaning its design should be based on: 
i. best practice within information visualization 
ii. experiences with realistic security risk scenarios 
iii. users’ preferences 
iv. existing risk modeling techniques 
d. has a structured semantics that translates arbitrary diagrams into English 
e. supports and documents the different steps in the security analysis process 
Of these, only 2a, 2b and 2e are of relevance here. 
2a) The suitability of the CORAS language for use in structured brainstorming is 
supported by statements 1, 2, 8, 9, 12 and 14.  
2b) According to statements 2, 8, 9, 12 and 14, the language is easy to understand for the 
participants in the analysis. However, there is little empirical data on how well people who 
have not participated in the actual analysis understand the language (see discussion in Sect. 
9.4.2).
2e) Statements 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 14 together indicate that the language is suited for 
documenting each step in a security analysis. 
Statements 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 13 provide advice and hints related to the use of the language 
that we have later included as recommendations in the guideline, or suggestions for tool 
support.
9.2.3 The Guideline 
The modeling guideline was applied for the first time in the Hydro-06 field trial. 
Statements relevant to this guideline are therefore found in experience reports from the 
Hydro-06 [40], FLO/IKT-06 [132] and Statnett-07 [20] field trials. 
1. The guideline was applied for the first time in the Hydro-06 trial, and was found to 
be very helpful in risk identification. 
Since the modeler in this field trial was a non-experienced user of the CORAS language, 
we interpret this statement as a confirmation of the guidelines suitability for non-
experienced modelers. 
2. In the Statnett-07 field trial, the team chose not to conduct the risk treatment as a 
separate workshop, but rather include it at the end of the risk estimation. This 
meant that the analysts did not have time to remove the acceptable risks before 
treatments were suggested.  
Better tool-support is probably the best way to address problems of this kind. 
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3. In the FLO/IKT-06 trial, the analysts chose not to follow the guidelines for the risk 
identification. Afterwards they concluded that by following the guidelines a better 
result could have been achieved, in terms of simpler diagrams and less work before 
and after the meeting. 
We have developed the guideline based on a large amount of experience from several field 
trials. If one chooses not to follow the guideline, it places responsibility on the analysis 
team. In our opinion, the only situation where this may be an option is if the analysis team 
is highly competent in security analysis and thereby knows when to take short cuts.
4. In the FLO/IKT-06 trial, each step of the guideline was evaluated, providing these 
judgments: 
o Context establishment: 
The modeling guidelines for asset diagram in the context establishment 
raised some questions and caused some confusion related to the 
difference between direct and indirect assets. The analysis team also 
pointed out the problem of having point 4 (indicate with arrows which 
assets may affect other assets) after point 2 (place the direct assets 
within the region). The team felt it more natural to decide how assets 
affect other assets before separating indirect assets from direct assets.  
The modeling guidelines for target descriptions were found very helpful 
and the analysis team managed to produce target descriptions that were 
well understood by the participants, and also useful for later analysis, by 
following the instructions closely and using suggested languages (UML 
class diagrams and activity diagrams). 
The guidelines for the approval step were also found adequate. 
o Risk identification: Although the analysis team deviated from the guideline at 
this step, they believed that the modeling guidelines for risk identification were 
helpful, but that they did not give sufficient guidance to ensure that an 
inexperienced analysis team was able to conduct a successful risk identification 
step.
o Risk estimation: the guideline provides sufficient support for this step. 
o Risk evaluation: the guideline provides sufficient support for this step.
o Risk treatment: the guideline provides sufficient support for this step.
Based on this feedback from the FLO/IKT-06 trial we chose to change the order and text of 
point 2-4 for the asset diagram. In addition, we have added a more detailed explanation of 
assets to the guideline. Except for the risk identification step, the statements above show 
that the analysis team judged the different parts of the guideline to provide sufficient 
support. With respect to the risk identification, we have later updated the guideline with 
more explanations and recommendations. As mentioned before, the analysis team in this 
trial consisted of inexperienced CORAS users. 
5. The FLO/IKT-06 trial suggested that the guidelines should allow direct assignment 
of likelihood values to unwanted incidents in cases where such estimates can be 
just as good as estimates for threat scenarios 
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Since one may use the CORAS language both in a high level manner, as well as at a more 
detailed level, this simplification should be allowed. We have later updated the guideline to 
reflect this decision. 
6. The importance of ranking the assets (in asset diagrams and in the approval step) 
was not clear to the analysis team in FLO/IKT-06 since the guideline does not use 
this information in the later steps. 
During the field trials, the ranking of assets has shown more problematic than anticipated. 
Often it creates much debate and discussion without being of great importance for the rest 
of the analysis. A ranking of assets may be achieved indirectly from the risk acceptance 
levels. An asset for which only a low risk level is accepted is "ranked" as more important 
than an asset for which one allows a higher risk level. The guideline has therefore eased 
this requirement and made it optional. 
7. The Statnett-07 trial pointed out difficulties in deciding the correct level of 
abstraction for the analysis, especially for the consequence scale.  
This is related to the whole security analysis process, and not specific to the modeling 
language used. In our opinion, it depends on the scope of the analysis and the experience of 
the analysis team. Our recommendation is to consult other analysts and previous analyses 
if available, or study the example given in the guideline to get an impression of how other 
analyses have been solved. 
8. In the FLO/IKT-06 trial, the analysis team requested suggestions for asset, 
consequence and likelihood scales.
For a non-experienced analysis team this may be very helpful, but it is not related to the 
graphical language in particular. In our opinion, this should be included as part of the 
CORAS method description.  
9. The analysis team in the Hydro-06 trial suggested that one should keep proposing 
examples of assets in order to engage the participants. 
This comment is a result of the difficulties the analysis team had with the asset 
identification. Instead of proposing numerous possible assets, the team should instead 
carefully explain the notion of assets and by this involve the participants in the discussion. 
When an analysis team has conducted a couple of security analyses, it will be better 
prepared since the assets in the various analyses often have quite similar characteristics. To 
help non-experienced users, the CORAS method should provide a list of assets based on 
experiences from field trials that one may use as a checklist. Assets like a company’s brand 
& reputation, the availability of a service, the effectiveness of a work task and more, are 
examples of real, but also very general assets. 
10. The analysts in the Statnett-07 trial requested tips on how to structure the 
brainstorming session so that most of the participants would be actively involved.
This depends on the scope of the analysis and the selection of participants. If the 
participants cannot contribute to each other’s areas, our recommendation is to split the 
brainstorming session into smaller sessions focusing on issues that are more specialized. If 
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participants feel they waste time by being present, they will become demoralized and not 
contribute to a fruitful discussion. 
11. The FLO/IKT-06 trial requested guidance on how much time to spend on each 
step, and how to prioritize between the activities.  
In general, no analysis is the same, and the time spent depends on the target complexity, 
the competence of the participants and more. The guideline provides a suggestion for the 
number of meetings and workshops that is expected during a CORAS analysis. It is up to 
the analysis team to judge this from case to case. 
Conclusion: the third success criterion for the thesis work is defined as follows: 
3. This thesis work should provide a modeling guideline for the modeler, that: 
a. is rich and detailed with realistic examples 
b. addresses non-experienced modelers 
c. has recommendations based on user experiences 
d. follows the security analysis process step by step 
The statements extracted from the experience reports above, provide support for all of the 
sub criteria. 
3a) we have extended the guideline with additional explanations to make the most difficult 
concepts more understandable (statements 2 and 3).  
3b) several of the comments suggests that the guideline is suitable for non-experienced 
users, and after the extension with more explanations and recommendations it should have 
improved even more in this point (statements 1, 2, 3 and 4).  
3c) the guideline is based on the field trials, and has been updated to include a number of 
practical recommendations based on experiences (statements 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11).  
3d) the guideline follows the security analysis process, and deviations from its instructions 
seem to be unwise (statements 2, 3 and 4). 
9.3 Evaluation Using the Quality Framework 
This section provides a summary of the quality evaluation of the CORAS language found 
in Appendix H. It includes an evaluation of how well the modeling language performs in 
modeling a set of "core security risk scenarios". It also presents the results and conclusions 
from the quality evaluation according to the language requirements described in Chapter 6.
9.3.1 Modeling the Core Security Risk Scenarios 
The "core security risk scenarios" is a textual description of typical information gathered 
during a security risk analysis. The CORAS language has shown capable of modeling the 
relevant parts of this information. In the next paragraphs, we summarize the results from 
Appendix H.
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Phase 1 – Context establishment: 
The CORAS language was capable of modeling: 
x The assets, including dependencies between them. 
x The stakeholders. 
x The indirect and direct assets. 
x The risk acceptance levels of the stakeholder for each asset. 
x The two stakeholders’ conflicting risk acceptance level for the same asset. 
This information was not modeled: 
x The full description of the assets. 
x The full description of the stakeholders. 
x The scales of the assets, likelihood and consequence values. 
When the stakeholders accept different risk values for an asset, the asset is split into two 
assets with reference to their stakeholder. If only one of the stakeholders value an asset, 
this is reflected by a specific reference to the stakeholder in the asset’s name. We have 
chosen not to include more than the name of the assets and stakeholders in the models, 
because any extra information will clutter the diagram. The diagrams should be 
accompanied with textual explanations, which is a more appropriate place to give detailed 
descriptions of the elements in the diagram. Anything that are not directly necessary in 
order to read and understand the diagram should be avoided. The decision of not modeling 
the value scales was taken from a usability perspective. We believe this kind of 
information is more suitable for presentation in a table than in a graphical model because it 
only consists of static definitions. 
Phase 2 – Risk identification: 
The CORAS language was able to model: 
x The threats, divided into human (accidental and deliberate) and non-human threats. 
x The vulnerabilities, placed in a logical sequence of events with association to the 
threats that may exploit them. 
x The threat scenarios with associations to relevant threats, vulnerabilities and unwanted 
incidents.
x The unwanted incidents with associations to the assets they may affect. 
x A logical region symbolizing the target, for each type of threat. 
This information was not modeled: 
x The full description of the vulnerabilities. 
x The full description of threats. 
x The full description of assets. 
As for the asset diagram, we decided to include only the names of the threats, 
vulnerabilities and assets to avoid messy and confusing diagrams. Any additional 
information about the elements should be stated in the accompanying textual description, 
which typically is required for the final analysis report. 
Phase 3 – Risk estimation: 
The CORAS language was able to model: 
x The consequence of each unwanted incident towards the assets. 
x The likelihood of each unwanted incident. 
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This information was not modeled: 
x None.
It required very little effort to model the information from this phase using the CORAS 
language. In practice, the modeling consisted of adding textual information about 
likelihoods and consequences to the threat diagrams made in the previous phase. This 
makes the notation very suitable for modeling "on-the-fly" during risk estimation.  
Phase 4 – Risk evaluation: 
The CORAS language was able to express: 
x The risks including their risk value. 
x A separation of acceptable and unacceptable risks according to the risk acceptance 
levels of each stakeholder. 
This information was not modeled: 
x None.
The risk evaluation phase basically takes the information gathered in the risk identification 
and risk estimation and compares it to the risk acceptance levels from the first phase. The 
CORAS language had no problems modeling this information. The language provides a set 
of overview diagrams that can be very useful when presenting the findings of the analysis. 
The risk diagrams are created by "hiding" the vulnerabilities and threat scenarios between a 
threat and an unwanted incident in the threat diagrams. The unwanted incident symbol is 
replaced with a risk symbol with the appropriate risk value. Depending on the modelers 
choice of tools, this can be done either manually (like in Microsoft Visio) or semi-
automatically in the CORAS tool. The risk evaluation diagram is a variation of the risk 
diagram where acceptable risks are grayed out. The latter diagram type is not necessary in 
order to model the core security risk scenarios. 
Phase 5 – Treatment identification: 
The CORAS language was able to express: 
x The treatments, pointing towards the element in the threat diagram where they should 
be applied. 
x An overview of the treatments that may be applied for each risk. 
x An example of the risk diagram after applying a specific treatment. 
This information was not modeled: 
x The treatments’ effect on the unacceptable risks. 
x The estimated change in risk value each treatment may have on each of the 
unacceptable risks. 
The decision of not modeling treatment effects in the diagrams is based on experience with 
the UML profile where this was a part of the notation. The treatment effect labels had a 
tendency of making the diagrams quite unreadable since they often conflicted with existing 
elements and relations. The CORAS language has the option for adding this kind of 
information to the treatment arrows, but we do not recommend using it, unless for very 
simple diagrams. The treatment overview diagram is an extra diagram type, suitable for 
presentation purposes in reports etc., but not required in order to model the core security 
risk scenarios. The CORAS language has no customized diagram for modeling the 
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expected effects of the treatments, but one may illustrate this using a risk diagram. In our 
opinion, it not necessary to spend time on modeling this information since it is more 
efficient to present it in a table like in the core security risk scenarios. 
9.3.2 Evaluating Against the Quality Requirements 
The table below summarizes the scores for each category of quality requirements in the 
quality framework (see Sect. 6.2). It is important to keep in mind that the number of 
requirements within each category and their level of details vary. We have not weighted 
the categories to adjust for this, and therefore the scores provide an indication of weak and 
strong aspects of the CORAS language. The highest possible average score for each topic 
within the categories is 3. 
Table 26 – Evaluation scores 
Category Must-requirements Should-requirements 
 Score # req. Avg. Score # req. Avg. 
- modeling perspectives  6 2 3  - -
- concepts 41,8 14 3  - -
Domain 
appropriateness:  
- symbols 30 10 3 9 3* 3
Participant language knowledge 
appropriateness 9 3 3  - -
Knowledge externalizability appropriateness 8 3 2,7 1  1 1
- internal representation  18 7* 2,3  - -Comprehensibility 
appropriateness:  - external representation 17 6* 2,8 8 3 2,7
Technical actor interpretation appropriateness 3 1 3 3  1 3
Organizational appropriateness 8 3 2,7  - -
"# req." denotes the number of requirements 
"-" means no requirements of this kind 
* requirements were omitted, see Appendix H for details 
As we can see from the scores, the CORAS language is judged to have maximum 
appropriateness factor for being used during security analyses (domain appropriateness). 
This means that it has all the required modeling perspectives, and includes the necessary 
concepts and symbols related to the security analysis domain.  
The CORAS language is also perceived as easy to learn and understand based on the users’ 
familiarity with other modeling languages (participant language knowledge 
appropriateness). Its resemblance with use cases and fault trees makes it easy to understand 
for new users, even though they are not familiar with the notation.  
Due to its already existing tool support and its formal, textual syntax, it has a high 
appropriateness factor for computerized tools (technical actor interpretation 
appropriateness).
There is however some aspects that still can be further improved, mainly related to 
comprehensibility appropriateness, the language’s ability to express all security related 
scenarios (knowledge externalizability appropriateness) and its appropriateness for various 
types of organizations (organizational appropriateness). 
The comprehensibility appropriateness of the internal representation of the language (its 
concepts and relationships between these) received the lowest score. As the investigations 
of security analysis terminology has shown, there are terms that are more difficult than 
other terms, for example risk and frequency measures (See details in Appendices A and B).
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On the other hand, these findings are not found to the same extent in the realistic settings 
of the field trials. Based on this we have reasons to believe that the artificial setting of the 
questionnaires influences the results, and that the concepts in fact are better understood 
than the initial investigations indicate. The language have been found to deviate from the 
requirement of using general rather than specialized concepts since threat is specialized 
into human or non-human threats, and human threats are either categorized as having 
deliberate origin or accidental (i.e. sabotage or blunder). This decision was made from a 
usability point of view, since the threat concept was found too general to comprehend for 
novices to security analysis and it was necessary to bring it down to a more pragmatic 
level. This is an example of where one of the general requirements in the quality evaluation 
requirement conflicts with requirements that should ensure understandability. 
The criticism regarding the comprehensibility appropriateness of the external 
representation of the CORAS language is valid for almost all modeling notations (UML 
included) and is related to drawing aesthetically pleasing models. When the CORAS 
diagrams grow in size they can easily become cluttered and difficult to read. One may 
avoid this by dividing the diagrams into smaller and more manageable pieces of 
information. Crossing lines may also be a problem, for example from treatment to treated 
entity, unwanted incident to assets or from threat to threat scenarios. This means that the 
modeler relies on experience to know when the maximum level of tolerable complexity in 
a diagram is reached, and a splitting is necessary. 
The main difficulty of achieving full score in knowledge externalizability appropriateness 
is related to the brainstorming setting and its free and creative nature. Since it is highly 
recommended to document the findings from the brainstorming immediately, preferably by 
modeling it "on-the-fly", it sets high demands to the analysis secretary. The secretary has 
to actively model new information, change and update existing models during the entire 
brainstorming session. The language receives top score for all the must requirements in this 
section, but not entirely the one that says modeling should be easy to conduct as part of the 
work task. The quality requirement is defined from a general modeling language point of 
view, and does not take into account the special modeling situation in a security analysis. 
This means that it may have to be interpreted in a slightly different manner, and assuming 
the modeler has been provided sufficiently tool support, the requirement may in fact be 
sufficiently fulfilled. 
One of the requirements for organizational appropriateness is that the language must help 
the organization to achieve its goals, which in a security analysis setting means controlling 
its security risks. In order to validate this requirement one should monitor the organization 
before and after the introduction of the CORAS language, but since this is beyond the 
scope of our work, the requirement is considered sufficiently supported, but not fully 
supported. Such an evaluation may be a subject of future work. We have however found it 
to ease the explanation of security risks within the organization, and this is an important 
aspect of the process of controlling risks. 
The low score on knowledge externalizability appropriateness for the should-requirements 
is related to expressing event trees. Should-requirements are not that important to the 
language quality, but more of the type "nice-to-have". Although event tree is an important 
technique within security analysis, it requires additional constructs beyond the current 
syntax of the CORAS language. The intention or meaning of event trees can however be 
expressed, but then in a form that does not look like traditional event tree notation. 
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9.4 Threats to the Validity of the Evaluations 
This section summarizes the main weaknesses of the evaluations of the CORAS language. 
9.4.1 The Validity of the Design Investigation 
In this section, we describe the main threats to validity of the investigation of graphical 
preferences from Sect. 9.1 (details in Appendix G). First, the diagrams we used were less 
detailed and complex than real diagrams, but more than just examples of notation. Real 
risk and threat diagrams contain more descriptive text, and this additional text might make 
the text labels less visible. This weakness is difficult to avoid, and we should therefore 
validate our findings by testing them in real threat diagrams in a future field trial.  
In this design investigation, we included several alternative representations addressing a 
selection of security analysis modeling challenges. It would be both interesting and useful 
to test also other aspects and modeling alternatives, but we had to limit the size of the 
material to increase the likelihood of it being completed and returned by the subjects.
The various modeling alternatives were tested on a population with considerable technical 
background. A background that is similar to that of most participants involved in security 
analyses and therefore considered a representative population. Nevertheless, it would have 
been useful to confirm our findings by testing them on a group with less technical and 
more management related background.  
Since the experiment material was distributed by email we could not control how the 
subjects chose to fill in the questionnaire (helping facilities, time spent etc.). We do not 
believe this affected the overall validity of the results since the subjects were asked to 
choose the alternatives they preferred, i.e. a completely subjective measure. 
The subjects received no other introduction to security analysis than the short background 
provided with the material. We do not know whether the results would have been different 
if the subjects had been familiar with security analysis. One of the success factors of the 
CORAS language is however that people without a background in modeling and security 
analysis may understand it. Therefore, we believe that it was a good idea to first test the 
language on this type of population, and rather test it on subjects with more competence on 
security risk analysis at a later occasion.
9.4.2 Strengths and Weaknesses Related to the Field Trials 
The SECURIS field trials took place in realistic settings and addressed real security issues 
within the organization of the client. The representatives of the client contributed to the 
diagrams by providing information during the brainstorming sessions, but leadership and 
modeling was the responsibility of the analysis team.  
A clear weakness of the field trials is how we have collected empirical data. The evaluation 
reports are based on the analysts’ opinions of how well the method, language and modeling 
tool worked (except for the Hydro-05 and Hydro-06 trials where the participants responded 
to questionnaires). From the Statnett-05 trial the client and the observers from the 
Norwegian Defense and Research Establishment (FFI) have summarized their experiences 
with the CORAS approach [9, 10]. This means that the evaluation involved a kind of "self-
evaluation" of our own method and language. To make this self-evaluation of the CORAS 
language as independent as possible, the author of the thesis did not participate in the 
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analysis team for the last three field trials. The limited number of hours available often 
made the analysis team choose between completing the analysis tasks and spending the 
client’s time on evaluation. When the aim of the field trials was to test CORAS in a 
realistic setting and deliver complete analysis results to the client (as if they had hired in a 
consultancy firm), the extent to which the client was involved in the evaluation part had to 
be reduced.
One of the points where we lack empirical support is related to how well the analysis 
documentation in form of CORAS models are understood by decision makers and others 
that receive the final analysis report. Within the scope of the SECURIS field trials there 
was no room for additional instigations beyond the actual security analyses, but this is 
subject to further work. 
9.4.3 Threats to the Validity of the Quality Framework Evaluation 
The quality framework evaluation consists of two parts, the core security risk scenarios and 
the quality requirement evaluation. 
The core security risk scenarios represent a typical security risk analysis based on our 
experience from several industrial field trials [22-24, 58]. The scenarios give a step-by-step 
example of the information that is expected to be identified during the analysis and how it 
can be modeled. This can be used to compare different analysis and modeling strategies 
like a "benchmarking test". The scenarios are influenced by analyses within various 
industrial sectors that all had different targets and scopes. They have been carefully defined 
to make them as general as possible, but also include the appropriate level of details. Later 
field trials have shown the need for AND-gates, but the scenarios do not include an 
example of this. If one chooses to revise the scenarios, this is suggested for inclusion. The 
core security scenarios can to some extent be modeled in different styles, depending on the 
preferences of the modeler. Deciding how well a modeling language expresses the 
scenarios is partly a subjective measure. One the one side, the modeling language should 
be able to express the main parts of the information gathered at each step in the analysis, 
but on the other side one has to ensure that the amount of details does not affect the 
readability of the diagrams.  
The quality framework SEQUAL has been developed for modeling languages in general. It 
has therefore been necessary to add several requirements that are specific to security risk 
analysis. One may claim that the set of extra requirements is incomplete or contains 
superfluous requirements, but at the time it was defined it seemed complete and well 
justified. Nevertheless, after two applications of the framework we have found some 
requirements to be overlapping, some are a bit irrelevant and some need a particular 
interpretation when applied to security analysis modeling languages (see Appendix H).
The quality evaluation framework has not been evaluated or tested by others than the 
author. Moreover, the second application of the framework was to evaluate a language 
made by the author. This is not sufficient to claim its validity as a general framework 
suitable for use by people unfamiliar with CORAS, SEQUAL and more. To support its 
validity, it should be tested by applying it to other security modeling languages, or at least 
use it for an independent evaluation of the CORAS language to see whether the results in 
Appendix H are confirmed. 
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10 Discussion 
This chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, Sect.10.1, we evaluate and discuss to 
what extent we have reached our research objectives. In the second part, Sect. 10.2, we 
outline alternative research directives and identify some interesting issues for further 
research.
10.1 Fulfilling the Success Criteria 
In Chapter 2, we characterized our research objectives in terms of success criteria. In the 
following, we investigate to what extent they have been fulfilled.
10.1.1 The First Success Criterion 
1. The work of this thesis should include a conceptual foundation for security analysis, 
that:
 a. specifies the main security analysis concepts and their relationships 
b. uses a terminology that is easy to understand 
c. uses a terminology that is in accordance with international standards 
d. is described in a simple and understandable manner 
e. provides a solid, underlying basis for a security risk modeling approach 
The sub criteria of the success criterion are supported as follows: 
1a) The main security analysis concepts and their relationships are defined in the 
conceptual model in Chapter 5. See Appendix A and Appendix B for the full 
documentation. 
1b) Many security and risk related concepts are used informally in English and other 
natural languages. To avoid misunderstandings we have conducted empirical investigations 
of how common people understand these concepts. We summarize the results of these in 
Chapter 5 and present the full details in Appendix A and Appendix B. These investigations 
have helped ensure that the conceptual foundation captures security analysis concepts in 
accordance with common understanding. The experience reports from five industrial field 
trials [20, 22, 40, 58, 132] in which the CORAS language and conceptual foundation have 
been used, indicate very few problems related to the concepts and relations between them 
(see also Chapter 9).
1c) The underlying foundation supports the CORAS security analysis method which 
follows the Australian/New Zealand Standard for Risk Management [6]. This standard has 
later been incorporated in the ISO17799/ISO27002 standard [82]. Terms specific to 
information security complies with the ISO/IEC13335 standard [76]. 
1d) The conceptual model in Chapter 5 is described using a simple UML 2.0 class 
diagram, and is accompanied with an explanatory example. 
1e) The conceptual foundation for the CORAS language may function as a basis for 
security risk modeling approaches that use concepts from the international standards that 
the definitions in our foundation are taken from. 
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10.1.2 The Second Success Criterion 
2. The work of this thesis should specify a language for describing security risks, that: 
 a. is suitable for use in structured brainstorming sessions  
b. is easily understandable for the participants in the brainstorming, including those 
who receive the analysis results afterwards 
c. has a precise syntax, meaning its design should be based on: 
  c.i best practice within information visualization 
c.ii experiences with realistic security risk scenarios  
c.iii users’ preferences 
c.iv existing risk modeling techniques 
 d. has a structured semantics that translates arbitrary diagrams into English 
e. supports and documents the different steps in the security analysis process 
The sub criteria of the success criterion are supported as follows: 
2a) The CORAS method is based on extensive use of structured brainstorming. The 
CORAS language has been designed for use in workshops where the diagrams are modeled 
"on-the-fly". Since the language may be used in high level as well as more detailed 
analyses, the diagrams may be extended with more information as the analysis progresses.  
In the industrial field trials [20, 22, 40, 58, 132] we have often received positive feedback 
with respect to the suitability of the CORAS language in brainstorming sessions. For 
instance, the client in the Statnett-05 field trial stated that the language was of high value 
when conducting threat and vulnerability assessments of complex ICT systems [9]. More 
evidence from the field trial evaluations supporting the fulfillment of this sub criterion is 
found in Sect. 9.2.2. 
2b) The language has been judged easy to understand by participants in several field trials. 
Statements supporting this are provided in Sect. 9.2.2. According to one of the participants 
in the Hydro-05 trial, the language is considered to be a good way of visualizing threat 
scenarios and very suitable for presentation. We lack empirical data on how the CORAS 
models are understood by decision makers and others that read the final report, and this is 
suggested for further work. 
2c) The graphical and textual syntaxes of the CORAS language are summarized in Chapter
8, and defined in detail in Appendix D. 
2c.i) The empirical investigation summarized in Sect. 9.1 tested several different syntax 
alternatives adhering to best practice within information visualization, to identify the most 
suitable way of capturing relevant aspects syntactically. We built heavily on the results 
form these in the selection of concrete syntax. A professional, graphical designer has 
designed the icons with the aim to match the concepts they symbolize in an intuitive 
manner. For instance, we emphasized that the icons should be easily discriminated, both in 
color and in black/white print. 
2c.ii) The syntax has evolved in order to handle the security analysis scenarios we have 
encountered in the field trials. The core security risk scenarios defined in Chapter 6 are 
inspired by experiences from the field trials [22-24, 58], and as argued in Appendix H the 
CORAS language is well suited to capture these. Based on this, and experiences from the 
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field trials [20, 22, 40, 58, 132] we claim that the CORAS language can handle realistic 
security risk scenarios. 
2c.iii) During the entire development of the CORAS language, we have had a strong focus 
on user preferences. The underlying foundation, on which the language builds, was defined 
to meet the users’ intuitive understanding of the terminology (see investigations in Sect. 
5.2). The decision on whether to use special risk related graphical icons was based on 
empirical investigations involving users (see investigation in Sect. 5.3). The final decisions 
regarding the concrete syntax were based on the results from the empirical investigation 
described in Sect. 9.1 which also focused on users. 
2c.iv) The development has been inspired of well-known risk analysis techniques like fault 
trees and event trees (often called cause-consequence diagrams when put together). Since 
we identified the need for tree-like graphs with multiple top events (not allowed in fault 
trees) we could not adapt the fault tree notation completely. The intention of event trees 
may also be described. If one needs to express fault trees we have included the 
characteristic AND/OR gates from this notation. The inclusion of these operators is a result 
from the empirical investigation described in Sect. 9.1. 
2d) The semantics of the CORAS language facilitates a schematic translation of any 
diagram into a paragraph in English (Sect. 8.1.3 and 8.1.4, full details in Appendix D). The 
semantics translates a diagram in two steps: (1) from the graphical syntax to the 
corresponding textual syntax, (2) from the textual syntax into corresponding sentences in 
English. The semantics is structured in the sense that we may translate each vertex and 
each relation separately. The meaning of a diagram as a whole is the set of sentences one 
gets from applying the semantic mapping to its vertices and relations. 
2e) The modeling language offers customized diagrams for each step of the security 
analysis. Which kind of diagram that is suited for each step is described in the modeling 
guideline in Chapter 8, including detailed modeling instructions. Compared to traditional 
documentation techniques, which are mainly based on the use of tables that are filled in 
manually, the CORAS language is based on the vision that the users should concentrate on 
the graphical modeling of threat scenarios and let a tool extract the relevant information 
and automatically fill in tables. Field trial evaluation reports support the CORAS 
language’s appropriateness for documenting the process in this manner (Chapter 9).
10.1.3 The Third Success Criterion 
3. This thesis work should provide a modeling guideline for the modeler, that: 
 a. is rich and detailed with realistic examples 
b. addresses non-experienced modelers 
c. has recommendations based on user experiences 
d. follows the security analysis process step by step 
The sub criteria of the success criterion are supported as follows: 
3a) The guideline provides an example-driven introduction to the CORAS method and 
CORAS language. The example addresses a security analysis of the same kind as those we 
have experience from in the field trials. In this example, we follow the analysis process 
from the start until the end. The guideline has been extended and revised several times 
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based on the experience reports [20, 22, 40, 58, 132], and practical recommendations has 
been included (Sect. 8.2.6). 
3b) We have designed the guideline to address non-experienced modelers and statements 
found in the experience reports indicate that it really does (see Sect. 9.2.3). More recently, 
we have updated the guideline with an additional section (Sect. 8.2.6) containing 
recommendations, tips and hints based on experiences from practical use.  
3c) The development of the guideline has been driven by experiences from the industrial 
field trials. From the experience reports we have gathered recommendations, tips and hints 
and included them into the guideline (see Sect. 9.2 and Sect. 8.2.6). 
3d) The guideline in Chapter 8 is structured according to the steps in a security analysis 
process. It describes the purpose of, and the expected outcome from each step, including 
detailed modeling instructions. The guideline also suggests which roles that should be 
present from the client’s side at each meeting or workshop.  
10.1.4 The Fourth Success Criterion 
4. This thesis work should provide a framework for evaluating the quality of security risk 
modeling approaches, that:
 a. covers quality requirements related to modeling languages in general 
b. includes quality requirements special to security risk analysis 
c. includes a modeling test case representing core security risk scenarios 
The quality evaluation framework defined in Chapter 6 was first applied to evaluate the 
UML profile [124] and then to evaluate the CORAS language (Appendix H). The 
evaluations have provided a good overview of the strengths and weaknesses of both 
languages. The sub criteria of this success criterion are supported as follows: 
4a) To ensure the inclusion of quality requirements relevant to modeling languages we 
have used the quality framework SEQUAL [100-104] as a basis when defining the quality 
requirements (see Chapter 6). SEQUAL provides a set of general requirements that any 
modeling language should fulfill.  
4b) In addition to the quality requirements from SEQUAL, we have added requirements 
aiming to capture the specific needs of the security analysis domain. These are related to 
security analysis concepts and the relevant modeling needs identified through the industrial 
field trials. 
4c) The quality evaluation framework also includes a realistic modeling test case (the core 
security risk scenarios) to ensure its practical usefulness. The core security risk scenarios 
are inspired of the analysis topics addressed in the DNV-04 [23], NetCom-04 [24], 
Statnett-05 [58] and Hydro-05 [22] field trials. These analyses are of course confidential, 
but they provided good indications regarding the complexity of the information gathered in 
a security analysis. They also increased our awareness of the challenges posed to a security 
risk modeling language. By embedding these experiences into general security related 
problems, relevant to any modern business organization, we ensured the relevance of the 
core security risk scenarios. The core security risk scenarios are used as a benchmarking 
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test with respect to the expressive power of the language, its modeling ease, elegance and 
more.
10.2 Things We Could Have Done Differently and Future 
Work
The research method we have used and the design we ended up with requires many choices 
on our behalf. In this section, we account for various alternative strategies and solutions 
and explain why we did not select them. We distinguish between strategies and solutions 
related to the design of our artifacts and strategies for evaluation. We also indicate some 
issues for future research. 
10.2.1 Strategies and Solutions Related to Design 
We believe one should adhere to international standards when defining risk related 
concepts for inclusion in the language. However, this does not ensure that these concepts 
match intuition. In our work, we particular experienced this kind of problem in relation to 
the concept asset. We believe it would have been fruitful to work more on the explanations 
related to asset identification; in particular develop more detailed guidelines for how to 
conduct the asset identification step of the analysis. The guidelines should focus on 
describing how to identify the "correct" assets, how to ensure that they are kept at the right 
level of abstraction, and how to define suitable consequence scales. We know this is one of 
the most difficult parts of the CORAS method, and it should be subject to further work.
Deciding upon, and designing the graphical icons for the language depends on two main 
tasks, first selecting a concept that represents the term, and second designing a graphical 
icon that represents the concept. For some of the terms we had problems in finding 
alternative concepts that could represent the term (e.g. vulnerability was difficult), whereas 
other terms were more straightforward (e.g. asset may be represented as monetary values). 
A professional designer made 1-3 alternative graphical icons for each concept, and we 
selected the one we felt represented the term best (for example for the asset we selected the 
moneybag icon over the coin and the gold barrel). Due to limited financial resources, it 
was not possible to have the icons tested on a broader test group in for instance an 
empirical study. It is quite expensive to hire a graphical designer, and the project could 
only fund one design iteration for the graphical icons. We are not aware of other concepts 
and icons that may represent the terms better, but cannot exclude that such exist. 
A concept that may be included in future versions of CORAS (in the conceptual 
foundation, modeling language and guideline) is the notion of "barriers". Barriers represent 
existing security mechanisms in the target that have been implemented to reduce the 
likelihood of threat scenarios and unwanted incidents (e.g. a firewall is a barrier). Barriers 
may also be implemented to reduce the consequences of potential unwanted incidents. The 
concept of barriers can be very useful in the process of estimating risks. If the target has 
several strong barriers, the likelihood of unwanted incidents is reduced, whereas weak or 
non-existent barriers means that unwanted incidents are more likely to happen. One may 
also judge the strengths of the barriers by classifying them into different categories 
according to type. An "organizational barrier" in the form of a written security policy is 
weaker than a physically separated network, which represents a "physical barrier". A 
"symbolic barrier", in the form of a pop-up message that warns the user when he/she 
connects to an unsecured wireless network, is stronger than a policy against using 
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unsecured networks (organizational barrier), but weaker than a physical barrier that makes 
it impossible to access unsecured networks. 
The current version of the CORAS approach provides little support for combining results 
from different analyses (for instance, analyses of two components of the same system). 
This kind of modularity might for example reduce the effort related to keeping an analysis 
documentation updated, since only the part where a change has been made needs to be re-
analyzed. This has not been within the scope of our work, but ongoing research [21] is 
investigating this problem, and this may in the future result in new versions of the CORAS 
approach.
To facilitate more advanced tool-based support, a semantics based on translating to 
paragraphs in English, may not be sufficiently precise. A more precise semantics is 
necessary, particularly with respect to developing automatic analysis functions: 
x From field trials, we know that there is a need for automatic computation of likelihood 
values of unwanted incidents.
x In treatment identification there is a need for functions that help choosing the optimal 
combination of treatments. These should be optimal with respect to risk level, costs, 
efficiency and more. This will require a more detailed specification of each treatment 
than the current version of the CORAS approach offers.
x The risk evaluation diagrams should be generated automatically based on the risk 
diagrams and the risk acceptance levels. This will also allow for an investigation of 
how an adjustment of the risk acceptance levels will affect the overall risk picture.  
The development of a sufficiently precise semantics for such purposes has however, not 
been within the scope of our work, but is a subject for further work. 
10.2.2 Strategies for Evaluation 
The project context and setting of the industrial field trials required us to conduct security 
analysis according to the CORAS method in a professional manner, resembling 
commercial analyses. This was a prerequisite for involvement by many of the industrial 
partners. This of course, ensured that the CORAS method was tested in realistic settings, 
but unfortunately it also restricted our possibilities to explore different modeling and 
analysis strategies. It would for instance been interesting to analyze the same system twice 
for the same client, one using the CORAS language and one using their own approach to 
see the differences. There are of course a number of practical and economical 
considerations related to this kind of experiments. Amongst others, the client would have 
to provide two sets of participants with similar competence (often very difficult in practice) 
and the time they spend on the second analysis might have to be compensated financially. 
To improve the guideline further, it would be interesting to test it on users without previous 
background in CORAS and get them to report their experiences. Within our research 
project, there have not been resources to carry out this kind of test.
One of the points where we lack empirical support is related to how well the 
documentation in the form of models in the security analysis reports are understood by 
decision makers and others who are supposed to make use of the results and 
recommendations. This has much to do with the confidentiality aspects of the analyses. 
One way we may test this is to have the client pointing out a trusted person within its 
organization, who have no previous knowledge of the analysis, and have him/her to read 
the analysis report. The analysis team could then interview this person to see whether the 
10 – Discussion 
A graphical approach to security risk analysis 139
diagrams were understood. It would also be interesting to revisit the client after some time, 
to see how the findings of the analysis have had consequences for the organization. This 
has however not been possible within the setting of our work, but may be considered in the 
future.
The structured semantics has only been tested by the developers. An interesting experiment 
would be to have one student group translating a set of diagrams into sentences in English, 
and then have a different group modeling these textual descriptions back to diagrams. By 
doing this, one could explore whether some information is lost in the translation. If so, it 
means that there is some information in the diagrams that is not captured by the semantics. 
This could for instance be the order or the placement of elements in the diagram. 
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